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OF  MODERN  KNOWLEDGE 

No.  82 

Editors : 

HERBERT    FISHER,  M.A.,  F.B.A. 
PROF.    GILBERT    MURRAY,    Lrrr.D., 

LL.D.,  F.B.A. 

PROF.  J.  ARTHUR    THOMSON,  M.A. 
PROF.  WILLIAM   T.  BREWSTER,  M.A, 


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THE     PAPACY    AND     MODERN 

TIMES By  WILLIAM  BARRY 

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(1865-1912) By  PAUL  L.  HA  WORTH 

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ANCIENT  GREECE By  GILBERT  MURRAY 

A  SHORT  HISTORY  OF  RUSSIA  By   PAUL    MILYOUKOV 

FRANCE  OF  TO-DAY By  M.  ALBERT  THOMAS 

THE  REFORMATION By  PRINCIPAL  LINDSAY 

ANCIENT    EGYPT By  F.  L.  GRIFFITH 

THE    ANCIENT    EAST By  D.  G.  HOGARTH 

MODERN  TURKEY By  D.   G.  HOGARTH 

THE   BYZANTINE    EMPIRE      .    .   By  N.    H.    BAYNES 
HISTORY    OF    SCOTLAND    .    .    .   By  R.   S.   RAIT 
ALPINE  EXPLORATION      ...  By  ARNOLD  LUNN 


THE  WARS  BETWEEN 

ENGLAND  AND 

AMERICA 

BY 

THEODORE    CLARKE    SMITH 

PROFESSOR  OF  AMERICAN    HISTORY  IN    WILLIAMS  COLLEGE 


NEW   YORK 
HENRY   HOLT  AND    COMPANY 

LONDON 
WILLIAMS   AND    NORGATE 


COPYRIGHT,  1914, 

BY 

HENRY   HOLT  AND    COMPANY 


THE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS,  CAMBRIDGE,   U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

THE  purpose  of  this  volume  is  to  show  how 
social,  economic  and  political  causes  led  to  a 
period  of  almost  continuous  antagonism 
between  England  and  the  American  com 
munities  from  1763  to  the  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  of  Ghent  in  1815.  The  war  of  Ameri 
can  Independence,  1775-1783,  and  the  war 
of  1812-1815  give  their  names  to  the  book, 
not  because  of  their  military  or  naval  im 
portance,  but  because  they  mark,  in  each 
case,  the  outcome  of  successive  years  of  un 
availing  efforts  on  the  part  of  each  country 
to  avoid  bloodshed.  With  this  aim  in  view, 
no  more  detailed  study  of  the  internal  po 
litical  history  or  institutions  of  either  country 
can  be  included  than  is  necessary  to  account 
for  different  political  habits,  nor  can  the 
events  of  diplomatic  history  be  developed 
beyond  what  is  called  for  to  explain  persist 
ent  lines  of  action  or  the  conclusion  of  a 
significant  treaty. 

THEODORE  CLARKE  SMITH. 

WlLLIAMSTOWN,  MASS. 

April,  1914 


CONTENTS 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I   ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM,  1763 9 

II   THE  CONTEST  OVER   PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION, 

1763-1773 28 

III  THE  DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE,  1773-1776      .       50 

IV  THE  CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE,  1776-1778      .       75 

V  FRENCH   INTERVENTION  AND  BRITISH    FAILURE, 

1778-1781 96 

VI  ENGLISH  PARTIES  AND  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE, 

1778-1783 113 

VII   THE  FORMATION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  1781- 

1793 129 

VIII   THE  FIRST  PERIOD  OF  COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM, 

1783-1795 148 

IX  THE  TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY  IN  THE  UNITED 

STATES,  1795-1805 168 

X  THE  SECOND   PERIOD  OF   COMMERCIAL  ANTAGO 
NISM,  1805-1812 188 

XI  THE  WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS"  AND  WEST 
WARD  EXPANSION,  1812-15 215 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

XII   THE  END  OF  THE  YEARS  OF  ANTAGONISM,  1812- 

1815 236 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 249 

INDEX  .  0*0 


THE  WARS 

BETWEEN 

ENGLAND  AND  AMERICA 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM,    1763 

IN  1763,  by  the  Peace  of  Paris,  England 
won  a  position  of  unapproached  supremacy 
in  colonial  possessions  and  in  naval  strength. 
The  entire  North  American  continent  east 
of  the  Mississippi  River  was  now  under  the 
English  flag,  and  four  West  India  sugar  is 
lands  were  added  to  those  already  in  English 
hands.  In  India  the  rivalry  of  the  French 
was  definitely  crushed  and  the  control  of  the 
revenues  and  fortunes  of  the  native  poten 
tates  was  transferred  to  the  East  India  com 
pany.  Guided  by  the  genius  of  Pitt,  British 
armies  had  beaten  French  in  Germany  and 
America,  and  British  fleets  had  conquered 
French  and  Spanish  with  complete  ease. 
The  power  of  the  empire  seemed  beyond  chal 
lenge.  Yet  within  this  empire  itself  there  lay 
already  the  seeds  of  a  discord  which  was  soon 
to  develop  into  an  irrepressible  contest,  lead 
ing  to  civil  war;  then,  for  a  generation,  to 
9 


AMERICAN  WARS 

drive  the  separated  parts  into  renewed  an 
tagonism  and  finally  to  cause  a  second  war. 
Between  the  North  American  colonies  and  the 
mother  country  there  existed  such  moral,  poli 
tical  and  economic  divergence  that  nothing  but 
prudent  and  patient  statesmanship  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  could  prevent  disaster. 

The  fundamental  source  of  antagonism  lay 
in  the  fact  that  the  thirteen  colonies  had  de 
veloped  a  wholly  different  social  and  political 
life  from  that  of  the  mother  country.  Origi 
nally  the  prevailing  ideas  and  habits  of  the 
colonists  and  of  the  Englishmen  who  re 
mained  at  home  had  been  substantially  the 
same.  In  England,  as  in  America,  the  gentry 
and  middle  classes  played  a  leading  part  dur 
ing  the  years  from  1600  to  1660.  But  by 
1763  England,  under  the  Hanoverian  kings, 
had  become  a  state  where  all  political  and 
social  power  had  been  gathered  into  the 
hands  of  a  landed  aristocracy  which  domi 
nated  the  government,  the  Church  and  the 
professions.  In  parliament  the  House  of 
Commons, — once  the  body  which  reflected 
the  conscious  strength  of  the  gentry  and 
citizens, — had  now  fallen  under  the  control  of 
the  peers,  owing  to  the  decayed  condition  of 
scores  of  ancient  parliamentary  boroughs. 
Nearly  one-third  of  the  seats  were  actually 
or  substantially  owned  by  noblemen,  and  of 
the  remainder  a  majority  were  venal,  the 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       11 

close  corporations  of  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
selling  freely  their  right  to  return  two  mem 
bers  at  each  parliamentary  election.  In 
addition,  the  influence  and  prestige  of  the 
great  landowners  were  so  powerful  that  even 
in  the  counties  and  in  those  boroughs  where 
the  number  of  electors  was  considerable, 
none  but  members  of  the  ruling  class  sought 
election.  So  far  as  the  members  of  the  middle 
class  were  concerned, — the  merchants,  master 
weavers,  iron  producers  and  craftsmen,— 
they  were  strong  in  wealth  and  their  wishes 
counted  heavily  with  the  'aristocracy  in  all 
legislation  of  a  financial  or  commercial  nature; 
but  of  actual  part  in  the  government  they  had 
none.  As  for  the  lower  classes, — the  labor 
ers,  tenant  farmers  and  shopkeepers, — they 
were  able  as  a  rule  to  influence  government 
only  by  rioting  and  uproar.  Without  the 
ballot,  they  had  no  other  way. 

Owing  to  the  personal  weakness  of  succes 
sive  monarchs  since  the  death  of  William  III, 
there  had  grown  up  the  cabinet  system  of 
government  which,  in  1763,  meant  the  reduc 
tion  of  the  King  to  the  position  of  an  honorary 
figurehead  and  the  actual  control  of  offices, 
perquisites,  patronage  and  preferment,  as  well 
as  the  direction  of  public  policy,  by  the  leaders 
of  parliamentary  groups.  The  King  was 
obliged  to  select  his  ministers  from  among 
the  members  of  noble  families  in  the  Lords  or 


12    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Commons,  who  agreed  among  themselves  after 
elaborate  bargains  and  negotiations  upon  the 
formation  of  cabinets  and  the  distribution  of 
honors.  In  this  way  sundry  great  Whig 
family  "connexions,"  as  they  were  called, 
had  come  to  monopolize  all  political  power, 
excluding  Tories,  or  adherents  of  the  Stuarts, 
and  treating  government  as  solely  a  matter 
of  aristocratic  concern.  Into  this  limited 
circle  a  poor  man  could  rise  only  by  making 
himself  useful  through  his  talents  or  his  elo 
quence  to  one  of  the  ruling  cliques,  and  the 
goal  of  his  career  was  naturally  a  peerage. 

The  weakness  of  this  system  of  government 
by  family  connection  lay  in  its  thorough  de 
pendence  upon  customs  of  patronage  and 
perquisite.  The  English  public  offices  were 
heavily  burdened  with  lucrative  sinecures, 
which  were  used  in  the  factional  contests  to 
buy  support  in  Parliament,  as  were  also  peer 
ages,  contracts  and  money  bribes.  When 
George  III  ascended  the  throne,  in  1760,  he 
found  the  most  powerful  minister  in  the  cabi 
net  to  be  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  whose  sole 
qualification,  apart  from  his  birth,  was  his 
preeminent  ability  to  handle  patronage  and 
purchase  votes.  That  such  a  system  did  not 
ruin  England  was  due  to  the  tenacity  and 
personal  courage  of  this  aristocracy  and  to 
its  use  of  parliamentary  methods,  whereby 
the  orderly  conduct  of  legislation  and  taxa- 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       13 

tion  and  the  habit  of  public  attack  and  de 
fence  of  government  measures  furnished 
political  training  for  the  whole  ruling  class. 
Furthermore  the  absence  of  any  sharp  caste 
lines  made  it  possible  for  them  to  turn,  in 
times  of  crisis,  to  such  strong-fibred  and  mas 
terful  commoners  as  Walpole  and  Pitt,  each 
of  whom,  in  his  way,  saved  the  country  from 
the  incompetent  hands  of  titled  ministries. 

This  system,  moreover,  rested  in  1763  on 
the  aquiescence  of  practically  all  Englishmen; 
It  was  accepted  by  middle  and  lower  classes 
alike  as  normal  and  admirable,  and  only  a 
small  body  of  radicals  felt  called  upon  to 
criticise  the  exclusion  of  the  mass  of  tax 
payers  from  a  share  in  the  government.  Pitt, 
in  Parliament,  was  ready  to  proclaim  a  na 
tional  will  as  something  distinct  from  the 
voice  of  the  borough-owners,  but  he  had  few 
followers.  Only  in  London  and  a  few  coun 
ties  did  sundry  advocates  of  parliamentary 
reform  strive  in  the  years  after  1763  to 
emphasize  these  views  by  organizing  the 
freemen  to  petition  and  to  "instruct"  their 
representatives  in  the  Commons.  Natu 
rally  such  desires  evoked  nothing  but  con 
tempt  and  antipathy  in  the  great  majority 
of  Englishmen.  Especially  when  they  be 
came  audible  in  the  mouths  of  rioters  did 
they  appear  revolutionary  and  obnoxious 
to  the  lovers  of  peace,  good  order  and  the 


14    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

undisturbed  'collection  of  rents  and  taxes. 
Nothing  but  a  genuine  social  revolution 
could  bring  such  ideas  to  victory  and  that, 
in  1763,  lay  very  far  in  the  future.  For  the 
time  conservatism  reigned  supreme. 

In  the  thirteen  colonies,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  communities  of  middle-class  Englishmen 
who  emigrated  in  the  seventeenth  century 
had  developed  nothing  resembling  a  real 
aristocracy.  Social  distinctions,  modelled 
on  those  of  the  old  country,  remained  be 
tween  the  men  of  large  wealth, — such  as 
the  great  landed  proprietors  in  New  York 
and  the  planters  in  the  South,  or  the  success 
ful  merchants  in  New  England  and  the 
Middle  colonies, — and  the  small  farmers,  shop 
keepers  and  fishermen,  who  formed  the  bulk 
of  the  population,  while  all  of  these  joined 
in  regarding  the  outlying  frontiersmen  as 
elements  of  society  deserving  of  small  con 
sideration.  Men  of  property,  education  and 
"position"  exercised  a  distinct  leadership  in 
public  and  private  life.  Yet  all  this  remained 
purely  social;  for  in  law  no  such  thing  as  an 
aristocracy  could  be  found,  and  in  govern 
ment  the  colonies  had  grown  to  be  very 
nearly  republican.  Here  lay  the  fundamental 
distinction  between  the  England  and  the 
America  of  1763.  In  America  a  title  or 
peerage  conferred  no  political  rights  what 
ever;  these  were  founded  in  every  case  on 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       15 

law,  on  a  royal  charter  or  a  royal  commis 
sion  which  established  a  frame  of  govern 
ment,  and  were  based  on  moderate  property 
qualifications  which  admitted  a  majority  of 
adult  males  to  the  suffrage  and  to  office. 

In  every  colony  the  government  consisted 
of  a  governor,  a  council  and  an  assembly  rep 
resenting  the  freenfen.  This  body,  by  charter, 
or  royal  instructions,  had  the  full  right  to 
impose  taxes  and  vote  laws,  and,  although  its 
acts  were  liable  to  veto  by  the  governor,  or 
by  the  Crown  through  the  Privy  Council,  it 
possessed  the  actual  control  of  political  power. 
This  it  derived  immediately  from  its  con 
stituents  and  not  from  any  patrons,  lords  or 
close  corporations.  Representation  and  the 
popular  will  were,  in  fact,  indissolubly  united. 

The  governor,  in  two  colonies,  Connecticut 
and  Rhode  Island,  was  chosen  by  the  free 
men.  Elsewhere  he  was  appointed  by  an 
outside  authority;  in  Pennsylvania,  Dela 
ware  and  Maryland  by  the  hereditary  propri 
etor  to  whom  the  charter  had  been  granted, 
in  all  other  colonies  by  the  Crown.  The 
councillors,  who  commonly  exercised  judicial 
functions  in  addition  to  their  duties  as  the 
governor's  advisers  and  as  the  upper  house 
of  the  legislature,  were  appointed  in  all 
colonies  except  the  three  in  New  England; 
and  they  were  chosen  in  all  cases  from  among 
the  socially  prominent  colonists.  The  judges 


16    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

also  were  appointed  by  the  governor,  and 
they,  with  governor  and  council,  were  sup 
posed  to  represent  the  home  government  in 
the  colonies. 

But  in  reality  there  was  no  effective  im 
perial  control.  The  Crown,  it  is  true,  ap 
peared  to  have  large  powers.  It  granted 
charters,  established  provinces  by  commis 
sions,  exercised  the  right  to  annul  laws  and 
hear  appeals  from  colonial  decisions,  exacted 
reports  from  governors,  sent  instructions 
and  made  appointments  and  removals  at 
will.  But  nearly  all  the  colonial  officials,  ex 
cept  the  few  customs  officers,  were  paid  out 
of  colonial  appropriations,  and  this  one  fact 
sufficed  to  deprive  them  of  any  independent 
position.  In  nearly  every  colony,  the  as 
sembly,  in  the  course  of  two  thirds  of  a  cen 
tury  of  incessant  petty  conflict,  of  incessant 
wrangling  and  bargaining,  of  incessant  en 
croachments  on  the  nominal  legal  powers 
of  the  governor,  had  made  itself  master  of 
the  administration.  The  colonists  resisted 
all  attempts  to  direct  their  military  or  civil 
policy,  laid  only  such  taxes  as  they  chose, 
raised  only  such  troops  as  they  saw  fit, 
passed  only  such  laws  as  seemed  to  them 
desirable  and  tied  the  governor's  hands  by 
every  sort  of  device.  They  usurped  the  ap 
pointment  of  the  colonial  treasurer,  they 
appointed  committees  to  oversee  the  ex- 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       17 

penditure  of  sums  voted,  they  systematic 
ally  withheld  a  salary  from  the  governor,  in 
order  to  render  him  dependent  upon  annual 
"presents,"  liable  to  diminution  or  termi 
nation  in  case  he  did  not  suit  the  assembly's 
wishes.  The  history  of  the  years  from  1689 
to  1763  is  a  chronicle  of  continual  defeat  for 
governors  who  were  obliged  to  see  one  power 
after  another  wrenched  away  from  them. 
Under  the  circumstances  the  political  life 
of  the  thirteen  colonies  was  practically  re 
publican  in  character  and  was  as  marked  for 
its  absence  of  administrative  machinery  as 
.  the  home  government  was  for  its  aristocracy 
and  centralization. 

Another  feature  of  colonial  life  tended  to 
accentuate  this  difference.  Although  re 
ligion  had  ceased  to  be  a  political  question 
and  the  English  Church  was  no  longer  re 
garded,  save  in  New  England,  as  dangerous 
to  liberty,  still  the  fact  that  the  great  ma 
jority  of  the  colonists  were  dissenters, — Con 
gregational,  Presbyterian  or  Reformed,  with 
a  considerable  scattering  of  Baptists  and 
other  sects, — had  an  effect  on  the  attitude  of 
the  people  toward  England.  In  the  home 
country  the  controlling  social  classes  ac 
cepted  the  established  church  as  part  of  the 
constitution;  but  in  the  colonies  it  had  small 
strength,  and  even  where  it  was  by  law  es 
tablished  it  remained  little  more  than  an 


18    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

official  body,  the  "Governor's  church." 
This  tended  to  widen  the  gap  between  the 
political  views  of  the  individualistic  dissent 
ing  and  Puritan  sects  in  the  colonies  and  the 
people  at  home. 

The  American  of  1763  was  thus  a  different 
kind  of  man  from  the  Englishman.  As  a 
result  of  the  divergent  development  on  the 
two  sides  of  the  Atlantic  from  a  common 
ancestry,  their  political  habits  had  become 
mutually  incomprehensible.  To  the  English 
man  the  rule  of  the  nobility  was  normal — the 
ideal  political  system.  He  was  content,  if  a 
commoner,  with  the  place  assigned  him.  To 
the  colonist,  on  the  other  hand,  government 
in  which  the  majority  of  adult  male  inhabi 
tants  possessed  the  chief  power  was  the  only 
valid  form, — all  others  were  vicious.  Patriot 
ism  meant  two  contradictory  things.  The 
Englishman's  patriotism  was  sturdy  but  un- 
enthusiastic,  and  showed  itself  almost  as 
much  in  a  contempt  for  foreigners  as  in 
complacency  over  English  institutions.  The 
colonist,  on  the  contrary,  had  a  double  allegi 
ance:  one  conventional  and  traditional,  to 
the  British  crown;  the  other  a  new,  intensely 
local  and  narrow  attachment  to  his  province. 
England  was  still  the  "old  home,"  looked  to 
as  the  source  of  political  authority,  of  man 
ners  and  literature.  It  was  for  many  of 
the  residents  their  recent  abode  and,  for  all 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       19 

except  a  few  of  Dutch,  German  or  French 
extraction,  their  ancestral  country.  But 
already  this  "loyalty"  on  the  part  of  the 
colonists  was  dwindling  into  something  more 
sentimental  than  real.  The  genuine  local 
patriotism  of  the  colonists  was  shown  by 
their  persistent  struggle  against  the  repre 
sentatives  of  English  authority  in  the  gover 
nors'  chairs.  There  had  developed  in  Amer 
ica  a  new  sort  of  man,  an  "American,"  who 
wished  to  be  as  independent  of  government  as 
possible,  and  who,  while  professing  and  no 
doubt  feeling  a  general  loyalty  to  England, 
was  in  fact  a  patriot  of  his  own  colony. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  the 
colonists  entered  very  slightly  into  the 
thoughts  of  the  English  noblemen  and 
gentry.  They  were  regarded  in  a  highly 
practical  way,  without  a  trace  of  any  senti 
ment,  as  members  of  the  middle  and  lower 
classes,  not  without  a  large  criminal  admix 
ture,  who  had  been  helped  and  allowed  to 
build  up  some  unruly  and  not  very  admir 
able  communities.  Nor  did  the  English 
middle  classes  look  upon  the  colonists  with 
much ,  interest,  or  regard  them  as,  on  the 
whole,  their  equals.  The  prevailing  colonial 
political  habits,  as  seen  from  England,  sug 
gested  only  unwarrantable  wrangling  indica 
tive  of  political  incompetence  and  a  spirit 
of  disobedience.  Loyalty,  to  an  English- 


20    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

man,  meant  submission  to  the  law.  To  men 
trained  in  such  different  schools  words  did 
not  mean  the  same  thing.  The  time  had 
come  when  the  two  peoples  were  scarcely 
able  to  understand  each  other. 

A  second  cause  for  antagonism,  scarcely 
less  fundamental  and  destined  to  cause  equal 
irritation,  is  to  be  found  in  the  conflict  be 
tween  the  economic  life  of  the  American 
communities  and  the  beliefs  of  the  mother 
country  concerning  commercial  and  naval 
policy.  Great  Britain,  in  1763,  was  predomi 
nantly  a  trading  country.  Its  ships  carried 
goods  for  all  the  nations  of  Europe  and 
brought  imports  to  England  from  all  lands. 
Although  the  manufacturers  were  not  yet 
in  possession  of  the  new  inventions  which 
were  to  revolutionize  the  industries  of  the 
world,  they  were  active  and  prosperous  in 
their  domestic  production  of  hardware  and 
textiles,  and  they  furnished  cargoes  for  the 
shipowners  to  transport  to  all  quarters.  To 
these  two  great  interests  of  the  middle 
classes,  banking  and  finance  were  largely 
subsidiary.  Agriculture,  the  mainstay  of 
the  nobility  and  gentry,  continued  to  hold 
first  place  in  the  interests  of  the  governing 
classes,  but  the  importance  of  all  sources  of 
wealth  was  fully  recognized. 

In  the  colonies,  on  the  contrary,  manufac 
turing  scarcely  existed  beyond  the  domestic 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       21 

production  of  articles  for  local  use,  and  the 
inhabitants  relied  on  importations  for  nearly 
all  finished  commodities  and  for  all  luxuries. 
Their  products  were  chiefly  things  which 
England  could  not  itself  raise,  such  as  sugar 
in  the  West  Indies;  tobacco  from  the  islands 
and  the  southern  mainland  colonies;  indigo 
and  rice  from  Carolina;  furs,  skins,  masts, 
pine  products;  and, from  New  England,  above 
all,  fish.  The  natural  market  for  these 
articles  was  in  England  or  in  other  colonies, 
and  in  return  the  manufactures  of  England 
found  their  natural  market  in  the  new  com 
munities.  When  the  Economic  Revolution 
transformed  industry,  and  factories,  driven 
by  steam,  made  England  the  workshop  of  the 
world,  the  existing  tendency  for  England  to 
supply  America  with  manufactured  products 
was  intensified  regardless  of  the  political 
separation  of  the  two  countries.  Not  until 
later  economic  changes  supervened  was  this 
normal  relationship  altered. 

The  traditional  British  policy  in  1763  was 
that  of  the  so-called  Mercantile  System, 
which  involved  a  thoroughgoing  application 
of  the  principle  of  protection  to  the  British 
shipowner,  manufacturer  and  corn-grower 
against  any  competition.  An  elaborate  tariff, 
with  a  system  of  prohibitions  and  bounties, 
attempted  to  prevent  the  landowner  from 
being  undersold  by  foreign  corn,  and  the 


22    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

manufacturer  from  meeting  competition  from 
foreign  producers.  Navigation  acts  shut  out. 
foreign-built,  -owned  or  -manned  ships  from 
the  carrying  trade  between  any  region  but 
their  home  country  and  England,  reserving"  all 
other  commerce  for  British  vessels.  Into  this 
last  restriction  there  entered  another  purely 
political  consideration,  namely,  the  perpetu-v. 
ation  of  a  supply  of  mariners  for  the  British 
navy,  whose  importance  was  fully  recog 
nized.  So  far  as  the  colonies  were  concerned 
they  were  brought  within  the  scope  of  mer-^ 
cantilist  ideas  by  being  considered  as  sources 
of  supply  for  England  in  products  not  possible 
to  raise  at  home,  as  markets  which  must  be 
reserved  for  English  manufacturers  and 
traders,  and  as  places  which  must  not  be 
allowed  to  develop  any  rivalry  to  British  pro 
ducers.  Furthermore  they  were  so  situated 
that  by  proper  regulations  they  might  serve 
to  encourage  English  shipping  even  if  this 
involved  an  economic  loss. 

The  Navigation  Acts  accordingly,  from 
1660  to  1763,  endeavored  to  put  this  theory 
into  operation  and  excluded  all  foreign  ves 
sels  from  trading  with  the  colonies,  pro 
hibited  any  trade  to  the  colonies  except  from 
English  ports  and  enumerated  certain  com 
modities, — sugar,  cotton,  dye  woods,  indigo, 
rice,  furs, — which  could  be  sent  only  to  Eng 
land.  To  ensure  the  carrying  out  of  these 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       23 

laws  an  elaborate  system  of  ibonds  and  local 
duties  was  devised  and  customs  officers  were 
appointed,  resident  in  the  colonies,  while 
governors  were  obliged  to  take  oath  to  enforce 
the  acts.  As  time  revealed  defects  or  un 
necessary  stringencies,  the  restrictions  were 
frequently  modified.  The  Carolinas,  for 
instance,  were  allowed  to  ship  rice  not  only 
to  England  but  to  any  place  in  Europe  south 
of  Cape  Finisterre.  Bounties  were  estab 
lished  to  aid  the  production  of  tar  and  tur 
pentine,  but  special  acts  prohibited  the 
export  of  hats  from  the  colonies,  or  the  manu 
facture  of  rolled  iron,  in  order  to  check  a 
possible  source  of  competition  to  English 
producers.  In  short,  the  Board  of  Trade,  the 
administrative  body  charged  with  the  over 
sight  of  the  plantations,  devoted  its  energies 
to  suggesting  devices  which  should  aid  the 
colonists,  benefit  the  British  consumer  and 
producer  and  increase  "navigation." 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  Acts  of  Trade 
were,  in  general,  a  source  of  loss  to  the  colo 
nies.  Their  vessels  shared  in  the  privileges 
reserved  for  British-built  ships.  The  com 
pulsory  sending  of  the  enumerated  com 
modities  to  England  may  have  damaged  the 
tobacco-growers,  but  in  other  respects  it  did 
little  harm.  The  articles  would  have  gone 
to  England  anyway.  The  restriction  of  im 
portation  to  goods  from  England  was  no 


24    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

great  grievance,  since  English  products  would, 
in  any  case,  have  supplied  the  American 
market.  Even  the  effort,  by  an  act  of  1672, 
to  check  intercolonial  trade  in  enumerated 
commodities  was  not  oppressive,  for,  with 
one  exception  noted  below,  there  was  no 
great  development  of  such  a  trade.  By  1763, 
according  to  the  best  evidence,  the  thirteen 
colonies  seem  to  have  adjusted  their  habits 
to  the  Navigation  Acts  and  to  have  been 
carrying  on  their  flourishing  commerce  with 
in  these  restrictions. 

To  this  general  condition,  however,  there 
were  some  slight  exceptions,  and  one  serious 
one.  The  colonists  undoubtedly  resented 
the  necessity  of  purchasing  European  prod 
ucts  from  English  middlemen,  and  were 
especially  desirous  of  importing  Spanish  and 
Portuguese  wines  and  French  brandies  di 
rectly.  Smuggling  in  these  articles  seems  to 
have  been  steadily  carried  on.  Much  more 
important, — and  to  the  American  ship 
owners  the  kernel  of  the  whole  matter, — was 
the  problem  of  the  West  India  trade.  It 
was  proved,  as  the  eighteenth  century  pro 
gressed,  that  the  North  American  colonies 
could  balance  their  heavy  indebtedness  to 
the  mother  country  for  excess  of  imports  over 
exports  only  by  selling  to  the  French,  as  well 
as  the  British  West  Indies,  barrel  staves, 
clapboards,  fish  and  food  products.  In  re- 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       25 

turn  they  took  sugar  and  molasses,  develop 
ing  in  New  England  a  flourishing  rum  manu 
facture,  which  in  turn  was  used  in  the  African 
slave  trade.  By  these  means  the  people  of 
the  New  England  and  Middle  colonies  built 
up  an  active  commerce,  using  their  profits 
to  balance  their  indebtedness  to  England. 
This  "triangular  trade"  disturbed  the  Brit 
ish  West  India  planters,  who,  being  largely 
non-residents  and  very  influential  in  London, 
induced  Parliament,  in  1733,  to  pass  an  act 
imposing  prohibitory  duties  on  all  sugar 
and  molasses  of  foreign  growth.  This  law, 
if  enforced,  would  have  struck  a  damaging 
blow  at  the  prosperity  of  the  Northern 
colonies,  merely  to  benefit  the  West  India 
sugar-growers  by  giving  them  a  monopoly; 
but  the  evidence  goes  to  show  that  it  was 
systematically  evaded  and  that  French  sugar, 
together  with  French  and  Portuguese  wines, 
was  still  habitually  smuggled  into  the  colo 
nies.  Thus  the  Navigation  Acts,  in  the 
only  points  where  they  would  have  been 
actually  oppressive,  were  not  enforced.  The 
colonial  governors  saw  the  serious  conse 
quences  and  shrank  from  arousing  discon 
tent.  It  is  significant  that  the  same  colonists 
who  contended  with  the  royal  governors  did 
not  hesitate  to  violate  a  parliamentary  law 
when  it  ran  counter  to  their  interests. 

The  only  reason  why  the  radical  difference 


26    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

between  the  colonies  and  the  home  govern 
ment  did  not  cause  open  conflict  long  before 
1763  is  to  be  found  in  the  absorption  of  the 
English  ministries  in  parliamentary  manoeu 
vring  at  home,  diplomacy  and  European 
wars  abroad.  The  weakness  of  the  imperial 
control  was  recognized  and  frequently  com 
plained  of  by  governors,  Boards  of  Trade 
and  other  officials ;  but  so  long  as  the  colonies 
continued  to  supply  the  sugar,  furs,  lumber 
and  masts  called  for  by  the  acts,  bought 
largely  from  English  shippers  and  manu 
facturers,  and  stimulated  the  growth  of 
British  shipping,  the  Whig  and  Tory  noble 
men  were  contented.  The  rapidly  growing 
republicanism  of  the  provincial  and  proprie 
tary  governments  was  ignored  and  allowed 
to  develop  unchecked.  A  half -century  of 
complaints  from  thwarted  governors,  teem 
ing  with  suggestions  that  England  ought  to 
take  the  government  of  the  colonies  into  its 
own  hands,  produced  no  results  beyond 
creating  in  official  circles  an  opinion  unfav 
orable  to  the  colonists. 

In  the  years  of  the  French  war,  1754-1760, 
the  utter  incompatibility  between  imperial 
theories  on  the  one  hand  and  colonial  politi 
cal  habits  on  the  other,  could  no  longer  be 
disregarded.  In  the  midst  of  the  struggle, 
the  legislatures  continued  to  wrangle  with 
governors  over  points  of  privilege;  they 


ELEMENTS  OF  ANTAGONISM       27 

were  slow  to  vote  supplies;  they  were  dila 
tory  in  raising  troops;  they  hung  back  from  a 
jealous  fear  that  their  neighbor  colonies 
might  fail  to  do  their  share;  they  were  ready 
to  let  British  soldiers  do  all  the  hard  fighting. 
Worse  still,  the  colonial  shipowners  persisted 
in  their  trade  with  the  French  and  Spanish 
West  Indies,  furnishing  their  enemies  with 
supplies,  and  buying  their  sugar  and  molasses 
as  usual.  When  in  Boston  Writs  of  Assist 
ance  were  employed  by  the  customs  officials, 
in  order  that  by  a  general  power  of  search 
they  might  discover  such  smuggled  prop 
erty,  the  merchants  protested  in  the  courts, 
and  James  Otis,  a  fiery  young  lawyer,  boldly 
declared  the  Writs  an  infringement  of  the 
rights  of  the  colonists,  unconstitutional  and 
beyond  the  power  of  Parliament  to  authorize. 
To  ministers,  engaged  in  a  tremendous  war 
for  the  overthrow  of  France,  the  behavior 
of  the  colonies  revealed  a  spirit  scarcely  short 
of  disloyalty,  and  a  weakness  of  government 
no  longer  to  be  tolerated.  The  Secretaries, 
the  Board  of  Trade,  the  customs  officials, 
army  officers,  naval  commanders,  colonial 
governors  and  judges  all  agreed  that  the 
time  had  come  for  a  thorough  and  drastic 
reform.  They  approached  the  task  accord 
ingly,  purely  and  simply  as  members  of  the 
English  governing  class,  ignorant  of  the 
colonists'  political  ideas  and  totally  indiffer- 


28    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

ent  to  their  views,  and  their  measures  were 
framed  in  the  spirit  of  unquestioning  ac 
ceptance  of  the  principles  of  the  Acts  of 
Trade  as  a  fundamental  national  policy. 

CHAPTER   II 

THE    CONTEST    OVER    PARLIAMENTARY    TAXA 
TION,  1763-1773 

THE  prime  minister  responsible  for  the 
new  colonial  policy  was  George  Grenville, 
who  assumed  his  position  in  May,  1763, 
shortly  after  the  final  treaty  of  Paris.  Every 
other  member  of  his  cabinet  was  a  nobleman, 
Grenville  himself  was  brother  to  an  earl,  and 
most  of  them  had  had  places  in  preceding 
ministries.  It  was  a  typical  administration 
of  the  period,  completely  aristocratic  in 
membership  and  spirit,  quite  indifferent  to 
colonial  views  and  incapable  of  compre 
hending  colonial  ideals  even  if  they  had 
known  them.  To  them  the  business  in  hand 
was  a  purely  practical  one,  and  with  con 
fident  energy  Grenville  pushed  through  a 
series  of  measures,  which  had  been  carefully 
worked  out,  of  course,  by  minor  officials  un 
known  to  fame,  during  the  preceding  months, 
but  which  were  destined  to  produce  results 
undreamed  of  by  anyone  in  England. 

In  the  first  place  a  number  of  ineasu 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       29 

endeavored  to  strengthen  and  revivify  the 
Acts  of  Trade.  Colonists  were  given  new 
privileges  in  the  whale  fishery,  hides  and 
skins  were  "enumerated,"  and  steps  were 
taken  to  secure  a  more  rigorous  execution 
of  the  acts  by  the  employment  of  naval 
vessels  against  smuggling.  A  new  Sugar 
Act  reduced  the  tariff  on  foreign  sugar  to  such 
a  point  that  it  would  be  heavily  protective 
without  being  prohibitive,  and  at  the  same 
time  imposed  special  duties  on  Portuguese 
wines  while  providing  additional  machinery 
for  collecting  customs.  This  was  clearly 
aimed  at  the  weak  point  in  the  existing  navi 
gation  system,  but  it  introduced  a  new  fea 
ture,  for  the  sugar  duties,  unlike  previous  ones, 
were  intended  to  raise  a  revenue,  and  this,  it 
was  provided  in  the  act,  should  be  used  to 
pay  for  the  defence  of  America. 

A  second  new  policy  was  inaugurated  in  a 
proclamation  of  October,  1763,  which  erected 
Florida  and  Canada  into  despotically  gov 
erned  provinces  and  set  off  all  the  land  west 
of  the  head- waters  of  the  rivers  running  into 
the  Atlantic  as  an  Indian  reservation.  No 
further  land  grants  were  to  be  made  in  that 
region,  nor  was  any  trade  to  be  permitted 
with  the  Indians  save  by  royal  license.  The 
Imperial  government  thus  assumed  control 
of  Indian  policy  and  endeavored  to  check  any 
further  growth  of  the  existing  communities 


30    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

to  the  west.  Such  a  scheme  necessitated  the 
creation  of  a  royal  standing  army  in  America 
on  a  larger  scale  than  the  previous  garrisons, 
and  this  plan  led  to  the  third  branch  of  the 
new  policy,  which  contemplated  the  positive 
interposition  of  Parliament  to  remedy  the 
shortcomings  of  colonial  assemblies.  An 
act  of  1764  prohibited  the  future  issue  of  any 
paper  money  by  any  colony,  thus  terminat 
ing  one  of  the  chief  grievances  of  British 
governors  and  merchants.  But  still  more 
striking  was  an  act  of  1765,  which  provided 
with  great  elaboration  for  the  collection  of  a 
stamp  tax  in  the  colonies  upon  all  legal  docu 
ments,  newspapers  and  pamphlets.  The 
proceeds  were  to  be  used  to  pay  about  one- 
third  of  the  cost  of  the  new  standing  army, 
which  was  to  consist  of  ten  thousand  men. 
Taken  in  connection  with  the  announced  in 
tention  of  using  the  revenue  from  the  Sugar 
Act  for  the  same  purpose  it  is  obvious  that 
Grenville's  measures  were  meant  to  relieve 
the  Imperial  government  from  the  necessity 
of  depending  in  future  upon  the  erratic  and 
unmanageable  colonial  legislatures.  They 
were  parts  of  a  general  political  and  financial 
program.  There  is  not  the  slightest  evidence 
that  Grenville  or  his  associates  dreamed  that 
they  were  in  any  way  affecting  the  colonists' 
rights  or  restricting  their  liberties.  Grenville 
did  consult  the  colonial  agents, — individ- 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       31 

uals  authorized  to  represent  the  colonial 
assemblies  in  England, — but  simply  with  a 
view  to  meeting  practical  objections.  The 
various  proclamations  or  orders  were  issued 
without  opposition  and  the  bills  passed 
Parliament  almost  unnoticed.  The  British 
governing  class  was  but  slightly  concerned 
with  colonial  reform:  the  Board  of  Trade, 
the  colonial  officials  and  the  responsible 
ministers  were  the  only  people  interested. 

To  the  astonishment  of  the  cabinet  and 
of  the  English  public  the  new  measures, 
especially  the  Sugar  Act  and  the  Stamp  Act, 
raised  a  storm  of  opposition  in  the  colonies 
unlike  anything  in  their  history.  The  reasons 
are  obvious.  If  the  new  Sugar  Act  was  to  be 
enforced  it  meant  the  end  of  the  flourishing 
French  West  India  intercourse  and  the  death 
of  the  "triangular"  trade.  Every  distiller, 
shipowner  and  exporter  of  fish,  timber  or 
grain,  felt  himself  threatened  with  ruin.  If 
the  Stamp  Act  were  enforced  it  meant  the 
collection  of  a  tax  from  communities  already 
in  debt  from  the  French  wars,  which  were 
in  future  to  be  denied  the  facile  escape  from 
heavy  taxes  hitherto  afforded  by  bills  of 
credit.  But  the  economic  burdens  threatened 
were  almost  lost  sight  of  in  the  political 
dangers.  If  England  meant  to  impose  taxes 
by  parliamentary  vote  for  military  purposes 
instead  of  calling  upon  the  colonists  to  fur- 


32    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

nish  money  and  men,  it  meant  a  deadly  blow 
to  the  importance  of  the  assemblies.  They 
could  no  longer  exercise  complete  control 
over  their  property  and  their  finances.  They 
would  sink  to  the  status  of  mere  municipal 
bodies.  So  far  as  the  Americans  of  1765 
were  concerned  the  feeling  was  universal  that 
such  a  change  was  intolerable,  that  if  they 
ceased  to  have  the  full  power  to  give  or  with 
hold  taxes  at  their  discretion  they  were 
practically  slaves. 

In  every  colony  there  sprang  to  the  front 
leaders  who  voiced  these  sentiments  in  im 
passioned  speeches  and  pamphlets;  for  the 
most  part  young  men,  many  of  them  law 
yers  accustomed  to  look  for  popular  approval 
in  resisting  royal  governors.  Such  men  as 
James  Otis  and  Samuel  Adams  in  Massa 
chusetts,  William  Livingston  in  New  York, 
Patrick  Henry  in  Virginia,  Christopher  Gads- 
den  in  South  Carolina  denounced  the  Stamp 
Act  as  tyrannous,  unconstitutional,  and  an 
infringement  on  the  liberties  of  the  colonists. 
Popular  anger  rose  steadily  until,  in  the  au 
tumn,  when  the  stamps  arrived,  the  people 
of  the  thirteen  colonies  had  nerved  themselves 
to  the  pitch  of  refusing  to  obey  the  act. 
Under  pressure  from  crowds  of  angry  men 
every  distributor  was  compelled  to  resign, 
the  stamps  were  in  some  cases  destroyed,  and 
in  Boston  the  houses  of  unpopular  officials 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       33 

were  mobbed  and  sacked.  Before  the  excite 
ment  the  governors  stood  utterly  helpless. 
They  could  do  nothing  to  carry  out  the  act. 

In  October,  delegates  representing  nearly 
all  the  colonies  met  at  New  York  and  drafted 
resolutions  expressing  their  firm  belief  that 
no  tax  could  legally  be  levied  upon  them  but 
by  their  own  consent  given  through  their 
legislatures.  It  was  the  right  of  English 
men  not  to  be  taxed  without  their  consent. 
Petitions  in  respectful  but  determined  lan 
guage  were  sent  to  the  King  and  to  Parlia 
ment,  praying  for  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp 
Act  and  the  Sugar  Act.  For  the  first  time 
in  their  history  the  colonies  stood  together 
in  full  harmony  to  denounce  and  reject  an 
act  passed  by  Parliament.  As  a  social  and 
political  fact  this  unanimous  demonstration 
of  colonial  feeling  was  of  profound  signifi- 
canc^j.  The  ease  and  ability  with  which  the 
lawyers,  planters,  farmers  or  merchants 
directed  the  popular  excitement  into  effec 
tive  channels  showed  the  widespread  political 
education  of  the  Americans.  A  not  dissimilar 
excitement  in  London  in  the  same  years 
found  no  other  means  of  expressing  itself 
than  bloody  rioting.  It  was  American  re 
publicanism  showing  its  strongest  aspect  in 
political  resistance. 

The  issue  thus  presented  to  the  British 
government  was  one  demanding  the  most 


34    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

careful  consideration  and  far-seeing  wisdom 
in  its  treatment.  Grenville's  measures,  how 
ever  admirable  and  reasonable  in  themselves, 
had  stirred  the  bitter  opposition  of  all  the 
colonists,  and  the  enforcement  or  modifica 
tion  of  them  called  for  steadiness  and  courage. 
Were  the  English  governing  noblemen  of 
the  day  ready  to  persist  in  the  new  policy? 
If  so,  it  meant  violent  controversy  and  pos 
sibly  colonial  insurrection;  but  the  exertion 
of  British  authority,  if  coupled  with  strong 
naval  pressure,  ought  to  prevail.  Angry  as 
the  colonists  were,  their  language  indicates 
that  revolution  was  not  in  their  thoughts; 
and  if  there  was  one  quality  beyond  all 
others  in  which  the  British  aristocracy  ex 
celled  it  was  an  inflexible  tenacity  when 
once  a  policy  was  definitely  embraced.  Un 
fortunately  for  both  sides,  the  clear-cut  issue 
thus  raised  was  obscured  and  distorted  by 
the  presence  of  an  ambitious  young  prince  on 
the  throne  with  a  policy  which  threw  Eng 
lish  domestic  affairs  into  unexampled  con 
fusion. 

George  III,  obstinate,  narrow-minded  and 
determined  to  make  his  own  will  felt  in  the 
choice  of  ministers  and  the  direction  of  af 
fairs,  had  succeeded  his  grandfather  in  1760. 
Too  astute  to  violate  the  fast-bound  tradition 
of  the  English  constitution  that  he  must  gov 
ern  only  through  ministers,  he  saw  that  to 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       35 

have  his  own  way  he  must  secure  political 
servants  who,  while  acting  as  cabinet  min 
isters,  should  take  their  orders  from  him.  He 
also  saw  that  to  destroy  the  hold  of  the  Whig 
family  cliques  he  must  enter  politics  himself 
and  buy,  intimidate  and  cajole  in  order  to  win 
a  following  for  his  ministers  in  parliament. 
With  this  ideal  in  view  he  subordinated 
all  other  considerations  to  the  single  one  of 
getting  subservient  ministers  and  fought  or 
intrigued  against  any  cabinet  which  did  not 
accept  his  direction,  until,  in  1770,  he  finally 
triumphed;  but  in  the  meantime  he  had 
kept  England  under  a  fluctuating  succession 
of  ministries  which  forbade  the  maintenance 
of  any  coherent  or  authoritative  colonial 
policy  such  as  alone  could  have  prevented 
disaster. 

In  1761  George  III  tried  to  induce  Parlia 
ment  to  accept  the  leadership  of  the  Earl 
of  Bute,  his  former  tutor,  who  had  never 
held  public  office;  but  his  rapid  rise  to  the 
premiership  aroused  such  jealousy  among 
the  nobility  and  such  unpopularity  among 
the  people,  that  the  unfortunate  Scot  quailed 
before  the  storm  of  ridicule  and  abuse.  He 
resigned  in  1763  and  was  succeeded  by  Gren- 
ville,  who  instantly  showed  George  III  that  he 
would  take  no  dictation.  On  the  contrary, 
he  drove  the  King  to  the  point  of  fury  by  his 
masterfulness.  In  desperation  George  then 


36    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

turned  to  the  Marquis  of  Rockingham  who, 
if  equally  determined  to  decline  royal  dicta 
tion,  was  personally  less  offensive  to  him,  and 
there  came  in  a  ministry  of  the  usual  type, 
all  noblemen  but  two  minor  members,  and 
all  belonging  to  different  "connexions"  from 
those  of  the  Grenville  ministry.  Thus  it  was 
that  when  the  unanimous  defiance  of  the 
Americans  reached  England,  the  ministers 
responsible  for  the  colonial  reforms  were  out 
of  office  and  the  Rockingham  Whigs  had 
assumed  control,  feeling  no  obligation  to 
continue  anything  begun  by  their  predeces 
sors.  George  Ill's  interposition  was  re 
sponsible  for  this  situation. 

When  Parliament  met  in  January,  1766, 
the  colonists  received  powerful  allies,  first 
in  the  British  merchants  who  petitioned 
against  the  act  as  causing  the  practical 
stoppage  of  American  purchases,  and  second 
in  William  Pitt  who,  in  a  burning  speech, 
embraced  in  full  the  colonists'  position,  and 
declared  that  a  parliamentary  tax  upon  the 
plantations  was  absolutely  contrary  to  the 
rights  of  Englishmen.  He  "rejoiced  that 
America  has  resisted."  This  radical  posi 
tion  found  few  followers,  but  the  Whig 
ministry,  after  some  hesitation,  decided  to 
grant  the  colonial  demands  while  insisting 
on  the  imperial  rights  of  Parliament.  This 
characteristically  English  action  was  highly 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       37 

distasteful  to  the  majority  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  who  voted  to  execute  the  law,  and  to 
George  III,  who  disliked  to  yield  to  mutinous 
subjects;  but  they  were  forced  to  give  way. 
The  Stamp  Act  was  repealed,  and  the  sugar 
duties  reduced  to  a  low  figure.  At  the  same 
time  a  Declaratory  Act  was  passed,  asserting 
that  Parliament  had  full  power  to  bind  the 
colonies  "in  all  cases  whatsoever."  Thus  the 
Americans  had  their  way  in  part  while  sub 
mitting  to  seeing  their  arguments  rejected. 
The  consequences  of  this  unfortunate 
affair  were  to  bring  into  sharp  contrast  the 
difference  between  the  British  and  the  Ameri 
can  view  of  the  status  of  the  colonies.  The 
former  considered  them  as  parts  of  the  realm, 
subject  like  any  other  part  to  the  legislative 
authority  of  King,  Lords  and  Commons.  The 
contention  of  the  colonists,  arising  naturally 
from  the  true  situation  in  each  colonial  gov 
ernment,  that  the  rights  of  Englishmen 
guaranteed  their  freedom  from  taxation 
without  representation,  was  answered  by  the 
perfectly  sound  legal  assertion  that  the 
colonists,  like  all  the  people  of  England, 
were  "virtually"  represented  in  the  House 
of  Commons.  The  words,  in  short,  meant 
one  thing  in  England,  another  thing  in 
America.  English  speakers  and  writers 
pointed  to  the  scores  of  statutes  affecting 
the  colonies,  calling  attention  especially  to 


38    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

the  export  duties  of  the  Navigation  Act  of 
1672,  and  the  import  duties  of  the  act  of 
1733,  not  to  mention  its  revision  of  1764. 
Further,  Parliament  had  regulated  provincial 
coinage  and  money,  had  set  up  a  postal 
service  and  established  rates.  Although 
Parliament  had  not  imposed  any  such  tax 
as  the  Stamp  Act,  it  had,  so  far  as  precedent 
showed,  exercised  financial  powers  on  many 
occasions. 

To  meet  the  British  appeal  to  history  the 
colonists  developed  the  theory  that  com 
mercial  regulation,  including  the  imposition 
of  customs  duties,  was  "external"  and 
hence  lay  naturally  within  the  scope  of  im 
perial  legislation,  but  that  "internal"  taxa 
tion  was  necessarily  in  the  hands  of  the  co 
lonial  assemblies.  There  was  sufficient  plausi 
bility  in  this  claim  to  commend  it  to  Pitt, 
who  adopted  it  in  his  speeches,  and  to  Benja 
min  Franklin,  the  agent  for  Pennsylvania, 
already  well  known  as  a  "philosopher,"  who 
expounded  it  confidently  when  he  was  ex 
amined  as  an  expert  on  American  affairs  at 
the  bar  of  the  Commons.  It  was,  however, 
without  any  clear  legal  justification,  and,  as 
English  speakers  kept  pointing  out,  it  was 
wholly  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  a 
genuine  imperial  government.  That  it  was 
a  perfectly  practical  distinction,  in  keeping 
with  English  customs,  was  also  true,  but 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       39 

that  was  not  to  be  realized  until  three  quar 
ters  of  a  century  later. 

With  the  repeal  of  the  objectionable  law  the 
uproar  in  America  ceased  and,  amid  profuse 
expressions  of  gratitude  to  Pitt,  the  ministry 
and  the  King,  the  colonists  returned  to  their 
normal  activities.  The  other  parts  of  the 
Grenville  program  were  not  altered,  and  it 
was  now  possible  for  English  ministers,  by  a 
wise  and  steady  policy,  to  improve  the  weak 
spots  in  the  colonial  system  without  giving 
undue  offence  to  a  population  whose  sen 
sitiveness  and  obstinate  devotion  to  entire 
self-government  had  been  so  powerfully 
shown  %  Unfortunately  the  King  again  in 
terposed  his  influence  in  such  wise  as  to  pre 
vent  any  rational  colonial  policy.  In  the 
summer  of  1766,  tiring  of  the  Rockingham 
ministry,  he  managed  to  bring  together  an 
odd  coalition  of  political  groups  under  the 
nominal  headship  of  the  Duke  of  Grafton. 
Pitt,  who  disliked  the  family  cliques,  ac 
cepted  office  and  the  title  of  earl  of  Chatham, 
hoping  to  lead  a  national  ministry.  The 
other  elements  were  in  part  Whig,  and  in  part 
representatives  of  the  so  called  "King's 
Friends," — a  growing  body  of  more  or  less 
venal  politicians  who  clung  to  George's  sup 
port  for  the  sake  of  the  patronage  to  be 
gained, — and  several  genuine  Tories  who 
looked  to  a  revived  royal  power  to  end  the 


40    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Whig  monopoly.  From  such  a  cabinet  any 
consistent  policy  was  not  to  be  expected  save 
under  leadership  of  such  a  man  as  Pitt. 
Unfortunately  the  latter  was  immediately 
taken  with  an  illness  which  kept  him  out 
of  public  life  for  two  years,  and  Grafton,  the 
nominal  prime  minister,  was  utterly  unable 
to  hold  his  own  against  the  influence  and  in 
trigues  of  the  King.  From  the  start,  accord 
ingly,  the  ministry  proved  weak  and  un 
stable  and  it  promptly  allowed  a  new  set  of 
colonial  quarrels  to  develop. 
\  Charles  Townshend,  Chancellor  of  the  Ex 
chequer,  one  of  the  originators  of  the  new 
colonial  policy  under  the  Bute  ministry,  was 
so  ill-advised  as  to  renew  the  attempt  to 
raise  a  colonial  revenue  by  parliamentary 
taxation.  His  manner  of  proposing  the 
measure  gave  the  impression  that  it  was  a 
piece  of  sheer  bravado  on  his  part,  intended 
to  regain  the  prestige  which  he  had  lost  by 
failing  to  carry  all  of  his  first  budget,  but  the 
nature  of  the  scheme  indicates  its  close  con 
nection  with  the  Grenville  ideals.  Avoid 
ing  the  appearance  of  a  direct  internal  tax,  he 
caused  the  imposition  of  duties  on  glass, 
painters'  colors,  paper  and  tea,  without  any 
pretence  of  regulating  commerce,  but  for  the 
announced  purpose  of  defraying  the  expenses 
of  governors  and  judges  in  the  colonies. 
Another  measure  established  an  American 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       41 

Board  of  Commissioners  for  customs.  Still 
another  punished  the  province  of  New  York 
for  failing  to  comply  with  an  act  of  1765  au 
thorizing  quartering  of  troops  in  the  colonies. 
The  assembly  was  forbidden  to  pass  any 
law  until  it  should  make  provision  for  the 
soldiers  in  question.  Ex-governor  Pownall 
of  Massachusetts,  now  in  Parliament,  did 
not  fail  to  warn  the  House  of  the  danger 
into  which  it  was  running;  but  his  words  were 
unheeded,  and  the  bills  passed  promptly. 

The  result  of  these  measures  was  inevi 
table.  Every  political  leader  in  the  colonies, 
— nay,  every  voter, — saw  that  the  Towns- 
hend  duties,  while  in  form  "external/'  were 
pure  revenue  measures,  unconnected  with 
the  Acts  of  Trade,  and  intended  to  strike  at 
colonial  independence  in  a  vital  point.  If 
Great  Britain  undertook  henceforward  to 
pay  the  salaries  of  royal  officials,  one  of  the 
principal  sources  of  power  would  be  taken 
away  from  the  assemblies.  Instantly  the 
distinction  of  "external"  and  "internal" 
taxation  was  abandoned,  and  from  end  to  end 
of  the  Atlantic  seaboard  a  cry  went  up  that 
the  duties  were  an  insidious  attack  on  the 
liberties  of  the  Americans,  an  outrageous 
taking  of  their  property  without  their  con 
sent,  and  a  wanton  interference  with  their 
governments.  Not  merely  agitators  such  as 
the  shrewd  Samuel  Adams  and  the  eloquent 


42    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Patrick  Henry  uttered  these  views,  but  men  of 
far  more  considerable  property  and  station, — 
such  as  John  Jay  and  New  York  landowners 
and  importers,  John  Dickinson  and  the 
Philadelphia  merchants,  George  Washington 
and  the  Virginia  planters.  While  no  general 
Congress  was  summoned,  the  legislatures  of 
the  colonies  adopted  elaborate  resolutions, 
pamphleteers  issued  a  stream  of  denuncia 
tions,  and,  most  important  of  all,  a  concerted 
effort  was  made  to  break  down  the  acts  by 
abstaining  from  any  importations,  not  only 
of  the  taxed  commodities,  but,  so  far  as  pos 
sible,  of  any  British  products.  Commercial 
boycott,  it  was  hoped,  would  liave  the  same 
effect  as  at  the  time  of  the  Stamp  Act. 

By  this  time  the  colonial  argument  had 
come  to  assume  a  much  broader  character, 
for,  in  order  to  deny  the  validity  of  the  New 
York  Assembly  Act  and  the  Townshend 
duties,  it  became  necessary  to  assert  that 
Parliament,  according  to  "natural  rights," 
had  no  legislative  authority  over  the  internal 
affairs  of  a  colony.  This  was  vested,  by  the 
constitution  of  each  province  or  chartered 
colony,  in  the  Crown  and  the  colonial  legisla 
ture.  Such  a  theory  reduced  the  imperial 
tie  to  little  more  than  a  personal  union 
through  the  monarch,  coupled  with  the  ad 
mitted  power  of  Parliament  to  regulate 
commerce  and  navigation.  Evidently,  as 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       43 

in  all  such  cases,  the  theory  was  framed  to 
justify  a  particular  desire,  namely,  to  keep 
things  where  they  had  been  prior  to  1763. 
The  sole  question  at  issue  was,  in  reality, 
one  of  power,  not  of  abstract  or  legal  right. 
Once  more  it  was  clear  to  men  of  penetrat 
ing  vision  that  the  American  colonies  needed 
extremely  careful  handling.  Whether  their 
arguments  were  sound  or  fallacious,  loyal 
or  seditious,  it  was  significant  that  the  whole 
continent  spoke  in  but  one  voice  and  felt 
but  one  desire,  —  to  be  allowed  to  exercise 
complete  financial  discretion  and  to  retain 
full  control  over  governors  and  judges.  Un 
fortunately  the  condition  of  things  in  Eng 
land  was  such  that  a  cool  *r  steady  treatment 
of  the  question  was  becoming  impossible. 
In  the  first  place,  the  Grafton  ministry  was 
reconstituted  in  1768,  the  "Pittite"  ele 
ments  withdrawing  and  being  replaced  by 
more  King's  Friends  and  Tories,  while 
George  Ill's  influence  grew  predominant. 
Townshend  died  in  September,  1767,  but  his 
place  was  taken  by  Lord  North,  a  Tory  and 
especially  subservient  to  the  King.  A  new 
secretaryship  for  the  colonies  was  given  to 
Lord  Hillsborough,  who  had  been  in  the 
Board  of  Trade  in  the  Grenville  ministry 
and  represented  his  views.  Neither  of  these 
men  was  inclined  to  consider  colonial  clamor 
in  any  other  light  than  as  unpardonable  im- 


44    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

pudence  and  sedition.  In  the  second  place 
the  old  Whig  family  groups  were  fast  assum 
ing  an  attitude  of  bitter  opposition  to  the 
new  Tories,  and  by  1768  were  prepared  to  use 
the  American  question  as  a  convenient 
weapon  to  discredit  the  ministry.  They  were 
quite  as  aristocratic  in  temper  as  the  min 
isterial  party  but  advocated  forbearance, 
conciliation  and  calmness  in  dealing  With  the 
Americans,  in  speeches  as  remarkable  for 
their  political  good  sense  as  for  their  ferocity 
toward  North,  Hillsborough  and  the  rest. 
While  the  ministry  drew  its  views  of  the 
American  situation  from  royal  governors 
and  officials,  the  Whigs  habitually  consulted 
with  Franklin  and  the  other  colonial  agents, 
who  occupied  a  quasi-diplomatic  position. 
Thus  the  American  question  became  a  par 
tisan  battleground.  The  Tories,  attacked  fey 
the  Whigs,  developed  a  stubborn  obstinacy  in 
holding  to  a  "firm"  colonial  policy,  and  ex 
hibited  a  steady  contempt  and  anger  toward 
their  American  adversaries  which  was  in  no 
small  degree  due  to  the  English  party 
antagonism. 

Still  further  to  confuse  the  situation  there 
occurred  at  this  time  the  contest  of  John 
Wilkes,  backed  by  the  London  mob,  against 
the  Grafton  ministry.  This  demagogue, 
able  and  profligate,  had  already  come  into 
conflict  with  the  Grenville  ministry  in  1765 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       45 

and  been  driven  into  exile.  Now,  in  1768,  he 
returned  and  was  repeatedly  elected  to  the 
Commons  and  as  repeatedly  unseated  by 
the  vindictive  ministerial  majority.  Hi*ts 
and  bloodshed  accompanied  the  agitation,  and 
Wilkes  and  his  supporters,  backed  by  the 
parliamentary  Whigs,  habitually  proclaimed 
the  same  doctrines  of  natural  rights  which 
were  universally  asserted  in  America.  To  the 
King  and  his  cabinet,  Wilkes  and  the  Ameri 
can  leaders  appeared  indistinguishable.  They 
were  all  brawling,  disorderly  and  dangerous 
demagogues,  deserving  of  no  consideration. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  complaints 
of  the  colonists,  although  supported  by  the 
Whigs  and  by  Chatham,  received  scant 
courtesy  in  England.  The  Graft^n  min 
istry  showed  nothing  but  an  irritated  inten 
tion  to  maintain  imperial  supremacy  by 
insisting  on  the  taxes  and  demanding  sub- 
missiveness  on  the  part  of  the  assemblies. 
A  series  of  "firm"  instructions  was  sent  out 
by  Hillsborough,  typical  of  which  was  an 
order  that  the  Massachusetts  legislature 
must  rescind  its  circular  letter  of  protest 
under  threat  of  dissolution,  and  that  the 
other  assemblies  must  repudiate  the  letter 
under  a  similar  menace.  The  sole  result  was 
a  series  of  embittered  wrangles,  dissolutions, 
protests  and  quarrels  which  left  the  colonists 
still  more  inflamed.  Then,  at  the  suggestion 


46    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

of  the  Commissioners  of  Customs,  two  regi 
ments  of  troops  were  sent  to  Boston  to  over 
awe  that  particularly  defiant  colony.  There 
being  no  legislature  in  session,  the  Massa 
chusetts  towns  sent  delegates  to  a  voluntary 
convention  which  drafted  a  protest.  Im 
mediately  this  action  was  denounced  by 
Hillsborough  as  seditious  and  was  censured 
by  Parliament,  while  the  Duke  of  Bedford 
moved  that  an  old  statute  of  Henry  VIII, 
by  which  offenders  outside  the  realm  could 
be  brought  to  England  for  trial,  should  be  put 
into  operation  against  the  colonial  agitators. 
When  the  Virginia  legislature  protested 
against  this  step,  it  was  immediately  dis 
solved.  Hillsborough  and  North  acted  as 
though  they  believed  that  a  policy  of  scolding 
and  nagging,  if  made  sufficiently  disagree 
able,  would  bring  the  colonists  to  their 
senses.  That  the  Whigs  did  not  cease  to 
pour  contempt  and  ridicule  on  the  folly  of 
such  behavior  was  probably  one  reason  why 
the  government  persisted  in  its  course.  The 
American  question  was  coming  to  be  be 
yond  the  reach  of  reason. 

Yet  in  1769  the  ministry  could  not  avoid 
recognizing  that  as  financial  measures  the 
Townshend  duties  were  a  hopeless  failure, 
since  their  net  proceeds  were  less  than  300 
pounds  and  the  increased  military  expenses 
were  declared  by  Pownall  to  be  over  170,000. 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       47 

On  May  1,  1769,  the  cabinet  voted  to  repeal 
the  taxes  on  glass,  colors  and  paper,  but  by  a 
majority  of  one  determined  to  keep  the  tea 
duty.  This  decision  was  due  to  the  complais 
ance  of  Lord  North,  who  saw  the  unwisdom 
of  the  step  but  yielded  to  the  King's  wish  to 
retain  one  tax  in  order  to  assert  the  principle 
of  parliamentary  supremacy.  A  year  later 
the  Grafton  ministry  finally  broke  up  and 
Lord  North  assumed  control,  with  a  cabinet 
composed  wholly  of  Tories  and  supported  by 
George  III  to  the  full  extent  of  his  power, 
through  patronage,  bribes,  social  pressure 
and  political  proscription.  North  himself  was 
inclined  to  moderation  in  colonial  matters. 
He  carried  the  promised  repeal  of  all  the 
duties  but  the  tea  tax,  and  in  1772  replaced 
the  arrogant  and  quarrelsome  Hillsborough 
with  the  more  amiable  Lord  Dartmouth. 
It  looked  for  a  while  as  though  the  political 
skies  might  clear,  for  the  American  merchants, 
tired  of  their  self-imposed  hardships,  began 
to  weaken  in  opposition.  In  1769  the  New 
York  assembly  voted  to  accept  the  parlia 
mentary  terms,  and  in  1770  the  merchants  of 
that  colony  voted  to  abandon  general  non 
importation,  keeping  only  the  boycott  on 
tea.  This  led  to  the  general  collapse  of  the 
non-importation  agreements ;  but  the  colonial 
temper  continued  to  be  defiant  and  suspicious, 
and  wrangling  with  governors  was  incessant. 


48    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Occasional  cases  of  violence  confirmed  the 
English  Tories  in  their  low  view  of  the  Ameri 
cans.  In  March,  1770,  a  riot  in  Boston  be 
tween  town  rowdies  and  the  soldiers  brought 
on  a  shooting  affray  in  which  five  citizens 
were  killed.  This  created  intense  indignation 
throughout  the  colonies,  regardless  of  the 
provocation  received  by  the  soldiers,  and  led 
to  an  annual  commemoration  of  the  "Boston 
Massacre,"  marked  by  inflammatory 
speeches.  The  soldiers,  however,  when  tried 
for  murder  in  the  local  courts,  were  defended 
by  prominent  counsel,  notably  John  Adams, 
and  were  acquitted.  Two  years  later,  on 
June  9,  1772,  the  Gaspee,  a  naval  schooner, 
which  had  been  very  active  in  chasing  smug 
glers  in  Rhode  Island  waters,  was  burned  by 
a  mob,  and  its  captain  taken  prisoner.  The 
utmost  efforts  of  the  home  government  failed 
to  secure  the  detection  or  punishment  of  any 
one  of  the  perpetrators. 

Finally  in  December,  1773,  a  still  more 
serious  explosion  occurred.  The  North  min 
istry,  desirous  of  assisting  the  East  India 
Company,  which  was  burdened  with  debt, 
removed  practically  all  restrictions  from 
the  exportation  of  tea  to  America  in  hopes 
of  increasing  the  sale  by  reducing  the 
price.  To  the  colonial  leaders,  now  in  a 
state  of  chronic  irritation,  this  measure 
seemed  an  insulting  and  insidious  attempt 


PARLIAMENTARY  TAXATION       49 

to  induce  the  Americans  to  forget  their 
principles  and  buy  the  tea  because  it  was 
cheap.  It  was  denounced  from  end  to  end 
of  the  country  in  burning  rhetoric,  and  when 
the  cargoes  of  tea  arrived  their  sale  was 
completely  prevented  by  the  overwhelming 
pressure  of  public  opinion.  Consignees, 
waited  on  by  great  crowds,  hastened  to 
resign,  and  the  tea  was  either  seized  for  non 
payment  of  duties  and  allowed  to  spoil  or 
was  sent  back.  In  Boston,  however,  the 
Governor,  Hutchinson,  stiffly  refused  to  let 
the  tea  ships  depart  without  landing  the 
tea,  whereat  the  exasperated  citizens  watched 
an  organized  mob  of  disguised  men  board 
the  ships  and  throw  the  tea  into  the  harbor. 
Once  more  the  unanimous  voice  of  the  col 
onies  defied  a  parliamentary  act. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  1773.  Thirteen 
groups  of  English  colonists,  obstinately  local 
in  their  interests,  narrowly  insistent  on  self- 
government,  habituated  to  an  antagonistic 
attitude  toward  royal  governors,  but,  after 
all  has  been  said,  unquestionably  loyal  to 
the  crown  and  the  home  country,  had  been 
transformed  into  communities  on  the  verge 
of  permanent  insubordination.  Incapable 
of  changing  all  their  political  habits,  they 
could  see  in  the  British  policy  only  a  purpose 
to  deprive  them  of  that  self-government 
which  was  inseparable  from  liberty.  The 


50    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Crown  ministers,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  discover  anything  illegal,  oppressiv< 
unreasonable  in  any  of  their  measures,  found 
no  explanation  of  the  extravagant  denuncia 
tions  of  the  colonial  radicals  other  than  a 
determination  to  foment  every  possible 
difficulty  with  a  view  to  throwing  off  all 
obedience.  While  Adams,  Dickinson,  Henry, 
Gadsden  and  the  rest  demanded  their 
"rights"  and  protested  against  "incroach- 
ments"  on  their  liberties,  Bedford,  Hills- 
borough,  North  and  Dartmouth  insisted  on 
the  "indecency,"  "insolence"  and  "dis 
loyalty"  shown  by  the  Americans.  The 
colonial  republicans  and  the  British  noble 
men  were  unable  to  speak  the  same  language. 
Yet  the  time  had  come  to  face  the  situation, 
and  it  was  the  duty  of  the  ministers  to  as 
sume  the  task  with  something  more  serious 
than  reproofs  and  legal  formulae.  The  con 
test  for  power  now  begun  must  lead,  unless 
terminated,  straight  to  a  disruption  of  the 
empire. 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE,   1773-1776 

WHEN  the  news  reached  England  that  the 
people  of  the  town  of  Boston  had  thrown 
the  tea  of  the  East  India  Company  into  the 
harbor,  the  patience  of  the  North  ministry, 


DISRUpflOT  0 


OF  THE  EMPIRE      51 

severely  strained,  reached  its  end. 
members  felt, — and  most  of  the  English 
people  felt  with  them, — that  to  submit  to 
such  an  act  of  violence  was  impossible. 
Every  consideration  of  national  dignity  de 
manded  that  Boston  and  its  rioters  should 
be  punished  and  that  the  outrage  done  to 
the  East  India  Company  should  receive 
atonement.  Hitherto,  they  said,  the  con 
tumacious  colonists  had  been  dealt  with 
chiefly  by  arguments,  reproofs  and,  as  it 
seemed  to  most  Englishmen,  with  conces 
sions  and  kindnesses  which  had  won  only 
insult  and  violence. 

It  was  resolved  to  make  an  example  of  the 
delinquent  community,  and  the  first  step  was 
to  humiliate  its  representative,  Benjamin 
Franklin.  Ever  since  1765  he  had  been  re 
siding  in  England,  respected  as  a  philosopher 
and  admired  as  a  wit,  bearing  a  sort  of  dip 
lomatic  character  through  his  position  as 
agent  for  the  assemblies  of  Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania  and  Georgia.  In  close  as 
sociation  with  the  Whig  opposition,  he  was 
undoubtedly  the  best-known  American,  and 
among  the  most  influential.  Now,  in  1774, 
having  to  present  a  petition  from  Massa 
chusetts  to  the  Privy  Council  for  the  removal 
of  Lieutenant-Governor  Hutchinson,  Frank 
lin  found  it  an  awkward  feature  of  the  case 
that  the  colony's  charges  were  based  on 


52    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

private  letters  which  he  himself  had  in  some 
way  acquired  and  sent  to  Boston.  The  court 
party  determined  to  crush  him  and  at  the 
hearing  put  forward  Wedderburn,  the  So 
licitor-General, — a  typical  King's  friend, — 
who  passed  over  the  subject  of  the  petition 
to  brand  Franklin  in  virulent  invective  as  a 
thief  and  scoundrel.  Amidst  general  ap 
plause  the  petition  was  rejected  as  false  and 
scandalous  and  Franklin  was  dismissed  from 
his  position  of  colonial  Postmaster-General. 

When  Parliament  met  it  was  instantly 
made  clear  that  the  sole  idea  controlling 
King,  cabinet  and  the  majority  of  members 
was  to  bring  the  Massachusetts  colonists  to 
their  senses  by  severe  punitive  legislation. 
The  Whig  opposition  did  not  attempt  to  de 
fend  the  destruction  of  the  tea,  but  it  spared 
no  effort  to  make  the  ministers  see  the  folly 
of  striking  at  effects  and  ignoring  causes.  In 
a  masterly  speech  of  April  19,  1774,  Burke 
showed  that  the  insistence  on  submission 
regardless  of  the  grievances  and  of  the  nature 
of  the  colonists  was  a  dangerous  and  absurd 
policy,  and  Pownall  and  Chatham  repeated 
his  *  arguments,  but  without  avail.  The 
ministerial  party  saw  no  danger  and  felt 
nothing  but  the  contempt  of  an  irritated 
aristocracy.  The  original  ideals  of  a  general 
colonial  reform  were  now  lost  sight  of;  the 
men  responsible  for  them  had  all  passed  off 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      53 

the  stage;  Grenville,  Townshend  and  Halifax 
were  dead,  and  North,  careless  and  subser 
vient  to  George  III,  Hillsborough,  Suffolk, 
Sandwich  and  Rochford, —  all  noblemen  and 
in  many  cases  inefficient, — did  not  see  be 
yond  the  problem  of  coercing  noisy  and 
troublesome  rioters,  indistinguishable  from 
the  followers  of  Wilkes.  Over  and  over  again 
they  reiterated  that  the  colonists'  resentment 
was  not  to  be  feared,  that  they  would  submit 
to  genuine  firmness,  that  they  were  all  cow 
ardly  and  dared  not  resist  a  few  regular 
troops.  Lord  George  Germaine  earned  the 
thanks  of  Lord  North  by  declaring  that  the 
colonists  were  only  "a  tumultuous  and  noisy 
rabble,"  men  who  ought  to  be  "  following  their 
mercantile  employment  and  not  attempting 
to  govern."  Not  a  gleam  of  any  other 
statesmanship  appears  in  any  of  the  minis 
terial  speeches  than  that  displayed  in  the  de 
termination  to  exact  complete  submission. 

There  were  passed,  accordingly,  by  the  full 
ministerial  majority,  five  measures  known  as 
the  Coercive  Acts,  or,  in  America,  as  the  Five 
Intolerable  Acts.  The  first  one  punished 
Boston  by  closing  the  port  to  all  trade  until 
the  offending  town  should  recompense  the 
East  India  Company  for  the  tea  destroyed. 
The  next  altered  the  government  of  Massa 
chusetts  Bay  by  making  the  councillors  ap 
pointive  instead  of  elective,  by  placing  the 


54    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

appointment  and  removal  of  all  judicial 
officers  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  governor, 
by  placing  the  selection  of  jurors  in  the  hands 
of  the  sheriffs  and  prohibiting  town-meetings, 
— apart  from  the  annual  one  to  elect  officers, — 
without  the  governor's  permission.  A  third 
act  authorized  the  transfer  to  England  for 
trial  of  British  officers  charged  with  murder 
committed  while  in  discharge  of  their  duties. 
A  fourth  act  reestablished  the  system  of 
quartering  troops. 

The  fifth  act  reorganized  the  province  of 
Quebec,  whose  government,  under  the  Proc 
lamation  of  1763,  had  proved  defective  in 
several  respects.  The  legal  institutions  of 
the  new  colony  were  not  well  adapted  to  the 
mixed  French  and  English  inhabitants,  and 
the  religious  situation  needed  definition. 
The  Quebec  Act  altered  the  government  of 
the  province  by  the  creation  of  an  appointive 
council,  authorized  the  Catholic  Church  to 
collect  tithes  and  allowed  the  French  to  sub 
stitute  an  oath  of  allegiance  for  the  oath  of 
supremacy.  Moreover,  French  civil  law  was 
permitted  to  exist.  At  the  same  time  the 
boundaries  of  the  province  were  extended 
into  the  region  west  of  the  mountains  so  as  to 
include  the  lands  north  of  the  Ohio  River. 

With  the  passage  of  these  acts  the  original 
causes  for  antagonism  were  superseded.  The 
commissioners  of  customs  might  have  en- 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      55 

forced  the  Navigation  Acts  indefinitely;  the 
objectionable  Tea  Act  might  have  stood  per 
manently  on  the  statute  book;  but,  without 
a  more  tangible  grievance,  it  is  not  easy  to 
conceive  of  the  colonists  actually  beginning 
revolution.  But  now  the  time  had  come 
when  a  more  serious  issue  was  raised  than 
the  right  of  Parliament  to  collect  a  revenue 
by  a  tariff  in  the  colonies.  If  Parliament  was 
to  be  allowed  to  crush  the  prosperity  of  a 
colonial  seaport,  to  render  centralized  a 
hitherto  democratic  government  created  by  a 
royal  charter,  and  to  remove  royal  officers 
from  the  scope  of  colonial  juries,  it  was  clear 
that  the  end  of  all  the  powers  and  privileges 
wrung  from  royal  or  proprietary  governors 
by  generations  of  struggle  was  at  hand.  But 
the  striking  feature  in  this  punitive  legisla 
tion  was  that  the  North  ministry  expected 
it  to  meet  no  resistance,  although  its  execu 
tion,  so  far  as  the  government  of  Massa 
chusetts  was  concerned,  rested  on  the  consent 
of  the  colonists.  There  was,  under  the  British 
system,  no  administrative  body  capable  of 
carrying  out  these  laws,  no  military  force 
except  the  few  regiments  in  Boston,  and  no 
naval  force  beyond  a  few  frigates  and  cruis 
ers.  The  mere  passage  of  the  laws,  accord 
ing  to  North  and  to  Lord  Mansfield,  was 
sufficient  to  bring  submission. 

Nothing  more  clearly  shows  the  profound 


56    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

ignorance  of  the  Tory  ministry  than  this 
expectation,  for  it  was  instantly  disappointed. 
At  the  news  of  the  acts  the  response  from 
America  was  unanimous.  Already  the  colo 
nial  Whigs  were  well  organized  in  commit 
tees  of  correspondence,  and  now  they  acted 
not  merely  in  Massachusetts  but  in  every 
colony.  The  town  of  Boston  refused  to  vote 
compensation,  and  was  immediately  [closed 
under  the  terms  of  the  Port  Act.  Expres 
sions  of  sympathy  and  gifts  of  provisions 
came  pouring  into  the  doomed  community, 
while  public  meetings,  legislatures,  political 
leaders  and  clergymen,  in  chorus  denounced 
the  acts  as  unconstitutional,  cruel  and 
tyrannous.  The  Quebec  Act,  extending  the 
Catholic  religion  and  French  law  into  the 
interior  valley  under  despotic  government, 
was  regarded  as  scarcely  less  sinister  than 
the  Regulating  Act  itself. 

Under  the  efficient  organization  of  the 
leaders  a  Continental  Congress  met  in  Phila 
delphia  in  October,  1774,  to  make  united 
protest.  This  body,  comprising  without 
exception  the  most  influential  men  in  the 
colonies,  presented  a  sharp  contrast  to  Parlia 
ment  in  that  every  man  was  the  representa 
tive  of  a  community  of  freemen,  self-govern 
ing  and  equal  before  the  law.  The  leaders 
did  not  regard  themselves  in  any  sense  as 
revolutionaries.  They  were  simply  delegates 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      57 

from  the  separate  colonies,  met  to  confer  on 
their  common  dangers.  Their  action  con 
sisted  of  the  preparation  of  a  petition  to  the 
King,  addresses  to  the  people  of  England, 
the  people  of  Quebec  and  the  people  of  the 
colonies,  but  not  to  Parliament,  since  they 
denied  its  right  to  pass  any  such  laws  as  those 
under  complaint.  The  Congress  further  drew 
up  a  declaration  of  rights  which  stated  sharply 
the  colonial  claims,  namely,  that  Parliament 
had  no  right  to  legislate  for  the  internal  affairs 
of  the  separate  colonies.  It  also  adopted  a 
plan  for  putting  commercial  pressure  on 
England  by  forming  an  Association,  whose 
members  pledged  themselves  to  consume  no 
English  products,  and  organized  committees 
in  every  colony  to  enforce  this  boycott.  The 
leaders  in  the  body  were  destined  to  long 
careers  of  public  prominence, — such  men  as 
George  Washington,  Lee  and  Patrick  Henry 
of  Virginia,  Rutledge  of  South  Carolina, 
Dickinson  of  Pennsylvania,  Jay  of  New 
York,  Samuel  and  John  Adams  of  Massa 
chusetts.  They  differed  considerably  in  their 
temper,  the  Massachusetts  men  being  far 
more  ready  for  drastic  words  and  deeds  than 
the  others,  but  they  held  together  admir 
ably.  If  such  protests  as  theirs  could  not 
win  a  hearing  in  England,  it  was  hardly  con 
ceivable  that  any  could. 

Meanwhile   the   situation   gave   signs   of 


58    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

being  more  explosive  in  reality  than  the 
respectful  words  of  the  Congress  implied.  In 
Massachusetts  the  town  of  Boston  showed 
no  sign  of  submitting,  and  endured  distress 
and  actual  starvation,  although  much  cheered 
by  gifts  of  food  from  all  parts  of  the  conti 
nent.  The  new  government  under  the  Reg 
ulating  Act  proved  impossible  to  put  into 
operation,  for  the  popular  detestation  was 
visited  in  such  insulting  and  menacing  forms 
that  the  new  councillors  and  judges  dared 
not  serve.  More  radical  action  followed. 
When  Gage,  having  caused  the  election  of  a 
legislature,  prorogued  it  before  it  had  assem 
bled,  the  members  none  the  less  gathered. 
Declaring  that  the  Regulating  Act  was  invalid, 
they  elected  a  council,  appointed  a  committee 
of  safety  and  named  a  receiver  of  taxes.  On 
February  1,  1775,  a  second  Provincial  Con 
gress  was  chosen  by  the  towns,  which  had  not 
even  a  nominal  sanctioipby  the  governor. 
The  colony  was  in  fact  in  peaceful  revolution, 
for  Gage  found  himself  unable  to  collect 
taxes  or  to  make  his  authority  respected  as 
governor  beyond  the  range  of  his  bayonets. 
Equally  significant  was  it  that  in  several 
other  colonies  where  the  governors  failed  to 
call  the  legislatures,  provincial  congresses  or 
conventions  were  spontaneously  elected  to 
supervise  the  situation  and  choose  delegates 
to  the  Continental  Congress. 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      59 

So  deep  was  the  popular  anger  in  Massa 
chusetts  Bay  that  the  collection  of  arms  and 
powder  and  the  organization  of  militia  were 
rapidly  begun.  Clearly  the  Massachusetts 
leaders  were  preparing  to  persist  to  the  verge 
of  civil  war.  But  by  this  time  there  began 
to  be  felt  in  the  colonies  a  countercurrent 
of  protest.  As  the  situation  grew  darker  and 
men  talked  openly  of  possible  separation 
unless  the  intolerable  wrongs  were  redressed, 
all  those  whose  interests  or  whose  loyalty 
revolted  at  the  idea  of  civil  war  became 
alarmed  at  the  danger.  Soon  men  of  such 
minds  began  to  print  pamphlets,  according 
to  the  fashion  of  the  time,  and  to  attempt 
to  prevent  the  radicals  from  pushing  the 
colonies  into  seditious  courses.  But  the 
position  of  these  conservatives  was  exceed 
ingly  difficult,  for  they  were  obliged  to  apolo 
gize  for  the  home  country  at  a  time  when 
every  act  on  the  part  of  that  country  indi 
cated  a  complete  indifference  to  the  colonial 
prejudices.  Further,  their  arguments  against 
revolution  or  independence  left,  after  all,  no 
alternative  except  submission.  Denounced 
as  Tories  by  the  hotter  radicals,  they  found 
themselves  at  once  more  and  more  alarmed 
by  the  daring  actions  of  the  Whigs  and  more 
detested  by  the  excited  people  of  their 
communities. 

The    action  of  the    British   government 


60    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

after  these  events  showed  no  comprehension 
of  the  critical  situation  into  which  they 
were  rushing.  George  III  and  North  secured 
in  the  election  of  1774  a  triumphant  majority 
of  the  Commons  and  felt  themselves  beyond 
reach  of  danger  at  home.  The  arguments 
of  the  colonists,  the  protests  of  the  Conti 
nental  Congress,  fell  upon  indifferent  ears. 
Although  Burke  and  Chatham  exerted  them 
selves  with  astonishing  eloquence  in  the 
session  of  Parliament,  which  began  in  Novem 
ber,  1774,  the  Whig  motions' for  conciliation 
were  voted  down  by  the  full  ministerial 
majority.  Petitions  from  merchants,  who 
felt  the  pressure  of  the  Non-importation 
Association,  were  shelved.  So  far  as  the  policy 
of  the  ministry  may  be  described,  it  con 
sisted  of  legislation  to  increase  the  punish 
ment  of  Massachusetts  Bay  and  extend  it 
to  other  colonies,  and  to  offer  a  conditional 
exemption  from  Parliamentary  taxation. 
Both  houses  of  Parliament  declared  Massa 
chusetts  Bay  to  be  in  rebellion  and  voted  to 
crush  all  resistance.  An  act  was  passed, 
March  30,  to  restrain  the  trade  of  New  Eng 
land,  shutting  off  all  colonial  vessels  from 
the  fisheries,  and  forbidding  them  to  trade 
with  any  country  but  England  or  Ireland. 
By  a  second  act,  in  April,  this  restriction  was 
extended  to  all  the  colonies  except  New  York 
and  Georgia.  The  only  purpose  of  this  act 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      61 

was  punitive.  Every  step  was  fought  by  the 
Whig  opposition,  now  thoroughly  committed 
to  the  cause  of  the  colonists,  but  their  argu 
ments  had  the  inherent  weakness  of  offering 
only  a  surrender  to  the  colonists'  position, 
which  the  parliamentary  majority  was  in  no 
mood  to  consider.  In  fact  it  was  only  with 
great  difficulty  and  after  a  stormy  scene 
that  North  induced  his  party  to  vote  a  so- 
called  conciliatory  proposition  offering  to 
abstain  from  taxing  any  colony  which  should 
make  such  a  fixed  provision  for  civil  and 
judicial  officers  as  would  satisfy  Parliament. 
It  was  only  a  few  days  after  the  passage 
of  the  restraining  acts  by  Parliament  that 
the  long-threatened  civil  war  actually  broke 
out  in  Massachusetts.  General  Gage,  aware 
of  the  steady  gathering  of  powder  and  war 
material  by  the  revolutionary  committee  of 
safety,  finally  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
his  position  required  him  to  break  up  these 
threatening  bases  of  supplies.  On  April  19, 
1775,  he  sent  out  a  force  of  800  men  to 
Lexington  and  Concord, — towns  a  few  miles 
from  Boston, — with  orders  to  seize  or  destroy 
provisions  and  arms.  They  accomplished 
their  purpose,  after  dispersing  with  musketry 
a  squad  of  farmers  at  Lexington;  but  were 
hunted  back  to  Boston  by  many  times  their 
number  of  excited  "  minute  men, "  who  from 
behind  fences  and  at  every  crossroad  har- 


62    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

assed  their  retreat.  A  reinforcement  of  1500 
men  enabled  the  raiding  party  to  escape,  but 
they  lost  over  300  men,  and  inflicted  a  total 
loss  of  only  90  in  their  flight. 

Thus  began  the  American  Revolution, 
for  the  news  of  this  day  of  bloody  skirmish 
ing,  as  it  spread,  started  into  flame  the  excite 
ment  of  the  colonial  Whigs.  From  the  other 
New  England  colonies  men  sprang  to  arms, 
and  companies  marched  to  Boston,  where 
they  remained  in  rude  blockade  outside  the 
town,  unprovided  with  artillery  or  military 
organization,  but  unwilling  to  return  to  their 
homes.  From  the  hill-towns  a  band  of  men 
surprised  Fort  Ticonderoga  on  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  taking  the  cannon  for  use  around 
Boston.  In  every  other  colony  militia  were 
organized,  officers  chosen  and  arms  collected, 
and  almost  everywhere,  except  in  Quaker 
Pennsylvania  and  in  proprietary  Maryland, 
the  governors  and  royal  officials  fled  to  the 
seacoast  to  take  refuge  in  royal  ships  of  war, 
or  resigned  their  positions  at  the  command 
of  crowds  of  armed  "minute  men."  Con 
ventions  and  congresses,  summoned  by 
committees  of  safety,  were  elected  by  the 
Whigs  and  assumed  control  of  the  colonies, 
following  the  example  of  Massachusetts. 
The  British  colonial  government,  in  short, 
crumbled  to  nothing  in  the  spring  of  1775. 
Only  Gage's  force  of  a  few  regiments,  shut 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      63 

up  in  Boston,  and  a  few  naval  vessels,  repre 
sented  the  authority  of  England  in  America. 

Again  there  met  a  Continental  Congress 
at  Philadelphia,  whose  duty  it  was  to  unify 
colonial  action  and  to  give  the  colonial 
answer  to  the  late  parliamentary  acts.  Once 
more  the  ablest  men  of  the  colonies  were 
present,  now  gravely  perturbed  over  the 
situation  and  divided  into  two  camps.  On 
the  one  hand  most  of  the  New  Englanders, 
led  by  Samuel  Adams  and  John  Adams,  his 
cousin,  felt  that  the  time  for  parley  was  at 
an  end,  that  nothing  was  to  be  hoped  for 
from  the  North  ministry  and  that  the  only 
reasonable  step  was  to  declare  independence. 
Others  still  hoped  that  George  III  would 
realize  the  extent  of  the  crisis  and  be  moved 
to  concessions,  while  yet  others,  who  hoped 
little,  thought  that  one  more  effort  should 
be  made  to  avoid  revolution.  But  none 
dreamed  of  surrender.  Of  the  growing  num 
ber  of  Americans  who  recoiled  in  horror  from 
the  possibility  of  independence,  and  were 
beginning  to  show  their  dread  in  every  way, 
not  one  was  in  this  body.  It  represented 
only  the  radicals  in  the  several  colonies. 

The  action  of  Congress  has  been  charged 
with  inconsistency,  for  some  of  its  measures 
were  impelled  by  the  most  radical  members, 
others  by  the  conservatives.  On  the  one 
hand  it  declined  to  adopt  a  form  of  federa- 


64    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

tion  suggested  by  Franklin,  and  authorized 
Dickinson  to  draw  up  a  final,  respectful, 
almost  obsequious  petition  to  the  King  to 
avoid  war, — a  document  called  the  "Olive 
Branch";  but  on  the  other  hand  it  appointed 
Washington  to  command  the  troops  near 
Boston  as  a  Continental  commander,  adopted 
a  report  censuring  the  conciliatory  proposi 
tion  in  bold  language  and  issued  an  address 
justifying  with  extravagant  rhetoric  the  tak 
ing  up  of  arms.  Still  more  daring,  it  went  so 
far  as  to  assume  to  pay  the  so-called  "Con 
tinental  army"  by  means  of  issuing  bills  of 
credit,  redeemable  by  the  united  colonies. 
Later,  in  1775,  it  appointed  a  secret  committee 
to  correspond  with  friends  abroad,  and  under 
took  extensive  measures  for  raising  troops 
and  accumulating  military  stores.  To  the 
revolted  colonies,  who  found  themselves 
with  no  legal  authorities,  it  gave  the  advice 
to  form  such  governments  as  would  secure 
peace  and  good  order  during  the  continuance 
of  the  existing  dispute,  a  step  which  was 
promptly  taken  by  several. 

Fighting  meanwhile  went  on.  General 
Gage,  on  June  17,  undertook  to  drive  from 
Charlestown,  across  the  harbor  from  Boston,  a 
body  of  about  1500  provincial  troops  who  had 
intrenched  themselves  on  Breed's  Hill.  In 
all  about  3000  British  were  brought  to  the 
attack,  while  gunboats  raked  the  peninsula 


DISRUPTION  OP  THE  EMPIRE     65 

between  Charlestown  and  the  mainland, 
hindering  the  arrival  of  reinforcements. 
With  true  British  contempt  for  their  adver 
saries,  the  lines  of  red-uniformed  troops 
marched  under  the  hot  sun  up  the  hill,  to  be 
met  with  a  merciless  fire  at  short  range  from 
the  rifles,  muskets  and  fowling  pieces  of  the 
defenders.  Two  frontal  attacks  were  thus 
repelled  with  murderous  slaughter,  but  a 
third  attack,  delivered  over  the  same  ground, 
was  pushed  home  and  the  defenders  driven 
from  their  redoubt.  Never  was  a  victory 
more  handsomely  won  or  more  dearly  bought. 
The  assailants  lost  not  less  than  1000  out  of 
3000  engaged,  including  92  officers.  The 
Americans  lost  only  450,  but  that  was  almost 
as  large  a  proportion.  It  was  obvious  to  any 
intelligent  officer  that  the  Americans  might 
have  been  cut  off  from  behind  and  compelled 
to  surrender  without  being  attacked,  but 
Gage  and  his  subordinates  were  anxious  to 
teach  the  rebels  a  lesson.  The  result  of  this 
action,  known  in  history  as  "Bunker  Hill," 
was  to  render  him  and  nearly  all  the  officers 
who  served  against  Americans  unwilling 
ever  again  to  storm  intrenchments.  They 
discovered  that,  as  Putnam,  who  commanded 
part  of  the  forces,  observed,  the  militia  would 
fight  well  if  their  legs  were  covered.  They 
were  later  to  discover  the  converse,  that  with 
no  protection  militia  were  almost  useless. 


66    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

From  this  time  the  British  force  remained 
quietly  in  Boston,  fed  and  supplied  from 
England  at  immense  cost  and  making  no 
effort  to  attack  the  miscellaneous  levies 
which  General  Washington  undertook  to 
form  into  an  army  during  the  summer  and 
autumn.  Nothing  but  the  inaction  of  the 
British  made  it  possible  for  Washington's 
command  to  remain,  for  they  lacked  powder, 
bayonets,  horses  and,  most  serious  of  all, 
they  lacked  all  military  conceptions.  The 
elementary  idea  of  obedience  was  inconceiv 
able  to  them.  Washington's  irritation  over 
the  perfectly  unconcerned  democracy  of  the 
New  Englanders  was  extreme,  but  he  showed 
a  wonderful  patience  and  tenacity,  and  by 
sheer  persistence  began  to  create  something 
like  a  military  organization.  Yet  even  after 
months  of  drill  and  work  the  army  remained 
little  more  than"an  armed  mob.  At  length, 
in  March,  1776,  Washington  managed  to 
place  a  force  on  Dorchester  heights,  which 
commanded  the  harbor  from  the  south.  At 
first  Gage  had  some  idea  of  attacking,  but 
storms  intervened,  and  finally,  without  an 
other  blow,  he  evacuated  the  city  and  sailed 
with  all  his  force  to  Halifax.  So  ended  a 
siege  which  ought  never  to  have  lasted  a 
month  had  the  British  generals  been  seri 
ously  minded  to  break  it  up. 

Other  military  events  consisted  of  a  few 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      67 

skirmishes  in  Virginia  and  North  Carolina, 
where  the  governors  managed  to  raise  small 
forces  of  loyalists,  who  were  thoroughly  de 
feated  by  the  Whig  militia,  and  of  a  gallant 
but  hopeless  attempt  by  the  rebels  to  capture 
Canada.  After  some  futile  efforts  on  the 
part  of  Congress  to  induce  the  French  to 
revolt,  two  bodies  of  men,  in  the  autumn  of 
1775,  made  their  way  across  the  border.  One, 
entering  Canada  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain, 
occupied  Montreal,and  then  advanced  against 
Quebec,  where  it  was  joined  by  the  other, 
which,  with  great  hardships,  had  penetrated 
through  the  wilderness  of  northern  Maine. 
The  commanders,  Richard  Montgomery, 
Benedict  Arnold  and  Daniel  Morgan  of 
Virginia,  were  men  of  daring,  but  their  force, 
numbering  not  more  than  1000,  was  inade 
quate,  and,  after  the  failure  of  an  effort  to 
carry  the  place  by  surprise  on  the  night  of 
December  31, — in  which  Montgomery  was 
killed  and  Morgan  captured, — they  were  un 
able  to  do  more  than  maintain  a  blockade 
outside  the  fortress. 

The  action  of  the  North  ministry  during 
these  months  showed  no  deviation  from  its 
policy  of  enforcing  submission.  The  Olive 
Branch  petition  was  refused  a  reception  and 
a  proclamation  was  issued  declaring  the 
colonies  in  rebellion  and  warning  all  subjects 
against  traitorous  correspondence.  When 


68    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Parliament  met  in  November,  1775,  the 
opposition,  led  as  usual  by  Burke,  made  one 
more  effort  to  avoid  civil  war,  but  the  minis 
terial  party  rejected  all  proposals  for  con 
ciliation  and  devoted  itself  to  preparing  to 
crush  the  rebellion.  On  December  22,  an  act 
became  law,  which,  if  enforced,  would  have 
been  a  sentence  of  death  to  all  colonial 
economic  life.  It  superseded  the  Boston 
Port  Act  and  the  restraining  acts,  absolutely 
prohibited  all  commerce  with  the  revolted 
colonies  and  authorized  the  impressment  into 
the  navy  of  all  seamen  found  on  vessels 
captured  under  the  act. 

Military  and  naval  preparations  were  slow 
and  costly.  The  Admiralty  and  War  Office, 
unprepared  for  a  general  war,  had  insufficient 
troops  and  sailors,  and  had  to  collect  or 
create  supplies  and  equipment.  The  Earl  of 
Sandwich  showed  activity,  but  slight  capacity 
as  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty.  Viscount 
Barrington  had  been  secretary  at  war  under 
Pitt  during  the  French  war,  but  he  lacked 
force  and  influence.  Hence,  although  Parlia 
ment  voted  50,000  troops,  there  was  con 
fusion  and  delay.  To  secure  a  prompt 
supply  of  men,  the  ministry  took  the  step 
of  hiring  German  mercenaries  from  the  lesser 
Rhine  princes, — Hesse,  Waldeck  and  others, 
— at  a  rate  per  head  with  a  fixed  sum  for 
deaths.  This  practice  was  customary  in 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      69 

wars  when  England  was  obliged  to  protect 
Hanover  from  the  French,  but  to  use  the 
same  method  against  their  own  kindred  in 
America  was  looked  upon  with  aversion  by 
many  English,  and  aroused  ungovernable 
indignation  in  all  Americans.  It  seemed  to 
show  a  callousness  toward  all  ties  of  blood  and 
speech  which  rendered  any  hope  of  reconcilia 
tion  futile.  The  war  was  not,  in  fact,  popular 
in  England.  The  task  of  conquering  rebels 
was  not  relished  by  many,  and  officers  and 
noblemen  of  Whig  connections  in  some  cases 
resigned  their  commissions  rather  than  serve. 
The  parliamentary  opposition  denounced  the 
war  with  fiery  zeal  as  an  iniquity  and  a 
scandal.  Nevertheless  the  general  opinion 
in  England  supported  the  ministry  in  its  de 
termination  to  assert  the  national  strength; 
for  the  colonial  behavior  seemed  to  the 
average  Englishman  as  nothing  more  or  less 
than  impudent  sedition,  to  yield  to  which 
would  be  disgrace. 

To  the  Americans  the  British  action  in 
1776  showed  that  the  only  alternatives  were 
submission  or  fighting;  and,  if  the  latter  must 
be  chosen,  then  it  was  the  feeling  of  a  grow 
ing  number  that  independence  was  the  only 
outcome.  There  now  went  on  a  contest  be 
tween  conservatives,  including  on  one  side 
those  who  opposed  all  civil  war,  those  who 
were  willing  to  fight  to  defend  rights  but 


70    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

who  were  unwilling  to  abandon  hopes  of 
forcing  England  to  surrender  its  claims,  and 
those  whose  businesses  and  connections 
were  closely  interwoven  with  the  mother 
country  and  all  the  radicals  on  the  other.  Un 
fortunately  for  the  conservatives  they  had 
only  fear,  or  sentiment,  for  arguments,  since 
the  North  ministry  gave  them  nothing  to 
urge  upon  doubtful  men.  Still  more  un 
fortunately  they  were,  as  a  rule,  outside  the 
revolutionary  organizations  of  conventions 
and  committees,  and  were  themselves  without 
means  of  cooperating. 

In  the  excitement  and  tension  of  the  time 
the  ruder  and  rougher  classes  tended  to 
identify  all  reluctance  to  join  in  the  revolution 
as  equivalent  to  upholding  the  North  policy, 
and  to  attack  as  Tories  all  who  did  not 
heartily  support  the  revolutionary  cause. 
Violence  and  intimidation  rapidly  made  them 
selves  felt.  Loyalists  were  threatened,  forced 
by  mobs  to  sign  the  Association;  their  houses 
were  defiled,  their  movements  watched. 
Then  arms  were  taken  from  them,  and  in  case 
they  showed  anger  or  temper  they  were 
occasionally  whipped  or  even  tarred  and 
feathered.  In  this  way  a  determined  minor 
ity,  backed  by  the  poorer  and  rougher  classes, 
overrode  all  opposition  and  swelled  a  rising 
cry  for  independence. 

The  Congress  was  slow,  for  it  felt  the  need 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE     71 

of  unanimity,  and  such  colonies  as  New  York 
and  Pennsylvania  were  controlled  by  moder 
ates.  But  at  length,  in  June,  1776,  spurred  on 
by  the  Virginia  delegates  and  by  the  tireless 
urgings  of  the  Massachusetts  leaders,  the 
body  acted.  Already  some  of  the  colonies 
had  adopted  constitutions  whose  language 
indicated  their  independence.  Now  the 
Continental  Congress,  after  a  final  debate, 
adopted  a  Declaration  of  Independence, 
drafted  by  Jefferson  of  Virginia  and  sup 
ported  by  the  eloquence  of  John  Adams  and 
the  influence  of  Franklin.  Basing  their 
position  on  the  doctrines  of  the  natural  right 
of  men  to  exercise  full  self-government  and 
to  change  their  form  of  government  when 
it  became  oppressive,  the  colonies,  in  this 
famous  document,  imitated  the  English  Dec 
laration  of  Rights  of  1689  in  drawing  up  a 
bill  of  indictment  against  George  Ill's  gov 
ernment.  In  this  can  be  discovered  every 
cause  of  resentment  and  every  variety  of 
complaint  which  the  thirteen  colonies  were 
ready  to  put  forward.  Practically  all  were 
political.  There  were  allusions  in  plenty 
to  the  wrangles  between  governors  and  as 
semblies,  denunciations  of  the  parliamentary 
taxes  and  the  coercing  acts,  but  no  reference 
to  the  Acts  of  Trade.  To  the  end,  the  colo 
nists,  even  in  the  act  of  declaring  independ 
ence,  found  their  grievances  in  the  field  of 


72    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

government  and  not  in  economic  regula 
tion.  What  they  wanted  was  the  unrestricted 
power  to  legislate  for  themselves  and  to  tax. 
I/  or  refrain  from  taxing  themselves.  When 
these  powers  were  diminished  their  whole 
political  ideal  was  ruined,  and  they  preferred 
independence  to  what  they  considered  ser 
vitude.  Such  ideas  were  beyond  the  com 
prehension  of  most  Englishmen,  to  whom  the 
whole  thing  was  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
plain  disloyalty,  however  cloaked  in  specious 
words  and  glittering  generalities. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  rupture  was^due 
to  a  spirit  of  independence  in  America  which, 
in  spite  of  all  disclaimers,  was  determined  to 
be  entirely  free  from  the  mother  country. 
Such  was  the  assertion  of  the  Tories  and 
officials  of  the  time,  and  the  same  idea  is  not 
infrequently  repeated  at  the  present  day. 
But  the  truth  is  that  the  colonists  would 
have  been  contented  to  remain  indefinitely 
in  union  with  England,  subjects  of  the  British 
crown,  sharers  of  the  British  commercial 
empire,  provided  they  could  have  been  sure 
of  complete  local  self-government.  The 
independence  they  demanded  was  far  less 
than  that  now  enjoyed  by  the  great  colonial 
unions  of  Canada,  Australia  and  South 
Africa.  It  may  be  assumed,  of  course,  that 
unless  Parliament  exercised  complete  au 
thority  over  internal  as  well  as  external 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  EMPIRE      73 

matters — to  employ  the  then  customary 
distinction — there  was  no  real  imperial  bond. 
Such  was  the  position  unanimously  taken  by 
the  North  ministry  and  the  Tories  in  1776. 
But  in  view  of  the  subsequent  history  of  the 
English  colonies  it  seems  hardly  deniable 
that  some  relationship  similar  to  the  ex 
isting  colonial  one  might  have  been  perpetu 
ated  had  the  Whig  policy  advocated  by 
Burke  been  adopted  and  the  right  of  Parlia 
ment  "to  bind  the  colonies  in  all  cases  what 
soever"  been  allowed  to  drop,  in  practice. 
The  obstinate  localism  of  the  colonies  was 
such  that  not  until  a  generation  after  the 
Revolution  did  a  genuine  American  national 
sentiment  appear.  The  colonies  were  driven 
to  act  together  in  1774-1776,  but  not  to  fuse, 
by  a  danger  not  to  national  but  to  local  in 
dependence.  This  fact  indicates  how  sharply 
defined  was  the  field  which  the  Americans 
insisted  on  having  free  from  parliamentary 
invasion.  Had  it  been  possible  for  England 
to  recognize  this  fact  there  would  have  been 
no  revolution. 

It  is  of  course  obvious  that  the  traditional 
American  view  of  the  Revolution  as  caused 
by  tyranny  and  oppression  is  symbolical  if 
not  fictitious.  The  British  government,  in 
all  its  measures,  from  1763  to  1774,  was  mod 
erate,  hesitating  and  at  worst  irritating. 
Its  action  threatened  to  destroy  the  practi- 


74    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

cal  independence  of  the  colonial  assemblies; 
but  the  danger  was  political.  Even  the  five 
"intolerable  acts"  inflicted  hardship  on  the 
town  of  Boston  alone.  It  was  not  until  the 
year  1775,  when  Parliament  imposed  severe 
commercial  restrictions,  that  anything  re 
sembling  actual  oppression  began,  but  by 
that  time  the  colonies  were  in  open  revolt. 
Yet  this  fact  only  emphasizes,  as  Burke 
pointed  out,  the  criminal  folly  of  the  North 
ministry  in  allowing  the  situation  to  become 
dangerous.  It  was  the  misfortune  of  the 
British  people  in  the  eighteenth  century  that 
in  the  critical  years  after  1767,  George  III 
and  his  ministers  were  unable  to  conceive  of 
any  value  in  colonies  which  were  not  in  the 
full  sense  dependencies,  and  were  narrowly 
limited  by  the  economic  ideas  of  their  time 
and  the  social  conventions  of  their  class. 
Since  the  colonies  had  developed,  unchecked, 
their  own  political  life  under  British  govern 
ment,  it  was  not  their  duty  humbly  to  sur 
render  all  that  had  come  to  be  identical  with 
liberty  in  their  eyes.  It  was  the  duty  of  the 
British  statesmen  to  recognize  the  situation 
and  deal  with  it.  This  they  failed  to  do  and 
the  result  was  revolution. 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       75 
CHAPTER  IV 

THE    CIVIL   WAR   IN   THE   EMPIRE,    1776-1778 

IN  the  war  which  now  began  the  military 
situation  was  such  that  neither  side  could 
look  forward  to  an  easy  victory.  The  Eng 
lish  home  country  outweighed  the  colonies 
in  population  by  three  or  four  to  one;  and 
in  every  element  of  military  strength  to  a 
much  greater  degree.  There  was  a  standing 
army,  an  ample  sufficiency  of  professional  offi 
cers,  the  most  powerful  navy  in  the  world, 
the  full  machinery  of  financial  administra 
tion,  abundant  credit  and  wealthy  manu 
facturing  and  agricultural  classes  which  had 
already  shown  their  power  to  carry  the 
burdens  of  a  world  contest  without  flinching. 
With  a  powerful  party  ministry  endowed 
with  full  discretion  in  the  ordering  of  military 
affairs  there  was  little  danger  of  divided 
councils  or  of  inability  to  secure  responsible 
direction.  North,  Sandwich  at  the  Admi 
ralty,  Barrington  as  Secretary  at  War,  Ger- 
maine  as  Secretary  for  the  Colonies,  could 
command  the  active  support  of  the  King, 
the  Parliament,  and,  it  appeared,  of  the 
people. 

On  the  other  hand  it  was  necessary  to 
carry  on  war  at  3000  miles  distance  from  the 
base  of  supplies,  and  to  feed  and  clothe  the 


76  ;  ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

armies  entirely  from  home.  The  cost  was 
certain  to  be  extremely  heavy  and  the 
practical  difficulties  of  management  arising 
from  the  distance  were  sure  to  be  great,  unless 
a  competent  commander  were  to  be  given 
complete  authority  in  the  colonies.  Then, 
too,  the  problem  was  not  one  of  conquering 
cities  or  single  strategic  points,  or  of  de 
feating  a  rival  state,  but  of  so  thoroughly 
beating  down  resistance  as  to  lead  the 
Americans  to  abandon  their  revolution  and 
submit  to  the  extinction  of  their  new-formed 
confederation.  Armies  must  operate  inland 
from  a  seacoast  where  landing  was  easy  in 
hundreds  of  places,  but  where  almost  every 
step  took  them  into  a  rough  country,  ill- 
provided  with  roads  and  lacking  in  easily 
collected  supplies.  In  spite  of  all  advantages 
of  military  power,  the  problem  before  the 
British  government  was  one  calling  for  the 
highest  forms  of  military  capacity,  and  this, 
by  an  unexplained  ill-fortune,  was  conspicu 
ously  lacking.  Not  a  British  general  who 
commanded  in  America  failed  to  show  fight 
ing  ability  and  tactical  sense,  but  not  one  of 
them  possessed  the  kind  of  genius  which 
grasps  the  true  military  ends  of  any  cam 
paign  and  ignores  minor  points  for  the  sake 
of  winning  decisive  advantages.  Perhaps  it 
would  be  unjust  to  apply  to  the  British 
forces  in  this  war  the  designation  won  in 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       77 

1744 — "armies  of  lions  led  by  asses";  but 
the  analogy  is  at  least  suggested. 

Still  more  serious  was  the  fact  that  the 
Nortiu  ministry  was  cliosgn  mainly  on  the 
basis  of  the  willingness  of  its  members  to 
execute_the  King's  or3grs  and  use  their  in 
fluence  and  parliamentary  power  and  con 
nections  in  his  behalf.  North  himself,  able 
as  a  parliamentarian,  was jrresolute  in  policy, 
ignoranjL  pf  war  and  careless  in  administra 
tion;  Weymouth  and  Suffolk,  the  Secre 
taries,  were  of  slight  ability;  Lord  George 
Germaine,  Secretary  for  the  Colonies,  was 
arroganfCcareless  and  lacking  in  military 
insight;  Barrington,  Secretary  at  War,  pos 
sessed  administrative  ability,  but  was  with 
out  personal  weight  in  the  cabinet;  Sand 
wich  at  the  Admiralty  was  grossly  inefficient. 
There  was  not  a  single  member  of  the  cabinet 
fitted  to  carry  on  war,  or  able  to  influence 
George  III.  For  such  a  body  of  men  to 
undertake  to  direct  the  operations  in  America 
at  the  distance  of  3000  miles  was  a  worse 
blunder  than  it  would  have  been  to  commit 
the  conduct  of  the  war  to  any  one  of  the 
generals  in  the  field,  however  commonplace 
his  abilities. 

On  the  side  of  the  colonists  the  problem 
of  fighting  the  full  power  of  England  was 
apparently  a  desperate  one.  The  militia, 
with  superior  numbers,  had  chased  the  British 


78    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

from  Concord  and  had  made  a  stubborn  de 
fence  at  Bunker  Hill;  but  the  British  <were 
about  to  move  with  overwhelming  strength. 
To  raise,  equip,  clothe  and  feed  armies  was 
the  task  of  a  strong  administration,  and  there 
was  nothing  of  the  kind  in  America.  The 
ex-colonists  not  only  had  never  known 
efficient  administration;  they  had  fought 
against  any  and  all  administration  for  gen 
erations,  and  their  leaders  had  won  their  fame 
as  opponents  of  all  executive  power.  To 
thunder  against  royal  oppression  won  ap 
plause,  but  indicated  no  ability  at  raising 
money  and  organizing  such  things  as  com 
missariat,  artillery  or  a  navy,  and  it  may  be 
said  of  such  men  as  Samuel  Adams,  Robert 
Morris,  Roger  Sherman,  John  Rutledge, 
Patrick  Henry  and  Thomas  Jefferson  that 
their  administrative  training  was  as  far  be 
low  that  of  their  enemies  in  the  North  min 
istry  as  their  political  capacity  was,  in  gen 
eral,  superior.  The  Continental  Congress, 
moreover,  which  assumed  responsibility  for 
the  army,  could  only  recommend  measures 
to  the  states  and  call  upon  them  Jto  furnish 
troops  and  money.  In  contrast  to  the  states, 
which  derived  their  powers  unquestionably 
from  the  voters  within  their  boundaries  and 
could  command  their  obedience,  the  Congress 
had  no  legal  or  constitutional  basis  and  was 
nothing  more  than  the  meeting  place  of 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       79 

delegates  from  voluntary  allies.  Such  mili 
tary  authority  as  it  exercised  rested  entirely 
upon  the  general  agreement  of  the  states. 
National  government,  in  short,  did  not 
exist.  Still  more  serious  was  the  fact 
that  there  were  very  few  trained  officers  in 
America.  The  American  military  leaders, 
such  as  Washington,  Greene,  Wayne,  Sulli 
van,  were  distinctly  inferior  in  soldiership 
to  their  antagonists,  although  Washington 
and  Greene  developed  greater  strategic  abil 
ity  after  many  blunders.  It  was  only 
through  sundry  military  adventurers,  some 
English, — such  as  Montgomery,  Gates,  Lee, 
Conway, — others  European, — such  as  De 
Kalb,  Steuben,  Pulaski, — that  something  of 
the  military  art  could  be  acquired. 

Most  serious  of  all,  there  were  no  troops 
in  America  who  comprehended  the  nature 
of  military  discipline.  The  conception  of 
obedience  to  orders,  of  military  duty,  of  the 
absolute  necessity  of  holding  steady,  was 
beyond  the  range  of  most  Americans.  They 
regarded  war  as  something  to  be  carried  on 
in  their  own  neighborhoods,  and  resisted 
obstinately  being  drawn  outside  their  own 
states.  They  refused  to  enlist  for  longer 
than  a  few  months,  since  they  felt  it  impera 
tive  to  return  to  look  after  their  farms.  They 
had  little  regard  for  men  from  different 
sections,  distrusted  commanders  from  any 


80    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

state  but  their  own,  and  had  no  loyalty  of 
any  description  to  the  Continental  Congress. 
They  were,  in  short,  still  colonists,  such  as 
generations  of  training  had  made  them;  very 
angry  with  Great  Britain,  infuriated  at 
Tories  and  glad  to  be  independent,  but  un 
able  to  realize  the  meaning  of  it  all  even 
under  the  terrible  stress  of  war. 

Under  the  circumstances  the  task  of  the 
men  to  whose  lot  it  fell  to  lead  the  Ameri 
can  forces  was  such  as  to  tax  to  the  utmost 
not  only  their  military  skill  but  their  ability  to 
control,  inspire  and  persuade  the  most  refrac 
tory  and  unreliable  of  material.  When  to  this 
were  added  the  facts  that  the  colonies  were 
almost  wholly  lacking  in  manufactures,  ex 
cept  those  of  the  most  rudimentary  sort, 
that  they  had  little  capital  that  was  not  in 
the  form  of  land,  buildings,  vessels  and  crops, 
and  that  whatever  revenue  they  had  been 
in  the  habit  of  deriving  from  commerce  was 
liable  to  be  destroyed  by  the  British  naval 
supremacy,  it  is  easily  seen  that  the  disad 
vantages  of  the  home  country  were  actually 
counterbalanced  by  the  still  more  crushing 
disadvantages  of  the  revolting  colonies. 

In  the  summer  of  1776  the  British  ad 
vanced  from  two  quarters.  In  the  north,  as 
soon  as  navigation  opened,  men-of-war  sailed 
up  the  St.  Lawrence  and  brought  reinforce 
ments  to  Quebec.  The  relics  of  the  American 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       81 

force,  unable  to  maintain  themselves  in 
Canada,  abandoned  their  conquests  with 
out  a  blow  and  retreated  into  the  Lake 
Champlain  region,  there  intending  to  hold 
the  forts  at  Crown  Point  and  Ticonderoga. 
Col.  Guy  Carleton,  the  new  commander,  soon 
was  able  to  move  southward  with  over 
whelming  numbers,  but,  after  reaching  the 
northern  end  of  Lake  Champlain,  he  found 
that  body  of  water  commanded  by  a  small 
squadron  of  gunboats  under  Benedict  Arnold, 
and  deeming  it  impossible  to  advance,  de 
layed  all  summer  in  order  to  construct  a 
rival  fleet.  Meanwhile  all  operations  came 
to  a  standstill  in  that  region.  Eleven  thou 
sand  men,  chiefly  regular  troops,  were  thus 
kept  inactive  for  months. 

The  principal  British  force  gathered  at 
Halifax  and  sailed  directly  against  New  York. 
It  was  there  joined  by  the  remains  of  a  naval 
expedition  which  had  endeavored  in  Jun*, 
1776,  to  capture  Charleston,  South  Carolina, 
but  had  suffered  severely  in  an  attempt  to 
bombard  Fort  Moultrie  and  been  compelled 
to  withdraw.  This  success,  which  raised 
the  spirits  of  the  rebels,  was,  however,  the 
last  they  were  to  enjoy  for  many  months. 
The  main  British  expedition  was  expected 
to  overpower  all  colonial  resistance,  for  it 
comprised  a  fleet  of  men-of-war,  and  an  army 
of  no  less  than  31,000  men,  including  Ger- 


82    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

man  mercenaries,  fully  equipped,  drilled 
and  provisioned.  The  admiral  in  command, 
Lord  Howe,  a  Whig,  was  authorized  to  issue 
pardons  in  return  for  submission,  and  evi 
dently  expected  the  mere  presence  of  so 
powerful  an  armament  to  cause  the  collapse 
of  all  resistance.  His  brother,  Sir  William 
Howe,  who  commanded  the  army,  was  a 
good  officer,  in  actual  fighting,  but  a  man  of 
little  energy  or  activity,  and  unwilling,  ap 
parently,  to  cause  the  revolted  colonies  any 
more  suffering  than  was  necessary.  He  was, 
moreover,  quite  without  military  insight  of 
the  larger  kind,  failing  to  recognize  the 
peculiar  character  of  the  war  upon  which  he 
was  entering  and  acting,  when  pushing  on  a 
campaign,  precisely  as  though  he  were 
operating  against  a  European  army  in  west 
Germany. 

In  spite,  however,  of  all  deficiencies,  it 
seemed  as  though  Howe  could  not  fail  to 
crush  the  undisciplined  collection  of  17,000 
militia  and  minute  men  with  which  Wash 
ington  endeavored  to  meet  him  at  New 
York.  Controlling  the  harbor  and  the  rivers 
with  his  fleet  he  could  move  anywhere  and 
direct  superior  numbers  against  any  Ameri 
can  position.  The  first  blow,  struck  after 
futile  efforts  at  negotiation,  was  aimed  at 
an  American  force  which  held  Brooklyn 
Heights  on  Long  Island.  About  20,000 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       83 

British  and  Hessian  troops  were  landed  on 
August  22,  and  five  days  later  they  out 
flanked  and  crushed  a  body  of  Americans 
placed  to  obstruct  their  advance.  There 
remained  the  American  intrenchments,  which 
were  weak  and  ill-defended,  but  Howe  re 
fused  to  attack,  probably  with  memories 
of  Bunker  Hill  in  his  mind.  Washington 
managed,  owing  to  favorable  rainy  weather, 
to  remove  his  beaten  force  by  night  on 
August  29,  but  only  the  inaction  of  Howe 
enabled  them  to  escape  capture. 

There  followed  a  delay  of  two  weeks,  dur 
ing  which  Admiral  Howe  tried  to  secure  an 
interview  with  American  leaders,  in  hopes 
of  inducing  the  rebels  to  submit;  but  finding 
Franklin,  Adams  and  Rutledge — commis 
sioners  named  by  Congress — immovably  com 
mitted  to  independence,  he  was  compelled 
to  renew  hostilities.  There  ensued  next  a 
slow  campaign  in  which  General  Howe  easily 
forced  Washington  to  evacuate  New  York, 
to  retreat  northward  and  after  various 
skirmishes  to  withdraw  over  the  Hudson 
River  into  New  Jersey.  At  no  time  did 
Washington  risk  a  general  engagement;  at 
no  time  did  he  inflict  any  significant  loss 
upon  his  antagonist  or  hinder  his  advance, 
The  militia  were  in  fact  almost  useless  in  the 
open  field,  and  only  dared  linger  before  the 
oncoming  redcoats  when  intrenched  or  when 


84    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

behind  walls  and  fences.  Many  of  them  from 
New  England  grew  discouraged  and  home 
sick,  and  left  the  moment  their  short  enlist 
ments  expired,  so  that  without  any  serious 
battles  Washington's  so-called  army  dwindled 
week  by  week.  On  November  16  a  severe 
loss  was  incurred  through  the  effort  of  Gen 
eral  Greene  to  hold  Fort  Washington,  which 
commanded  the  Hudson  River  from  the 
heights  at  the  northern  end  of  Manhattan 
Island.  This  stronghold,  besieged  by  Howe, 
made  a  fair  defence,  but  was  taken  by  storm 
and  the  whole  garrison  captured.  The  Ameri 
can  army  then,  in  two  detachments,  under 
Washington  and  Lee  respectively,  was  obliged 
to  retreat  across  New  Jersey,  followed  by  the 
British  under  Cornwallis,  until,  by  Decem 
ber  8,  the  remnant  was  at  Philadelphia  in 
a  state  of  great  discouragement  and  demorali 
zation.  The  Continental  Congress,  fearing 
capture,  fled  to  Baltimore  and,  moved  to 
desperate  measures,  passed  a  resolution 
giving  Washington  for  six  months  unlimited 
authority  to  raise  recruits,  appoint  and  dis 
miss  officers,  impress  provisions  and  arrest 
loyalists.  Howe  felt  that  the  rebellion  was 
at  an  end.  On  November  30  he  issued  a 
proclamation  offering  pardon  to  all  who 
would  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  within 
sixty  days,  and  farmers  in  New  Jersey  took 
it  by  hundreds,  securing  in  return  a  certificate 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       85 

of  loyalty.  The  rebels'  cause  seemed  lost. 
But  at  the  moment  when,  if  ever,  it  was  worth 
while  to  push  pursuit  to  the  uttermost,  with 
the  prospect  of  reducing  three  colonies  and 
breaking  up  all  show  of  resistance,  Howe, 
satisfied  with  his  campaign,  began  to  prepare 
winter  quarters. 

To  the  northward  a  similar  fatality  seemed 
to  prevent  full  British  success.  During  the 
summer  General  Guy  Carleton  waited  at  the 
northern  end  of  Lake  Champlain  while  his 
carpenters  built  gunboats.  Month  after 
month  went  by  until,  on  October  11,  the 
British  vessels  engaged  Arnold's  inferior 
flotilla.  Two  days  of  hot  fighting  with 
musketry  and  cannon  resulted  in  the  de 
struction  of  the  American  squadron,  so  that 
the  way  seemed  clear  for  Carleton  to  advance; 
but  the  season  was  late,  the  difficulties  of 
getting  provisions  from  Canada  seemed  ex 
cessive,  and  on  November  2  the  British 
withdrew.  Here  again  only  extreme  caution 
and  slowness  permitted  the  colonial  army  to 
hold  its  ground.  Yet  it  seemed  doubtful 
whether  the  American  cause  might  not  col 
lapse  even  without  further  pressure,  for  the 
"armies"  were  almost  gone  by  sheer  dis 
integration.  General  Schuyler  had  a  scanty 
3000  near  Lake  Champlain;  Washington 
could  not  muster  over  6000  at  Philadelphia, 
and  these  were  on  the  point  of  going  home. 


86    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

The  attempt  to  carry  on  the  war  by  volun 
tary  militia  fighting  was  a  visible  failure. 

At  this  stage,  the  darkest  hour,  Washing 
ton,  who  had  never  dared  to  risk  a  battle/ 
took  the  bold  step  of  recrossing  the  Delaware 
with  part  of  his  half-starved  and  shivering 
troops  and  captured  nearly  all  of  a  Hessian 
encampment  at  Trenton  on  December  25. 
Further,  he  drew  on  Cornwallis  to  advance 
against  him,  skirmished  successfully  on 
January  2,  and  then,  moving  by  a  night 
march  to  the  British  rear,  defeated  a  regi 
ment  at  Princeton.  Cornwallis,  with  7000 
men,  was  out-generaled  by  Washington  in 
this  affair,  which  was  the  first  really  aggres 
sive  blow  struck  by  the  Americans.  The 
result  was  to  lead  Howe  to  abandon  the 
effort  to  hold  all  of  New  Jersey,  while  Wash 
ington  was  able  to  post  his  men  in  winter 
quarters  at  Morristown,  where  he  could 
watch  every  British  move.  This  masterly 
little  campaign,  carried  on  under  every  dis 
advantage,  made  Washington's  fame  secure, 
and  undoubtedly  saved  the  American  revolu 
tion  from  breaking  down.  It  revived  fight 
ing  spirit,'  encouraged  the  Congress  and  the 
people  and  created  a  faith  in  Washington 
on  the  part  of  the  soldiers  and  farmers  which 
was  destined  to  grow  steadily  into  love  and 
veneration.  With  no  particular  military 
insight  beyond  common  sense  and  the  com- 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       87 

prehension  of  military  virtues,  he  was  a  man 
of  iron  will,  extreme  personal  courage  and  a 
patience  and  tenacity  which  had  no  limit. 

Congress  now  showed  that  its  members 
realized  in  part  the  military  lesson,  for  it 
authorized  a  standing  regular  army  and 
gave  Washington  power  to  establish  it  and 
appoint  lower  officers.  It  was  a  hard  task  to 
induce  any  Americans  to  enlist  in  such  an 
organization,  but  little  by  little  there  were 
collected  "Continental  troops"  who  did  not 
rush  back  to  their  family  duties  at  the  end  of 
three  months,  but  stayed  and  grew  in  dis 
cipline  and  steadiness.  Yet  Washington 
never  could  count  on  more  than  a  few  thou 
sand  such;  Americans  in  general  simply 
would  not  fight  except  under  pressure  [of 
invasion  and  in  defence  of  their  homes. 

During  the  year  1776-7  the  revolted  com 
munities  assumed  something  of  the  appear 
ance  of  settled  governments.  The  states  re 
placed  their  revolutionary  conventions  with 
constitutions  closely  modelled  upon  their 
provincial  institutions  but  with  elective 
governors  and,  to  safeguard  liberty,  with  full 
control  over  legislation,  taxation  and  most 
offices  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  legislatures. 
Executive  power  was  confined  mainly  to 
military  matters.  The  Continental  Con 
gress  continued  to  act  as  a  grand  committee 
of  safety,  framing  recommendations  and 


88    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

requests  to  the  states  and  issuing  paper 
money  on  the  credit  of  its  constituents. 
Military  administration  proved  a  task  be 
yond  the  capacity  of  the  new  governments, 
even  for  such  diminutive  armies  as  those 
which  guarded  the  northern  frontier  and 
New  Jersey,  and  the  forces  suffered  from  lack 
of  food,  covering  and  powder.  The  country 
had  few  sources  of  supplies  and  wretched 
roads. 

In  1777,  when  spring  opened,  the  British 
armies  slowly  prepared  to  push  matters  to  a 
definite  conclusion.  The  North  cabinet, 
especially  Lord  George  Germaine,  had  no 
single  coherent  plan  of  operations  beyond 
continuing  the  lines  laid  down  in  1776.  It 
was  early  planned  to  have  the  Canadian 
force  march  southward  and  join  Howe,  col 
lecting  supplies  and  gathering"  recruits  as  it 
traversed  New  York.  Howe  was  told  that 
he  was  expected  to  cooperate,  but  was  not 
prevented  from  substituting  a  plan  of  his 
own  which  involved  capturing  Philadelphia, 
the  chief  American  town,  and,  as  the  seat 
of  the  Continental  Congress,  the  "rebel 
capital."  Germaine  merely  intimated  that 
Howe  ought  to  make  such  speedy  work  as 
to  return  in  time  to  meet  the  Canadian  force, 
but  did  not  give  him  any  positive  order,  so 
Howe  considered  his  plan  approved.  In 
leisurely  fashion  he  tried  twice  to  march 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       89 

across  New  Jersey  in  June,  but,  although 
he  had  17,000  to  Washington's  8000,  he 
would  not  risk  leaving  the  latter  in  his  rear 
and  withdrew.  He  next  determined  to  move 
by  water,  and  began  the  sea  journey  on 
July  5.  This  process  occupied  not  less  than 
six  weeks,  since  he  first  tried  to  sail  up  the 
Delaware,  only  to  withdraw  from  before 
the  American  forts;  and  it  was  not  until 
August  22  that  he  finally  landed  his  men 
at  the  head  of  Chesapeake  Bay. 

Meanwhile  General  Burgoyne,  a  man  of 
fashion  as  well  as  an  officer,  began  his  march 
southward  from  Lake  Champlain  with  7500 
men  and  some  Indian  allies,  forced  the 
Americans  to  evacuate  Fort  Ticonderoga 
without  a  blow,  and  chased  the  garrison  to 
the  southward  and  eastward.  Pushing  for 
ward  in  spite  of  blocked  roads  and  burned 
bridges,  he  reached  the  Hudson  River  on 
August  1  without  mishap  and  there  halted 
to  collect  provisions  and  await  reinforce 
ments  from  Tories  and  from  a  converging 
expedition  under  St.  Leger,  which  was  to  join 
him  by  way  of  Lake  Ontario  and  the  Mohawk 
Valley.  Up  to  this  time  the  American  defence 
had  been  futile.  It  seemed  as  though  noth 
ing  could  stop  Burgoyne's  advance.  Con 
gress  now  appointed  a  new  general,  Gates, 
to  whom  Washington  sent  General  Morgan 
with  some  of  his  best  troops.  While  Burgoyne 


90    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

waited,  the  militia  of  New  England  began 
collecting,  and  presently,  on  August  15  and  16, 
two  detachments  of  the  British  sent  to  seize 
stores  at  Bennington  were  surrounded  and 
captured.  St.  Leger,  unable  to  manage  his 
Indian  allies,  or  force  the  surrender  of  the 
American  fort  Stanwix,  was  obliged,  on 
August  22,  to  retreat.  Burgoyne,  with 
diminishing  forces  and  no  hope  of  reinforce 
ment,  found  himself  confronted  by  rapidly 
growing  swarms  of  enemies.  At  the  moment 
when  his  need  of  cooperation  from  Howe 
became  acute,  the  latter  general  was  two 
hundred  miles  away  in  Pennsylvania. 

Under  the  circumstances  the  two  cam 
paigns  worked  themselves  out  to  independent 
conclusions.  In  Pennsylvania  Washington 
boldly  marched  his  summer  army  with  its 
nucleus  of  veterans  out  to  meet  the  British 
and  challenged  a  battle  along  the  banks  of 
the  Brandy  wine  creek.  On  September  11, 
Howe,  with  18,000,  methodically  attacked 
Washington,  who  had  not  over  11,000,  sent 
a  flanking  column  around  his  right  wing  and 
after  a  stiff  resistance  pushed  the  Americans 
from  the  field.  There  was  no  pursuit,  and 
four  days  later  Washington  was  prevented 
only  by  bad  weather  from  risking  another 
fight.  He  did  not  feel  able  to  prevent  Howe 
from  entering  Philadelphia  on  September  27, 
but  on  October  3,  taking  advantage  of  a 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       91 

division  of  the  British  army,  he  assumed  the 
offensive  at  Germantown  and  brought  his 
unsteady  forces  into  action,  only  to  suffer 
another  defeat.  With  this  Washington  was 
forced  to  abandon  operations  in  the  field 
and  to  go  into  winter  quarters  at  Valley 
Forge,  not  far  from  the  city,  while  Howe 
besieged  and  on  November  2  took  the 
American  forts  on  the  Delaware.  The 
British  campaign  was  successful,  Philadel 
phia  was  theirs  and  they  had  won  every 
engagement.  But  nothing  shows  more  clearly 
Washington's  ability  as  a  fighter  and  leader 
than  his  stubborn  contest  against  odds  in 
this  summer. 

Meanwhile  the  Northern  campaign  came 
to  its  conclusion.  By  September,  Gates,  the 
new  commander,  found  himself  at  the  head 
of  nearly  20,000  men,  and  Burgoyne's  case 
grew  desperate.  He  made  two  efforts  to 
break  through  to  the  southward,  at  Freeman's 
Farm,  and  again  at  Bemis  Heights,  but  was 
met  by  superior  numbers  and  overwhelmed 
in  spite  of  the  gallantry  of  his  troops.  Forced 
back  to  Saratoga  on  the  Hudson  River,  he 
was  surrounded  and  at  length  compelled  to 
surrender,  on  October  17.  Sir  Henry  Clin 
ton,  who  commanded  the  British  garrison  of 
New  York  in  Howe's  absence,  sent  a  small 
expedition  up  the  Hudson,  but  it  did  not 
penetrate  nearer  than  sixty  miles  from  the 


92    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

spot  where  Burgoyne  stood  at  bay,  and  it 
achieved  nothing  more  than  a  raid.  So  the 
northern  British  force,  sent  to  perform  an 
impossible  task,  was  destroyed  solely  be 
cause  neither  Howe  nor  his  superiors  realized 
the  necessity  of  providing  for  certain  coopera 
tion  from  the  southward.  The  prisoners, 
according  to  the  terms  of  the  surrender, 
were  to  be  returned  to  England,  but  Congress, 
owing  in  part  to  some  complaints  of  Burgoyne, 
chose  to  violate  the  agreement,  and  the  cap 
tive  British  and  Hessians  were  retained. 
Burgoyne  himself  returned  to  England,  burn 
ing  with  anger  against  Howe  and  the  North 
ministry. 

The  winter  of  1777-8  found  the  two  British 
armies  comfortably  housed  in  New  York 
and  Philadelphia,  and  Washington,  with  his 
handful  of  miserably  equipped  men,  present 
ing  the  skeleton  of  an  army  at  Valley  Forge. 
Congress,  now  manned  by  less  able  leaders 
than  at  first,  was  almost  won  over  to  dis 
placing  the  unsuccessful  commander  by 
Gates,  the  victor  of  Saratoga,  and  it  did  go 
so  far  as  to  commit  the  administration  of  the 
army  to  a  cabal  of  Gates's  friends,  who 
carried  on  a  campaign  of  depreciation  and 
backbiting  against  Washington.  But  the 
whole  unworthy  plot  broke  down  under  a  few 
vigorous  words  from  the  latter,  the  would-be 
rival  quailing  before  the  Virginian's  personal 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       93 

authority.  He  was  not  a  safe  man  to  bait. 
The  military  headship  remained  securely 
with  the  one  general  capable  of  holding 
things  together. 

In  the  winter  of  1778,  however,  a  new  ele 
ment  entered  the  game,  namely,  the  possi 
bility  of  French  intervention.  From  the 
outbreak  of  the  Revolution  very  many  Ameri 
cans  saw  that  their  former  deadly  enemy, 
France,  would  be  likely  to  prove  an  ally 
against  England,  and  as  early  as  1776  Ameri 
can  emissaries  began  to  sound  the  court  of 
Versailles.  In  March,  1776,  Silas  Deane  was 
regularly  commissioned  by  the  Continental 
Congress,  and  in  the  autumn  he  was  followed 
by  no  less  a  person  than  Benjamin  Franklin. 
It  was  the  duty  of  these  men  to  get  whatever 
aid  they  could,  but  especially  to  seek  an  alli 
ance.  The  young  King,  Louis  XVI,  was  not  a 
man  of  any  independent  statecraft,  but  his 
ministers,  above  all  Vergennes,  in  charge  of 
foreign  affairs,  were  anxious  to  secure  revenge 
upon  England  for  the  damage  done  by  Pitt, 
and  the  tone  of  the  French  court  was  em 
phatically  warlike.  The  financial  weakness 
of  the  French  government,  destined  shortly 
to  pave  the  way  for  the  Revolution,  was 
clearly  visible  to  Turgot,  the  minister  of 
finances,  and  he  with  a  few  others  protested 
against  the  expense  of  a  foreign  war;  but 
Vergennes  carried  the  day. 


94    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

As  early  as  the  summer  of  1776  French 
arms  and  munitions  were  being  secretly 
supplied,  while  the  foreign  minister  solemnly 
assured  the  watchful  Lord  Stormont,  the 
English  ambassador,  of  his  government's 
perfect  neutrality.  Thousands  of  muskets, 
hundreds  of  cannon,  and  quantities  of  clothes 
were  thus  shipped,  and  sums  of  money  were 
also  turned  over  to  Franklin.  Beaumar- 
chais,  the  playwright  and  adventurer,  acted 
with  gusto  the  part  of  intermediary,  and  the 
lords  and  ladies  of  the  French  court,  amus 
ing  themselves  with  "philosophy"  and  specu 
lative  liberalism,  made  a  pet  of  the  witty 
and  sagacious  Franklin.  His  popularity 
actually  rivalled  that  of  Voltaire  when  the 
latter,  in  1778,  returned  to  see  Paris  and  die. 
But  not  until  the  colonies  had  proved  that 
they  could  meet  the  English  in  battle  with 
some  prospect  of  success  would  the  French 
commit  themselves  openly,  and  during  1776 
and  1777  the  tide  ran  too  steadily  against 
the  insurgents.  Finally,  in  December,  when 
the  anxieties  of  Franklin  and  his  associates 
were  almost  unendurable,  the  news  of  Bur- 
goyne's  surrender  was  brought  to  Paris. 
The  turning  point  was  reached.  Vergennes 
immediately  led  the  French  King  to  make 
two  treaties,  one  for  commercial  reciprocity, 
the  other  a  treaty  of  military  alliance,  recog 
nizing  the  independence  of  the  United  States 


CIVIL  WAR  IN  THE  EMPIRE       95 

and  pledging  the  countries  to  make  no  sepa 
rate  peace.  In  the  spring  of  1778  the  news 
reached  America  and  the  war  now  entered 
upon  a  second  stage. 

There  can  be  little  doubt,  however,  that 
under  abler  commanders  the  British  armies 
might  have  crushed  out  all  armed  resistance 
in  the  middle  colonies.  In  spite  of  all  draw 
backs,  the  trained  British  soldiers  and  officers 
were  so  superior  in  the  field  to  the  American 
levies  on  every  occasion  where  the  forces 
were  not  overwhelmingly  unequal  that  it  is 
impossible  for  any  but  the  most  bigoted 
American  partisan  to  deny  this  possibility. 
Had  there  been  a  blockade,  so  that  French 
and  Dutch  goods  would  have  been  excluded; 
had  General  Howe  possessed  the  faintest 
spark  of  energy  in  following  up  his  successes; 
had  the  North  cabinet  not  failed  to  compel 
Howe  to  cooperate  with  Burgoyne,  the  con 
dition  of  things  in  1778  might  well  have  been 
so  serious  for  the  colonists'  cause  that  Ver- 
gennes  would  have  felt  a  French  intervention 
to  be  fruitless.  In  that  case  it  is  hard  to  see 
how  the  rebellion  could  have  failed  to  be 
crushed  in  the  next  year.  As  it  was,  the 
Americans,  by  luck  and  by  the  tenacity  of 
Washington  and  a  few  otherdeaders,  had  won 
the  first  victory. 


96    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 
CHAPTER  V 

FRENCH  INTERVENTION  AND  BRITISH  FAILURE, 

1778-1781 

DURING  the  two  years  of  fighting  the  party 
situation  in  England  had  grown  increasingly 
bitter.  The  Whigs,  joined  now  by  young 
Charles  Fox,  unremittingly  denounced  the 
war  as  a  crime,  sympathized  with  the  rebels 
and  execrated  the  cruelty  of  the  ministers 
while  deriding  their  abilities.  Parliament 
rang  with  vituperation;  personal  insults  flew 
back  and  forth.  From  time  to  time  Chatham 
took  part  in  the  attack,  joining  Burke  and 
Fox  in  an  opposition  never  surpassed  for 
oratorical  power.  But  the  ministerial  party, 
secure  in  its  strength,  pushed  on  its  way. 
The  King  now  regarded  the  war  as  the  issue 
upon  which  he  had  staked  his  personal  honor 
and  would  tolerate  no  faltering.  Yet  in  the 
winter  of  1778  the  rumors  of  a  French  alli 
ance  thickened,  and,  when  the  probability 
seemed  to  be  a  certainty,  North  made  a 
desperate  effort  to  end  the  war  through  a 
•-  policy  of  granting  everything  except  inde 
pendence.  In  a  speech  of  incredible  assur 
ance  he  observed  that  he  had  never  favored 
trying  to  tax  America  and  brought  in  a  bill 
by  which  every  parliamentary  measure  com 
plained  of  by  the  Americans  was  repealed 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  97 

and  the  right  of  internal  taxation  was  ex 
pressly  renounced.  Amid  the  dejection  of 
the  Tories  and  the  sneers  of  the  Whigs  this 
measure  became  law,  March  2,  1778,  and 
commissioners,  empowered  to  grant  general 
amnesty,  were  sent  with  it  to  the  United 
States. 

At  no  other  time  in  English  history  would 
it  have  been  possible  for  a  ministry  thus  ut 
terly  to  reverse  its  policy  and  remain  in  office, 
but  North's  tenure  depended  on  influences 
outside  the  House  of  Commons,  and  he  con 
tinued  in  his  place.  So  severe  was  the  crisis, 
however,  that  an  effort  was  made  to  arrange 
a  coalition  ministry,  with  the  aged  Chatham 
at  its  head;  but  George  III  positively  refused 
to  permit  North  to  surrender  the  first  place. 
He  would  consent  to  Whigs  entering  the  cabi 
net  only  in  subordinate  positions.  This 
>bstinacy  and  the  sudden  death  of  Chatham 
)locked  all  coalition  proposals  and  left  the 
war  to  continue  as  a  party  measure,  not 
national  in  its  character, — the  "King's  war." 
In  America  the  task  of  the  commissioners 
proved  hopeless.  The  men  now  in  control  of 
the  Continental  Congress  and  the  state 
governments  were  pledged  to  independence 
from  the  bottom  of  their  souls,  and  in  the 
course  of  months  of  appeals,  and  attempts  at 
negotiations,  the  commissioners  failed  to 
secure  even  a  hearing.  Congress  did  not 


98    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

hesitate  to  ratify  the  French  treaties  with 
enthusiasm.  That  their  proposal  if  made 
before  the  Declaration  would  have  been  suc 
cessful  can  scarcely  be  doubted.  If  might 
even  have  produced  an  effect  after  1776  had 
it  been  made  by  a  Whig  ministry,  headed  by 
Chatham.  But  coming  in  1778,  after  three 
years  of  war,  when  every  vestige  of  the  former 
sentiment  of  loyalty  was  dead,  and  offered 
by  the  same  North  ministry  which  had 
brought  on  the  revolution,  it  was  foredoomed 
to  defeat. 

The  war  now  entered  upon  a  second  phase, 
in  which  England  found  itself  harder  pressed 
than  at  any  time  in  its  history.  It  had  not 
an  ally  in  the  world,  and  could  count  on  no 
Rhine  campaigns  to  exhaust  French  resources. 
For  the  first  time  England  engaged  France 
in  a  purely  naval  war,  and  for  the  only  time 
France  was  sufficiently  strong  in  sail-of-the- 
line  to  meet  England  on  equal  terms.  The 
French  fleet,  rebuilt  since  1763,  was  in  ex 
cellent  condition;  the  British  navy,  on  the 
contrary,  under  the  slack  administration  of 
Lord  Sandwich,  was  worse  off  in  equipment, 
repairs,  number  of  sailors  and  esprit  de  corps 
than  at  any  time  in  the  century.  The  French 
were  able  to  send  fleets  unhindered  wherever 
they  wished,  and  when  Spain  entered  as  an 
ally,  in  1779,  their  combined  navies  swept 
the  channel,  driving  the  humiliated  British 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION  9d 

fleet  into  port.  England  was  called  upon  to 
make  defensive  war  at  home,  at  Gibraltar, 
in  the  West  Indies  and  finally  in  India,  at  a 
time  when  the  full  strength  of  the  country 
was  already  occupied  with  the  rebellion. 

This  led  to  an  alteration  of  military  meth 
ods  in  America.  The  policy  of  moving  heavy 
armies  was  abandoned,  and  the  British, 
forced  to  withdraw  troops  to  garrison  the 
West  Indies  and  Florida,  began  the  practice 
of  wearing  down  the  revolted  colonies  by 
raids  and  destruction  of  property.  George  III 
especially  approved  this  punitive  policy.  As 
a  first  step,  the  army  in  Philadelphia  marched 
back  to  New  York,  attacked  on  its  retreat  by 
Washington  at  Monmouth  on  June  27,  1778. 
The  American  advance  was  badly  handled 
by  General  Lee  and  fell  back  before  the 
British,  but  Washington  in  person  rallied  his 
men,  resumed  the  attack  and  held  his  posi 
tion.  Clinton,  who  succeeded  Howe,  con 
tinued  his  march,  and  the  British  army  now 
settled  down  in  New  York,  not  to  depart 
from  its  safe  protection  except  on  raids. 

Washington  accordingly  posted  his  forces, 
as  in  1777,  outside  the  city  and  awaited 
events.  He  could  assume  the  offensive  only 
in  case  a  French  fleet  should  assist  him,  and 
this  happened  but  twice,  in  1778,  and  not 
again  for  three  years.  The  first  time  Admiral 
D'Estaing  with  a  strong  fleet  menaced  first 


100    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

New  York  and  then  Newport,  the  latter  in 
conjunction  with  an  American  land  force. 
But  before  each  port  he  was  foiled  by  the 
superior  skill  of  Admiral  Howe,  and  he  finally 
withdrew  without  risking  a  battle,  to  the 
intense  disgust  of  the  Americans.  For  the 
rest,  the  war  in  the  northern  states  dwindled 
to  raids  by  the  English  along  the  Connecti 
cut  coast  and  into  New  Jersey,  and  outpost 
affairs  on  the  Hudson,  in  some  of  which  Wash 
ington's  Continental  troops  showed  real 
brilliancy  in  attack.  But  with  the  British  in 
command  of  the  sea  little  could  be  done  to 
meet  the  raids,  and  southern  Connecticut  was 
ravaged  with  fire  and  sword. 

At  the  same  time  the  states  suffered  the 
horrors  of  Indian  war,  since  the  Tories  and 
British  from  Canada  utilized  the  Iroquois 
and  the  Ohio  Valley  Indians  as  allies.  The 
New  York  frontier  was  in  continual  distress, 
and  the  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  and 
Virginia  settlements  felt  the  scalping  knife 
and  torch.  Hamilton,  the  British  commander 
at  the  post  oTTJeTfoit,  paid  a  fixed  price  for 
scalps,  and  was  known  as  "the  hair  buyer." 
Against  the  Iroquois,  Sullivan  led  an  expedi 
tion  in  1779  which  could  not  bring  the  savages 
to  a  decisive  battle,  although  he  ravaged 
their  lands  and  crippled  their  resources. 
Against  the  northwestern  Indians  a  daring 
Virginian,  George  Rogers  Clark,  led  a  counter- 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION         101 

raid  which  captured  several  posts  in  the 
territory  north  of  the  Ohio  River  and  finally 
took  Hamilton  himself  prisoner  at  Vincennes. 
But  in  every  such  war  the  sufferings  of  the 
settlers  outnumbered  a  hundred-fold  all  that 
they  could  inflict  in  return,  and  this  con 
sciousness  burned  into  their  souls  a  lasting 
hatred  of  England,  the  ally  of  the  murdering, 
torturing  devils  from  the  forests. 

While  the  English  fleets  fought  indecisive 
actions  in  European  waters,  or  near  the  West 
Indies,  the  British  raiding  policy  was  trans 
ferred  to  a  new  region,  namely,  the  southern 
states,  which  thus  far  had  known  little  of  the 
severities  of  war.  In  December,  1778,  an 
expedition  under  Prevost  easily  occupied 
Savannah,  driving  the  Georgia  militia  away. 
The  next  year  an  effort  was  made  by  an  Amer 
ican  force,  in  combination  with  the  French 
fleet  under  D'Estaing,  who  returned  from 
the  West  Indies,  to  recapture  the  place.  The 
siege  was  formed  and  there  appeared  some 
prospects  of  a  successful  outcome,  but  the 
French  admiral,  too  restless  to  wait  until  the 
completion  of  siege  operations,  insisted  on 
trying  to  take  the  city  by  storm  on  October  9. 
The  result  was  a  complete  repulse,  after 
which  D'Estaing  sailed  away  and  the  Ameri 
can  besiegers  were  obliged  to  withdraw.  The 
real  interests  of  the  French  were,  in  fact,  in 
the  West  Indies,  where  they  were  gradually 


102    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

capturing  English  islands,  and  their  contri 
butions  so  far  to  the  American  cause  con 
sisted  in  gifts  of  munitions  and  loans  of 
money,  together  with  numerous  adventurous 
officers  who  aspired  to  lead  the  American 
armies.  The  most  amiable  and  attractive  of 
these  was  the  young  Marquis  de  Lafayette, 
owing  largely  to  whose  influence  a  force  of 
French  soldiers  under  de  Rochambeau  was 
sent  in  1780  to  America.  But  for  months  this 
force  was  able  to  do  no  more  than  remain  in 
camp  at  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  blockaded 
by  the  English  fleet. 

In  1780  the  British  raiding  policy  was  re 
sumed  in  the  southern  states  and  achieved  a 
fairly  startling  success.  In  January  Clinton 
sailed  from  New  York  with  a  force  of  8000 
men,  and  after  driving  the  American  levies 
into  the  city  of  Charleston,  South  Carolina, 
besieged  and  took  it  May  12,  with  all  its 
defenders.  He  then  returned  to  New  York, 
leaving  Lord  Cornwallis  with  a  few  troops  to 
complete  the  conquest  of  the  state.  Congress 
now  sent  General  Gates  southward  to  repeat 
the  triumph  of  Saratoga.  At  Camden,  on 
August  16,  1780,  the  issue  was  decided.  The 
American  commander  with  only  3000  men, 
encountered  Cornwallis,  who  had  about  2200, 
and,  as  usual,  the  militia,  when  attacked  by 
British  in  the  open  field,  fled  for  their  lives 
at  the  first  charge  of  the  redcoats,  leaving 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION          103 

the  few  continentals  to  be  outnumbered  and 
crushed. 

For  a  period  of  several  weeks  all  organ 
ized  American  resistance  disappeared.  Only 
bands  of  guerillas,  or  "partisans,"  as  they 
were  called,  kept  the  field.  Clinton  had 
issued  a  proclamation  calling  all  loyalists 
to  join  the  ranks,  and  Cornwallis  made  a 
systematic  effort  to  compel  the  enrolment 
of  Tory  militia.  The  plan  bore  fruit  in 
an  apparent  large  increase  of  British  num 
bers,  but  also  in  the  outbreak  of  a  murderous 
civil  war.  Raiding  parties  on  both  sides 
took  to  ambuscades,  nocturnal  house-burn 
ing,  hanging  of  prisoners  and  downright 
massacres.  Preeminent  for  his  success 
was  the  British  Colonel  Tarleton,  who 
with  a  body  of  light  troops  swept  tirelessly 
around,  breaking  up  rebel  bands,  riding  down 
militia  and  rendering  his  command  a  terror  to 
the  state.  Marion,  Sumter  and  other  Ameri 
cans  struggled  vainly  to  equal  his  exploits. 

Even  occasional  American  successes  could 
not  turn  back  the  tide.  On  October  18, 
1780,  a  band  of  Tories  under  General  Fergu 
son  ventured  too  far  to  the  westward,  and  at 
King's  Mountain  were  surrounded  and  shot 
or  taken  prisoners  by  a  general  uprising  of 
the  frontiersmen.  General  Greene,  who 
replaced  Gates  in  December,  managed  to 
rally  a  few  men,  but  dared  not  meet  Corn- 


104    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

wallis  in  the  field.  His  lieutenant,  Morgan, 
when  pursued  by  Tarleton,  turned  on  him 
at  the  Cowpens,  and  on  January  17  managed 
to  inflict  a  severe  defeat.  The  forces  were 
diminutive, — less  than  a  thousand  on  each 
side, —  but  the  battle  was  skilfully  fought. 
After  it,  however,  both  Morgan  and  Greene 
were  forced  to  fly  northward  and  did  not 
escape  Corn  wallis 's  pursuit  until  they  were 
driven  out  of  North  Carolina.  The  state 
seemed  lost,  and  on  February  23,  Corn- 
wallis  issued  a  proclamation  calling  upon 
all  loyalists  to  join  the  royal  forces.  Mean 
while,  encouraged  by  the  striking  successes 
in  the  Carolinas,  Clinton  sent  a  force  under 
Arnold  to  Virginia,  which  marched  unopposed 
through  the  seaboard  counties  of  that  state 
in  the  winter  of  1781.  It  seemed  as  though 
the  new  British  policy  were  on  the  verge  of  a 
great  triumph. 

By  this  time  it  was  becoming  a  grave 
question  whether  the  American  revolution 
was  not  going  to  collapse  from  sheer  weak 
ness;  for  the  confederation,  as  a  general 
government,  seemed  to  be  on  the  verge  of 
breaking  down.  The  state  governments,  al 
though  badly  hampered  wherever  British 
raids  took  place,  were  operating  regularly 
and  steadily,  but  the  only  common  govern 
ment  continued  to  be  the  voluntary  Con 
tinental  Congress,  whose  powers  were  entirely 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION         105 

undefined  and  rested,  in  fact,  on  sufferance. 
In  1776  a  committee,  headed  by  John  Dickin 
son,  drafted  Articles  of  Confederation  which, 
if  adopted  promptly,  would  have  provided 
a  regular  form  of  government;  but,  although 
these  were  submitted  in  1777  for  ratifica 
tion,  interstate  jealousy  sufficed  to  block 
their  acceptance.  It  was  discovered  that  all 
those  states  which,  by  their  original  charters, 
were  given  no  definite  western  boundaries, 
were  disposed  to  claim  an  extension  of 
their  territory  to  the  Mississippi  River. 
Virginia,  through  her  general,  Clark,  actually 
occupied  part  of  the  region  claimed  by  her, 
and  assumed  to  grant  lands  there.  The 
representatives  of  Maryland  in  Congress 
declared  such  inequality  a  danger  to  the 
union  and  refused  to  sign  the  Articles  unless 
the  land  claims  west  of  the  mountains  were 
surrendered  to  the  general  government. 
This  determination  was  formally  approved 
by  the  Maryland  legislature  in  February, 
1779,  and  matters  remained  at  a  standstill. 
At  last,  in  1780,  Congress  offered  to  hold  any 
lands  which  might  be  granted  to  it,  with  the 
pledge  to  form  them  into  states,  and,  fol 
lowing  this,  New  York  and  Virginia  inti 
mated  a  willingness  to  make  the  required 
cessions.  Then  Maryland  yielded  and  rati 
fied  the  Articles,  so  that  they  went  into 
operation  on  March  2,  1781. 


106    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Meanwhile  the  self-styled  "United  States" 
had  traveled  so  far  on  the  road  to  bankruptcy 
that  the  adoption  of  the  "Articles  of  Per 
petual  Union"  seemed  scarcely  more  than 
an  empty  form.  In  the  first  place  the  fed 
eral  finances  were  prostrate.  The  device 
of  issuing  paper  money  had  proved  fatal, 
for,  after  a  brief  period,  in  1775,  the  ex 
cessive  issues  depreciated  in  spite  of  every 
effort  to  hinder  their  decline  by  proclama 
tions,  price  conventions  and  political  pres 
sure.  The  only  way  of  sustaining  such 
notes,  namely,  the  furnishing  by  the  states 
of  a  full  and  sufficient  revenue,  was  never 
attempted;  for  the  states  themselves  pre 
ferred  to  issue  notes,  rather  than  to  tax, 
and  when  called  upon  by  the  Continental 
Congress  for  requisitions  they  turned  over 
such  amounts  of  paper  as  they  saw  fit. 
By  1780  the  "continental  currency"  was 
practically  worthless.  Congress  could  rely 
only  upon  such  small  sums  of  money  as  it 
could  raise  by  foreign  loans  through  Frank 
lin  and  by  the  contributions  of  a  few  pa 
triotic  people,  notably  Robert  Morris. 

Under  the  circumstances  the  maintenance 
of  the  army  exhausted  the  resources  of  Con 
gress  and  every  winter  saw  the  story  of  Valley 
Forge  repeated.  To  secure  supplies  Congress 
was  driven  to  authorize  seizure  and  impress 
ment  of  food  and  payment  in  certificates 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION         107 

of  indebtedness.  It  was  for  this  reason,  as 
well  as  from  the  unwillingness  of  the  Ameri 
cans  to  enlist  for  the  war,  that  the  Continen 
tal  forces  dwindled  to  diminutive  numbers 
in  1781.  Nothing  but  Washington's  tireless 
tenacity  and  loyalty  held  the  army  together 
and  kept  the  officers  from  resigning  in  dis 
gust.  Yet  it  seemed  impossible  that  Wash 
ington  himself  could  carry  the  burden 
much  longer.  The  general  government  ap 
peared  to  be  on  the  point  of  disintegrating, 
leaving  to  the  separate  states  the  task  of  de 
fending  themselves.  Everywhere  lassitude, 
preoccupation  with  local  matters,  a  disposi 
tion  to  leave  the  war  to  the  French,  a  willing 
ness  to  let  other  states  bear  the  burdens, 
replaced  the  fervor  of  1776.  In  other  words, 
the  old  colonial  habits  were  reasserting  them 
selves  and  the  separate  states,  reverting 
to  their  former  accustomed  negative  poli 
tics,  were  behaving  toward  the  Continental 
Congress  precisely  as  they  had  done  toward 
England  itself  during  the  French  wars. 
With  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  of 
fighting  age  in  America  it  was  impossible, 
in  1781,  to  collect  more  than  a  handful 
for  service  away  from  their  homes.  The 
essentially  unmilitary  nature  of  the  Ameri 
cans  was  not  to  be  changed. 

Fortunately  for  the  rebels,  the  policy  of 
Great  Britain  was  such  as  to  give  them  a 


108    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

lease  of  hope.  In  spite  of  the  great  British 
naval  power  during  the  first  two  years  of 
the  war,  no  blockade  had  been  attempted, 
and  after  1778  the  British  fleets  were  thor 
oughly  occupied  in  'following  and  foiling  the 
French.  The  result  was  that  commerce 
of  a  sort  continued  throughout  the  war, 
armed  privateers  and  merchantmen  ven 
turing  from  the  New  England  and  other 
ports  and  trading  with  France,  Spain  and 
the  West  Indies.  Hundreds  of  these  were 
taken  by  British  cruisers,  but  hundreds  more 
continued  their  dangerous  trade,  and  so 
America  continued  to  receive  imports.  The 
Dutch,  especially,  served  to  supply  the 
revolted  colonies  with  some  of  the  commodi 
ties  which  their  exclusion  from  British 
ports  rendered  scarce.  So,  except  for  paper 
money,  there  was  no  economic  distress. 

In  1781,  when  if  ever  the  British  might  hope 
to  reduce  the  colonies,  the  Empire  was  itself 
in  sore  straits  for  men  to  fill  its  ships  and 
garrison  its  forts.  This  made  it  difficult 
for  England  to  send  any  reinforcements 
to  America,  and  left  Clinton  and  Corn- 
wallis  with  about  27,000  men  to  complete 
their  raiding  campaign.  The  task  proved 
excessive.  In  March,  1781,  Greene,  having 
assembled  a  small  force,  gave  battle  to  Corn- 
wallis  at  Guilford  Court  House.  The  little 
army  of  British  veterans,  only  2219  in  all, 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION          109 

drove  Greene  from  the  field  after  a  stiff 
fight,  but  were  so  reduced  in  numbers  that 
Cornwallis  felt  obliged  to  retreat  to  Wil 
mington  on  the  coast,  where  he  was  entirely 
out  of  the  field  of  campaign.  On  April  25 
he  marched  northward  into  Virginia  to 
join  the  force  which  had  been  there  for  several 
months,  took  command,  and  continued  the 
policy  of  marching  and  destroying.  Before 
his  arrival  Washington  had  tried  to  use  the 
French  force  at  Newport  against  the  Vir 
ginia  raiders,  but  the  French  squadron, 
although  it  ventured  from  port  in  March, 
1781,  and  had  a  successful  encounter  with 
a  British  fleet,  declined  to  push  on  into  the 
Chesapeake  and  the  plan  was  abandoned. 
Cornwallis  was  able  to  march  unhindered 
by  any  French  danger  during  the  summer 
of  1781. 

But  while  the  British  were  terrifying  Vir 
ginia  and  chasing  militia,  the  forces  left 
in  the  Carolinas  were  being  worn  down  by 
Greene  and  his  "partisan"  allies.  On  April 
25,  at  Hobkirk's  Hill,  Rawdon,  the  British 
commander  defeated  Greene  and  then,  with 
reduced  ranks,  retreated.  During  the  sum 
mer  further  sieges  and  raids  recaptured 
British  posts,  and  on  September  8  another 
battle  took  place  at  Eutaw  Springs.  This 
resulted,  as  usual,  in  a  British  success  on 
the  battlefield  and  a  retreat  afterwards. 


110    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

By  October  the  slender  British  forces  in 
the  southernmost  states  were  cooped  up  in 
Charleston  and  Savannah  and  a  war  of 
extermination  was  stamping  out  all  organ 
ized  Tory  resistance.  The  raiding  policy 
had  failed  through  weakness  of  numbers. 
The  superior  fighting  ability  and  tactical 
skill  of  Cornwallis,  Rawdon,  Stuart  and 
Tarleton  were  as  obvious  as  the  courage 
and  steadiness  of  their  troops,  but  their  means 
were  pitifully  inadequate  to  the  task  as 
signed  them.  .j- 

Further  north  a  still  greater  failure  took 
place.  Washington  was  not  deterred  by 
the  futile  outcome  of  his  previous  attempts 
to  use  French  cooperation  from  making 
a  patient  and  urgent  effort  to  induce  De 
Grasse,  the  French  admiral  in  the  West 
Indies,  to  come  north  and  join  with  him 
and  Rochambeau  in  an  attack  on  Corn 
wallis  in  Virginia.  He  was  at  last  successful, 
and  on  August  28  the  wished-for  fleet,  a 
powerful  collection  of  28  sail-of-the-line, 
with  frigates,  reached  Chesapeake  Bay.  Al 
ready  the  French  troops  from  Newport,  and 
part  of  the  American  army  from  outside 
New  York,  had  begun  their  southward 
march,  carefully  concealing  their  purposes 
from  Clinton,  and  were  moving  through 
Pennsylvania.  As  a  third  part  of  the  com 
bination,  the  French  squadron  from  New- 


FRENCH  INTERVENTION          111 

port  put  to  sea,  bringing  eight  more  sail-of- 
the-line,  which,  added  to  De  Grasse's,  would 
overmatch  any  British  fleet  on  the  western 
side  of  the  Atlantic. 

The  one  disturbing  possibility  was  that 
the  British  West  India  fleet,  which  very 
properly  had  sailed  in  pursuit,  might  defeat 
the  two  French  fleets  singly.  This  chance 
was  put  to  the  test  on  September  5.  On 
that  day  Admiral  Graves,  with  nineteen  men- 
of-war,  attacked  De  Grasse,  who  brought 
twenty-four  into  line  outside  Chesapeake 
Bay,  and  the  decisive  action  of  the  Revo 
lution  took  place.  Seldom  has  a  greater 
stake  been  played  for  by  a  British  fleet,  and 
seldom  has  a  naval  battle  been  less  success 
fully  managed.  Graves  may  have  intended 
to  concentrate  upon  part  of  the  French 
line,  but  his  subordinates  certainly  failed 
to  understand  any  such  purpose,  and  the 
outcome  was  that  the  head  of  the  British 
column,  approaching  the  French  line  at 
an  angle,  was  severely  handled,  while  the 
rear  took  no  part  in  the  battle.  The  fleets 
separated  without  decisive  result  and  the 
British,  after  cruising  a  few  days  irreso 
lutely,  gave  up  and  returned  to  New  York. 
The  other  French  squadron  had  meanwhile 
arrived  and  the  allied  troops  had  come  down 
the  Chesapeake.  Cornwallis,  shut  up  in 
Yorktown  by  overwhelming  forces,  defended 


ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

himself  until  October  17  and  then  surrendered 
with  8000  men  to  the  man  who  had  beaten 
him  years  before  at  Trenton  and  Princeton. 
Clinton,  aware  at  last  of  his  danger,  sailed 
with  every  vessel  he  could  scrape  together 
and  approached  the  bay  on  October  24  with 
twenty-five  sail-of-the-line  and  7000  men; 
but  it  was  too  late.  He  could  only  retreat  to 
New  York,  where  he 'remained  in  the  sole 
British  foothold  north  of  Charleston  and 
Savannah. 

Washington  would  have  been  glad  to 
retain  De  Grasse  and  undertake  further 
combined  manoeuvres,  but  the  French  ad 
miral  was  anxious  to  return  to  the  West 
Indies  and  so  the  military  operations  of  the 
year  ended.  More  was  in  reality  unnecessary 
for  the  collapse  of  the  British  military  policy 
was  manifest  and  the  surrender  of  Corn- 
wallis  was  a  sufficiently  striking  event  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  close.  Washington  had 
not  won  the  last  fight  with  his  own  Con 
tinentals.  The  cooperation  not  only  of 
the  French  fleet  but  of  the  French  troops 
under  Rochambeau  had  played  the  decisive 
part.  Yet  it  was  his  planning,  his  tenacity, 
his  personal  authority  with  French  and 
Americans  that  determined  the  combined 
operation  and  made  it  successful.  In  the 
midst  of  a  half-starved,  ill-equipped  army, 
a  disintegrating,  bankrupt  government,  and 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE    113 

a  people  whose  fighting  spirit  was  rapidly 
dwindling,  it  was  he  with  his  officers  who  had 
saved  the  Revolution  at  the  last  gasp. 

But  it  was  no  less  the  British  mismanage 
ment  which  made  this  possible,  for  had 
not  Howe,  by  delays,  thrown  away  his 
chances;  had  not  Howe  and  Burgoyne  and 
Clinton  and  Cornwallis,  by  their  failures  to 
cooperate,  made  it  possible  for  their  armies 
to  be  taken  separately;  had  not  the  navy 
omitted  to  apply  a  blockade;  had  not  the 
ministry,  in  prescribing  a  raiding  policy, 
failed  to  strain  every  nerve  to  furnish  an 
adequate  supply  of  men,  the  outcome  would 
have  been  different.  As  it  was,  the  British 
defeat  could  no  longer  be  concealed  by  the 
end  of  1781.  The  attempt  to  conquer  Amer 
ica  had  failed. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ENGLISH    PARTIES   AND   AMERICAN    INDEPEN 
DENCE,  1778-1883 

WHEN  the  news  of  the  surrender  of  Corn 
wallis  at  Yorktown  reached  England  it 
was  recognized  by  Whigs  and  Tories  alike 
that  the  time  had  come  to  admit  the  failure 
of  the  war.  The  loss  of  7000  troops  was  not 
in  itself  a  severe  blow,  at  a  time  when  Eng 
land  had  over  200,000  men  under  arms  in 


114    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

various  parts  of  the  world;  but  it  actually 
marked  the  breakdown  of  the  American 
campaign,  and,  what  was  still  more  signi 
ficant,  the  political  bankruptcy  of  the  North 
ministry.  Ever  since  1778  the  tide  had  been 
rising  against  the  royal  policy.  At  first, 
when  the  French  war  began,  the  nation 
rallied  against  the  ancient  foe  and  there  was 
some  enthusiasm  displayed  in  recruiting 
and  furnishing  supplies;  but  as  general  after 
general  returned  from  America,  —  first  Bur- 
goyne,  then  Howe  and  his  brother,  the 
admiral, — to  rise  in  Parliament  and  de 
nounce  the  administrative  incompetence 
which  had  foiled  their  efforts;  as  month  after 
month  passed  and  no  victory  either  in 
America  or  Europe  came  to  cheer  the  public; 
worst  of  all  when,  in  1779,  and  again  in  1780, 
combined  French  and  Spanish  fleets  swept 
the  Channel  in  overpowering  numbers,  driv 
ing  the  English  fleet  into  Torbay  harbor, 
— the  war  spirit  dwindled  and  bitter  criticism 
took  its  place. 

The  Whig  opposition,  no  longer  hampered 
by  having  the  defence  of  the  revolted  col 
onists  as  their  sole  issue,  denounced  in 
unmeasured  language  the  incompetence,  cor 
ruption  and  despotism  of  the  North  ministry, 
singling  out  Sandwich,  in  the  Admiralty,  and 
Germaine,  Secretary  for  the  Colonies,  as  ob 
jects  for  especial  invective.  Party  hatred 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE      115 

festered  in  army  and  navy,  Whig  and  Tory 
admirals  distrusting  each  other  and  engaging 
in  bitter  quarrels,  Whig  and  Tory  generals 
criticising  one  another's  plans  and  motives. 
On  his  part  Lord  North  felt,  as  early  as  1779, 
that  his  task  was  hopeless,  and  sought  repeat 
edly  to  resign;  but  in  spite  of  secessions  from 
the  ministry,  in  spite  of  defeats  and  humili 
ations  such  as  the  control  by  the  allies  of 
the  Channel,  nothing  could  shake  George's 
determination.  He  would  never  consent 
to  abandon  the  colonies  or  permit  North 
to  surrender  to  the  detested  Whigs. 

In  1780  the  opposition,  led  by  Fox  and 
Burke,  began  to  direct  its  fire  at  the  King 
himself,  and  finally,  in  March  of  that  year, 
they  had  the  satisfaction  of  carrying  in  the 
Commons,  by  votes  of  men  who  once  had 
been  on  the  administration  side,  a  resolution 
to  the  effect  that  "the  power  of  the  Crown 
has  increased,  is  increasing,  and  ought  to 
be  diminished."  This  passed,  233  to  215, 
in  a  house  where  four  years  before  the 
total  opposition  mustered  only  a  hundred. 
Measures  to  cut  down  sinecures,  to  limit 
the  secret  service  fund,  to  take  away  op 
portunities  for  royal  corruption,  were  in 
troduced  by  Burke  and,  although  defeated, 
drew  large  votes. 

But  the  tenacious  politician  who  wore  the 
crown  was  not  yet  beaten.  In  the  summer 


116    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

of  1780  the  disgraceful  Gordon  riots  broke 
out  in  London  and  the  King,  by  his  coura 
geous  personal  bearing  and  bold  direction 
of  affairs,  won  momentary  prestige.  The  news 
from  America,  moreover,  was  brighter  than  for 
a  long  time,  and  the  British  defence  of  Gibral 
tar  was  unshaken.  Suddenly  dissolving 
Parliament,  the  King  employed  every  resource 
of  influence  or  pressure,  and  managed  to  se 
cure  once  more  a  majority  in  the  House  of 
Commons.  During  the  year  1781  the  North 
ministry  breathed  more  freely  and  was 
able  to  repel  Whig  attacks  by  safe  majori 
ties.  But  the  respite  was  short. 

In  the  winter  session  of  1782  the  news  of 
Yorktown  shook  the  ministry  to  its  centre, 
and  on  top  of  that  came  the  reports  of 
the  surrender  of  Minorca,  St.  Kitts  and 
Nevis.  Held  together  only  by  the  inflexible 
determination  of  George  III  never  to  yield 
American  independence  or  "stoop  to  oppo 
sition,"  the  ministers  fought  bitterly  but 
despairingly  against  a  succession  of  Whig 
motions,  censuring  the  Admiralty,  demanding 
the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  and  finally  cen 
suring  the  ministry.  Majorities  dwindled  as 
rats  began  to  leave  the  sinking  ship.  On 
March  8  North  escaped  censure  by  ten  votes 
only.  The  King  made  repeated  efforts  to  in 
duce  members  of  the  opposition  to  come 
into  some  sort  of  coalition,  but  the  hatred 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE      117 

was  too  fierce,  the  divergence  of  principle 
too  wide.  Rockingham  would  accept  only 
absolute  surrender.  On  March  15  a  reso 
lution  of  want  of  confidence  was  lost  by 
nine  only. 

Five  days  later,  in  the  face  of  a  renewed 
motion  of  the  same  kind,  North  announced 
his  resignation.  The  end  had  come.  The 
system  of  George  III  had  broken  down, 
ruined  by  the  weaknesses  of  the  Tory  cabinet 
in  administration,  in  war  and  in  diplomacy, 
the  most  disastrous  ministry  in  the  history 
of  England.  There  was  no  possible  doubt  as 
to  the  significance  of  the  collapse,  for  Lord 
Rockingham  took  office  with  a  Whig  cabinet, 
containing  Shelburne  and  Fox,  steadfast 
friends  of  America,  as  secretaries  of  state, 
and  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  conceding 
independence  to  the  former  colonies,  while 
maintaining  the  contest  with  Spain  and 
France. 

Interest  now  shifted  from  the  battlefield 
to  the  regions  of  diplomacy,  where  the 
situation  was  complicated  and  delicate,  ow 
ing  to  the  unusual  relations  of  the  parties 
involved.  The  United  States  and  France 
were  in  alliance,  each  pledged  not  to  make 
a  separate  peace.  Spain  was  in  alliance 
with  France  for  the  purpose  of  recovering 
Gibraltar,  Minorca  and  Florida,  but  was  not 
in  any  alliance  with  the  United  States. 


118    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

The  French  government,  tied  thus  to  two 
allies,  recognized  the  possible  contingency 
of  diverging  interests  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States  and  exerted  all  the  in 
fluence  it  could  to  keep  diplomatic  control 
in  its  own  hands.  This  it  accomplished 
through  its  representatives  in  America,  es 
pecially  de  la  Luzerne,  who  wielded  an 
immense  prestige  with  the  members  of  the 
Continental  Congress,  not  only  through 
his  position  as  representative  of  the  power 
whose  military,  naval  and  financial  aid 
was  absolutely  indispensible,  but  also  by 
means  of  personal  intrigues  of  a  type  hither 
to  more  familiar  in  European  courts  than  in 
simple  America.  Under  his  direction  Con 
gress  authorized  its  European  representatives, 
Franklin,  Jay/  and  Adams,  accredited  to 
Frajice,  Spain/  and  thK.Netherlands  respec 
tively,  to  act  as  peace  commissioners  and 
to  be  guided  in  all  things  by  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  French  minister,  Vergennes. 
Their  instructions  designated  boundaries, 
indemnity  for  ravages  and  for  the  taking 
of  slaves,  and  a  possible  cession  of  Canada, 
but  all  were  made  subject  to  French  ap 
proval.  When,  accordingly,  in  1781,  both 
Shelburne  and  Fox  of  the  Rockingham  min 
istry  sought  to  open  negotiations  with  the 
American  representatives,  while  pushing  on 
vigorously  the  war  against  France  and  Spain, 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE      119 

they  interjected  an  embarrassing  element 
into  the  situation.  Vergennes  could  not 
prohibit  American  negotiation,  but  he  relied 
upon  the  instructions  of  the  commissioners 
to  enable  him  to  prevent  the  making  of  any 
separate  peace,  contrary  to  the  treaty  of 
1778. 

The  first  steps  were  taken  by  Franklin 
and  Shelburne,  who  opened  unofficial  nego 
tiations  through  Richard  Oswald,  a  friend 
of  America.  It  seems  to  have  been  Shel 
burne  's  plan  to  avoid  the  preliminary  conces 
sion  of  independence,  hoping  to  retain  some 
form  of  connection  between  America  and 
England,  or  at  least  to  use  independence  as 
a  make- weight  in  the  negotiations.  Hence 
Oswald,  his  agent,  was  not  commissioned 
to  deal  with  the  United  States  as  such. 
Fox,  on  the  other  hand,  Secretary  for  For 
eign  Affairs,  felt  that  the  negotiation  be 
longed  in  his  field,  and  he  sent  Thomas  Gren- 
ville  to  Paris,  authorized  to  deal  with  France 
and,  indirectly,  with  the  United  States. 
Over  this  difference  in  the  cabinet,  and  over 
other  matters,  an  acute  personal  rivalry 
developed  between  Fox  and  Shelburne,  which 
culminated  when  Rockingham  died  in  July, 
1782.  George  III,  who  much  preferred  Shel 
burne  to  Fox,  asked  him  to  form  a  ministry, 
and  upon  his  acceptance  Fox,  absolutely 
refusing  to  serve  under  him,  withdrew  from 


120    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

the  cabinet,  carrying  his  friends  with  him. 
Thus  the  triumphant  Whig  party  was  split 
within  a  few  months  after  its  victory. 
The  whole  responsibility  now  rested  on 
Shelburne. 

Meanwhile  a  new  situation  had  devel 
oped  in  Paris,  for  Jay  and  Adams,  the 
other  two  commissioners,  had  brought  about 
a  change  in  the  American  policy.  Frank 
lin,  deeply  indebted  to  the  French  court 
and  on  the  best  of  terms  with  Vergennes, 
was  willing  to  credit  him  with  good  inten 
tions  and  was  ready  to  accept  his  advice  to 
negotiate  with  England  under  the  vague 
terms  of  Oswald's  commission;  but  Jay, 
who  had  had  a  mortifying  experience  in 
Spain,  suspected  treachery  and  insisted  that 
England  must,  in  opening  negotiations,  fully 
recognize  American  independence.  He  was 
sure  that  Spain  would  gladly  see  the  United 
States  shut  in  to  the  Atlantic  coast  away 
from  Spanish  territory,  and  he  felt  certain 
that  Vergennes  was  under  Spanish  in 
fluence.  Adams,  who  knew  nothing  of  Spain, 
but  distrusted  the  French  on  general  prin 
ciples,  sided  with  Jay,  and  Franklin,  sub 
mitting  to  his  colleagues,  agreed  to  a  curious 
diplomatic  manoeuvre.  Jay  sent  to  Shel 
burne  a  secret  message,  urging  him  to  deal 
separately  with  the  United  States  under  a 
proper  commission  and  not  seek  to  play 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE      121 

into  the  hands  of  Spain  and  France.  He 
knew  that  a  French  emissary  had  visited 
Shelburne  and  he  dreaded  French  double- 
dealing,  especially  on  the  question  of  boun 
daries  and  fishery  rights. 

The  British  prime  minister  was  in  the 
odd  position  of  being  appealed  to  by  one  of  the 
three  hostile  powers  to  save  it  from  the  other 
two,  but  underlying  the  situation  was  the 
fact  that  Shelburne,  as  a  Whig  since  the 
beginning  of  the  American  quarrel,  was  com 
mitted  to  a  friendly  policy  toward  America. 
He  knew,  moreover,  that  when  Parlia 
ment  should  meet  he  must  expect  trouble 
from  Fox  and  the  dissatisfied  Whigs,  as 
well  as  the  Tories,  and  he  was  anxious  to 
secure  a  treaty  as  soon  as  possible.  So 
yielding,  on  September  27,  he  gave  Oswald 
the  required  commission,  but,  suspecting 
that  he  was  rather  too  complaisant,  sent 
Henry  Strachey  to  assist  him.  During  the 
summer  Franklin  and  Oswald,  in  informal 
discussions,  had  already  eliminated  various 
matters,  so  that  when  negotiations  formally 
opened  it  took  not  over  five  weeks  to  agree 
upon  a  draft  treaty. 

During  all  this  time  the  Americans  violated 
their  instructions  by  failing  to  consult  Ver- 
gennes.  Here  Franklin  was  again  overruled 
by  Jay  and  Adams,  whose  antipathy  to 
French  and  Spanish  influence  was  insupera- 


ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

ble.  It  does  not  appear  that  Vergennes  had 
any  definite  intention  to  work  against  Amer 
ican  boundaries  or  fishery  rights,  but  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  Rayneyal  and  Marjbpis, 
two  of  his  agents,  committed  themselves 
openly  in  a  sense  unfavorable  to  American 
claims,  and  it  is  likely  that,  had  the  nego 
tiations  taken  place  under  his  control,  the 
outcome  would  have  been  delayed  in  every 
way  in  order  to  allow  France  to  keep  its 
contract  with  Spain,  whose  attacks  on 
Gibraltar  were  pushed  all  through  the  sum 
mer.  As  it  was,  the  negotiators  managed  to 
agree  on  a  treaty  of  peace  which  reflected  the 
Whig  principles  of  Shelburne  and  the  skill  and 
pertinacity  of  the  three  Americans.  Little 
trouble  was  encountered  over  boundaries, 
Shelburne  ceding  everything  east  of  the 
Mississippi  and  north  of  Florida,  and  des 
ignating  as  a  boundary  between  the  United 
States  and  Canada  in  part  the  same  line 
as  that  in  the  Proclamation  of  1763,  from  the 
St.  Croix  River  to  the  eastward  of  Maine, 
to  the  Great  Lakes  and  thence  westward  by  a 
system  of  waterways  to  the  headwaters  of 
the  Mississippi.  At  the  especial  urgence  of 
Adams,  whose  Massachusetts  constituents 
drew  much  of  their  wealth  from  the  New 
foundland  fisheries,  the  right  of  continu 
ing  this  pursuit  was  comprised  in  the  treaty, 
together  with  the  right  to  land  and  dry 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE      123 

fish  on  unoccupied  territories  in  Labra 
dor  and  Nova  Scotia.  As  a  possible  make 
weight  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  was 
guaranteed  to  citizens  of  both  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain. 

The  'chief  difficulty  arose  over  the  question 
of  the  treatment  of  American  loyalists  and  the 
payment  of  British  debts  which  had  been  con 
fiscated  in  every  colony.  Shelburne  insisted 
that  there  must  be  restoration  of  civil  rights, 
compensation  for  damages  and  a  pledge 
against  any  future  confiscations  or  disfran- 
chisements  for  loyalists,  and  also  demanded 
a  provision  for  the  payment  of  all  debts 
due  British  creditors.  Here  the  negotiation 
hung  in  a  long  deadlock,  for  Franklin, 
Adams  and  Jay  were  unanimously  deter 
mined  to  concede  no  compensation  for  in 
dividuals  whom  they  hated  as  traitors; 
while  the  British  negotiators  felt  bound  in 
honor  not  to  abandon  the  men  who  had  lost 
all  and  suffered  every  indignity  and  hu 
miliation  as  a  penalty  for  their  loyalty. 
At  length  progress  was  made  when  Adams 
suggested  that  the  question  of  British  debts 
be  separated  from  that  of  Tory  compensation; 
so  a  clause  was  agreed  upon  guaranteeing 
the  full  payment  of  bona  fide  debts  hereto 
fore  contracted. 

Finally,  after  Franklin  had  raised  a 
counterclaim  for  damages  due  to  what  he 


124    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

called  the  "inhuman  burnings"  of  the 
British  raids  since  1778,  it  was  agreed  to 
insert  a  clause  against  any  future  confisca 
tions  or  prosecutions  of  loyalists  and  to  add 
that  Congress  should  "earnestly  recommend" 
to  the  states  the  restoration  of  loyalists' 
estates  and  the  repealing  of  all  laws  against 
them.  At  the  time  the  commissioners  drew 
up  this  article  they  must  have  known  that 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  had  no 
power  to  enforce  the  treaty  and  that  any 
such  recommendations,  however  "earnest," 
would  carry  no  weight  with  the  thirteen 
communities  controlled  by  embittered  rebels, 
who  remembered  every  Tory,  alive  or  dead, 
with  execration.  Nevertheless  it  offered  a 
way  of  escape,  and  the  British  representa 
tive  signed,  November  30,  1782.  The  great 
contest  was  at  an  end. 

When  Franklin  revealed  to  Vergennes 
that,  unknown  to  the  French  court,  the 
American  commissioners  had  agreed  on 
a  draft  treaty,  the  French  minister  was 
somewhat  indignant  at  the  trick  and  com 
municated  his  displeasure  to  his  agent  in 
America.  This  induced  the  easily  worried 
Congress  to  instruct  Livingston,  the  Secre 
tary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  write  a  letter 
censuring  the  commissioners;  but,  although 
Jay  and  Adams  were  hotly  indignant  at 
such  servility,  the  matter  ended  then  and 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE       125 

there.  Vergennes's  displeasure  was  mo 
mentary,  and  the  French  policy  continued  as 
before.  The  European  war  was,  in  fact, 
wearing  to  its  end.  Already  in  April,  1782, 
Admiral  Rodney^  had  inflicted  a  sharp  de 
feat  on  D_ejGrasse,  capturing  five  of  his 
vessels,  including  the  flagship  with  the  ad 
miral  himself.  This,  together  with  the  ex 
treme  inefficiency  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  put 
an  end  to  the  hope  of  further  French  gains 
in  the  West  Indies.  Before  Gibraltar  also 
the  allied  fleet  of  forty-eight  vessels  did 
not  dare  to  risk  a  general  engagement 
with  a  British  relieving  fleet  of  thirty,  and 
when  in  September,  1782,  a  final  bombard 
ment  was  attempted  the  batteries  from  the 
fort  proved  too  strong  for  their  assailants. 
The  allies  felt  that  they  had  accomplished 
all  they  could  hope  to  and  agreed  to  terms 
of  peace  on  January  20,  1783.  France  gained 
little  beyond  sundry  West  India  Islands, 
but  Spajn  profited  to  the  extent  of  *£i 
gaining  Miuorca^and  aJsoJJncida.  It  was 
at  best  a  defeat  for  England,  and  the  Whig 
ministry,  which  carried  it  through,  was  unable 
to  prevent  such  an  outcome. 

The  American  peace  was  made  the  pretext 
for  Shelburne's  fall,  since  a  coalition  of  dis 
satisfied  Whigs  and  Tories  united  in  March, 
1783,  to  censure  it,  thereby  turning  out  the 
ministry.  But  although  Fox  regained  control 


126    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

of  diplomatic  matters  and  made  some  slight 
moves  toward  reopening  negotiations,  he 
had  no  serious  intention  of  disturbing  Shel- 
burne's  work,  and  the  provisional  treaty 
was  made  definitive  on  September  3,  1783, — 
the  same  day  on  which  the  French  treaty 
was  signed.  Thus  the  Americans  tech 
nically  kept  to  the  terms  of  their  alliance 
with  France  in  agreeing  not  to  make  a 
separate  peace,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  hostili 
ties  had  entirely  ceased  in  America  since 
January,  1783,  and  practically  since  the 
fall  of  the  North  ministry.  The  British 
had  remained  quietly  in  New  York  and 
Charleston,  withdrawing  from  all  other 
points,  and  Washington  with  his  small 
army  stood  at  Newburg-on-the-Hudson. 
In  October,  1783,  the  last  British  with 
drew,  taking  with  them  into  exile  thousands 
of  Tories  who  did  not  dare  remain  to  test 
the  value  of  the  clauses  in  the  treaty  of 
peace  which  sought  to  protect  them.  So 
the  last  traces  of  the  long  con  test  disappeared, 
and  the  United  States  entered  upon  its 
career. 

But  the  treaty,  as  must  have  been 
foreseen  by  the  commissioners  themselves, 
remained  a  dead  letter  so  far  as  the  Tories 
were  concerned.  Congress  performed  its 
part  and  gave  the  promised  recommenda 
tion,  but  the  states  paid  no  heed.  The  loyal- 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE      127 

ists  were  not  restored  to  civil  or  property 
rights.  Furthermore  the  plain  provision  of 
the  treaty,  prohibiting  further  legislation 
against  loyalists,  was  defied  in  several  states, 
and  additional  disqualifications  were  placed 
upon  those  who  dared  to  remain  in  the 
country.  Still  further,  the  provision  re 
garding  the  payment  of  debts  remained 
unfulfilled,  since  there  was  no  mechanism 
provided  in  the  treaty  through  which  the 
article  could  be  enforced.  Only  from  the 
British  government  could  the  Tories  re 
ceive  any  recompense  for  their  sufferings, 
and  there  they  were  in  part  relieved. 
Very  many  received  grants  of  land  in 
Canada,  where  they  formed  a  consider 
able  part  of  the  population  in  several 
sections.  More  went  to  New  Brunswick 
and  Nova  Scotia  to  receive  similar  grants. 
Others  spent  their  days  in  England  as  un 
happy  pensioners,  forgotten  victims  of  a 
war  which  all  Englishmen  sought  to  bury  in 
oblivion.  Those  who  remained  in  the  United 
States  ultimately  regained  standing  and 
fared  better  than  the  exiles,  but  not  until 
new  domestic  issues  had  arisen  to  obliterate 
the  memory  of  revolutionary  antagonisms. 

With  the  Treaty  of  1782  the  mother  coun 
try  and  the  former  colonies  definitely  started 
on  separate  paths,  recognizing  the  fundamen 
tal  differences  which  for  fifty  years  had  made 


128    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

harmonious  cooperation  impossible.  Eng 
land  remained  as  before,  aristocratic  in  social 
structure,  oligarchic  in  government,  mili 
tary  and  naval  in  temper, — a  land  of  strongly 
fixed  standards  of  religious  and  political 
life,  a  country  where  society  looked  to  a 
narrow  circle  for  leadership.  Its  commercial 
and  economic  ideals,  unaltered  by  defeat, 
persisted  to  guide  national  policy  in  peace 
and  war  for  two  more  generations.  The 
sole  result  of  the  war  for  England  was  to 
render  impossible  in  future  any  such  per 
version  of  cabinet  government  as  that  which 
George  III,  By  intimidation,  fraud  and  po 
litical  management,  had  succeeded  for  a  dec 
ade  in  establishing.  Never  again  would 
the  country  tolerate  royal  dictation  of  pol 
icies  and  leaders.  England  became  what 
it  had  been  before  1770,  a  country  where 
parliamentary  groups  and  leaders  bore  the 
responsibility  and  gained  the  glory  or  dis 
credit,  while  the  outside  public  approved 
or  protested  but  could  not  seek  in  any  other 
manner  to  control  the  destinies  of  the  state. 
While  the  English  thus  sullenly  fell  back 
into  their  accustomed  habits,  the  former 
Colonies,  now  relieved  from  the  old-time 
subordination,  were  turned  adrift  to  solve 
problems  of  a  wholly  different  sort. 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    FORMATION   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES, 

1781-1793 

THE  British  colonists,  who  assumed  inde 
pendent  legal  existence  with  the  adoption 
of  Articles  of  Confederation  in  1781,  had 
managed  to  carry  through  a  revolution 
and  emerge  into  the  light  of  peace.  They 
were  now  required  to  learn,  in  the  hard 
school  of  experience,  those  necessary  facts 
of  government  which  they  had  hitherto 
ignored  and  which,  even  in  the  agonies  of 
civil  war,  they  had  refused  to  recognize. 
Probably  with  three  quarters  of  the 
American  people  the  prevailing  political 
sentiment  was  that  of  aversion  to  any  gov 
ernmental  control,  coupled  with  a  deep- 
rooted  jealousy  and  distrust  of  all  officials, 
even  those  chosen  by  and  dependent  upon 
themselves.  Their  political  ideals  contem 
plated  the  government  of  each  colony 
chiefly  by  the  elected  representatives  of  the 
voters,  who  should  meet  annually  to  legis 
late  and  tax,  and  then,  having  defined  the 
duties  of  the  few  permanent  officers  in  such 
a  way  as  to  leave  them  little  or  no  discretion, 
should  dissolve,  leaving  the  community 
to  run  itself  until  the  next  annual  session. 
Authority  of  any  kind  was  to  them  an 


130    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

object  of  traditional  dread,  even  when  exer 
cised  by  their  own  agents.  The  early  state 
constitutions  concentrated  all  power  in  the 
legislature,  leaving  the  executive  and  judicial 
officials  little  to  do  but  execute  the  laws.  The 
only  discretionary  powers  enjoyed  by  govern 
ors  'were  in  connection  with  military  affairs. 

In  establishing  the  Articles  of  Confedera 
tion  the  statesmen  of  the  Continental  Con 
gress  had  no  intention  of  creating  in  any 
sense  a  governing  body.  All  that  the  Con 
gress  could  do  was  to  decide  upon  war  and 
peace,  make  treaties,  decide  upon  a  common 
military  establishment  and  determine  the 
sums  to  be  contributed  to  the  common 
treasury.  These  matters,  moreover,  called 
for  an  affirmative  vote  of  nine  states  in  each 
case.  There  was  no  federal  executive,  nor 
judiciary,  nor  any  provision  for  enforce- 
ing  the  votes  of  the  Congress.  To  carry  out 
any  single  thing  committed  by  the  Articles 
to  the  Congress,  and  duly  voted,  required 
the  positive  cooperation  of  the  state  legisla 
tures,  who  were  under  no  other  compulsion 
than  their  sense  of  what  the  situation  called 
for  and  of  what  they  could  afford  to  do. 

Things  were,  in  short,  just  where  the  col 
onists  would  have  been  glad  to  have  them 
before  the  Revolution, — with  the  objection 
able  provincial  executives  removed,  all  co 
ercive  authority  in  the  central  government 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    131 

abolished  and  the  legislatures  left  to  their 
own  absolute  discretion.  In  other  words, 
the  average  American  farmer  or  trader  of  the 
day  felt  that  the  Revolution  had  been 
fought  to  get  rid  of  all  government  but  one 
directly  under  the  control  of  the  individual 
voters  of  the  states.  Typical  of  such  were 
men  like  Samuel  Adams  of  Massachusetts 
and  Patrick  Henry  of  Virginia.  They  had 
learned  their  politics  in  the  period  before 
the  Revolution  and  clung  to  the  old  colonial 
spirit,  which  regarded  normal  politics  as 
essentially  defensive  and  anti-governmental. 
On  the  other  hand  there  were  a  good  many 
individuals  in  the'  country  who;  recognized 
that  the  triumph  of  the  colonial  ideal  was 
responsible  for  undeniable  disasters.  Such 
men  were  found  especially  among  the  army 
officers  and  among  those  who  had  tried  to 
aid  the  cause  in  diplomatic  or  civil  office 
during  the  Revolution.  Experience  made 
them  realize  that  the  practical  abolition  of  all 
executive  authority  and  the  absence  of  any 
real  central  government  had  been  responsible 
for  chronic  inefficiency.  The  financial  col 
lapse,  the  lack  of  any  power  on  the  part  of 
Congress  to  enforce  its  laws  or  resolutions, 
the  visible  danger  that  state  legislatures 
might  consult  their  own  convenience  in 
supporting  the  common  enterprises  or  ob 
ligations, — all  these  shortcomings  led  men 


132    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

such  as  Washington,  Hamilton,  Madison, 
Webster,  a  pamphleteer  of  New  England,  to 
urge  even  before  1781  that  a  genuine  govern 
ment  should  be  set  up  to  replace  the  mere 
league.  Their  supporters  were,  however, 
few,  and  confined  mainly  to  those  mer 
chants  or  capitalists  who  realized  the  neces 
sity  of  general  laws  and  a  general  authority. 
It  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  the  inherited 
prejudices  of  most  Americans  in  favor  of 
local  independence  could  have  been  over 
borne  had  not  the  Revolution  been  followed 
by  a  series  of  public  distresses,  which  drove 
to  the  side  of  the  strong-government  ad 
vocates, — temporarily  as  it  proved, — a  great 
number  of  American  voters. 

When  hostilities  ended  the  people  of  the 
United  States  entered  upon  a  period  of  eco 
nomic  confusion.  In  the  first  place,  trade  was 
disorganized,  since  the  old  West  India 
markets  were  lost  and  the  privileges  for 
merly  enjoyed  under  the  Navigation  Acts 
were  terminated  by  the  separation  of  the 
countries.  American  shippers  could  not 
at  once  discover  in  French  or  other  ports  an 
equivalent  for  the  former  triangular  trade. 
In  the  second  place  English  manufacturers 
and  exporters  rushed  to  recover  their  Amer 
ican  market  and  promptly  put  out  of 
competition  the  American  industries  which 
had  begun  to  develop  during  the  war. 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    133 

Specie,  plentiful  for  a  few  months,  now  flowed 
rapidly  out  of  the  country,  since  American 
merchants  were  no  longer  able  to  buy 
British  goods  by  drawing  on  West  India 
credits.  At  the  same  time,  with  the  arrival 
of  peace,  the  state  courts  resumed  their 
functions,  and  general  liquidation  began; 
while  the  state  legislatures,  in  the  effort 
to  adjust  war  finances,  imposed  what  were 
felt  to  be  high  taxes.  The  result  was  a  general 
complaint  of  hard  times,  of  poverty  and  of 
insufficient  money.  Some  states  made  efforts 
to  retaliate  against  Great  Britain  by  tariffs 
and  navigation  laws,  but  this  only  damaged 
their  own  ports  by  driving  British  trade 
to  their  neighbors'.  Congress  could  afford 
no  help,  since  it  had  no  power  of  commercial 
regulation. 

The  effect  upon  the  working  of  the  Con 
federation  showed  that  a  majority  of  Amer 
icans  had  learned  nothing  from  all  their  ex 
periences,  for  the  state  legislatures  de 
clined  to  furnish  to  the  central  government 
any  more  money  than  they  felt  to  be 
convenient,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  with 
out  their  regular  support  the  United  States 
was  certain  to  become  bankrupt.  Robert 
Morris  was  appointed  Financier  in  1781,  and 
took  energetic  steps  to  introduce  order 
into  the  mass  of  loan  certificates,  foreign 
loans,  certificates  of  indebtedness  and  moun- 


134    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

tains  of  paper  currency;  but  the  one  unes- 
capable  fact  stood  in  his  way,  that  the  states 
felt  under  no  obligation  to  pay  their  quotas 
of  expenses.  In  spite  of  his  urgent  appeals, 
backed  by  resolutions  of  Congress,  the 
government  revenues  remained  too  scanty 
to  pay  even  the  interest  on  the  debt.  Morris 
resigned  in  disgust  in  1784,  and  his  successors, 
a  committee  of  Congress,  found  themselves 
able  to  do  nothing  more  than  confess  bank 
ruptcy.  The  people  of  the  states  felt  too 
poor  to  support  their  federal  government 
and,  what  was  more,  felt  no  responsibility 
for  its  fate. 

Without  revenue  it  naturally  followed  that 
the  Congress  of  the  Confederation  accom 
plished  practically  nothing.  As  will  be 
shown  later,  it  could  secure  no  treaties  of  any 
importance,  since!  its  impotence  to  enforce 
them  was  patent.  It  managed  to  disband 
the  remaining  troops  with  great  difficulty 
and  only  under  the  danger  of  mutiny,  a 
danger  so  great  that  it  took  all  of  Wash 
ington's  personal  influence  to  prevent  an 
uprising  at  Newburg  in  March,  1783.  For 
the  rest,  its  leaders,  men  often  of  high  ability, 
— Hamilton,  Madison,  King  of  Massachu 
setts,  Sherman  of  Connecticut, — found  them 
selves  helpless.  Naturally  they  appealed 
to  the  states  for  additional  powers  and 
submitted  no  less  than  three  amendments: 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    135 

first,  in  1781,  a  proposal  to  permit  Congress 
to  levy  and  collect  a  five  per  cent  duty  on  im 
ports;  then,  in  1783,  a  plan  by  which  certain 
specific  duties  were  to  be  collected  by  state 
officers  and  turned  over  to  the  government; 
and  finally,  in  1784,  a  request  that  Congress 
be  given  power  to  exclude  vessels  of  nations 
which  would  not  make  commercial  treaties. 
No  one  of  these  succeeded,  although  the  first 
plan  failed  of  unanimous  acceptance  by  one 
state  only.  The  legislatures  recognized  the 
need  but  dreaded  to  give  any  outside  power 
whatever  authority  within  their  respec 
tive  boundaries.  While  those  who  advocated 
these  amendments  kept  reiterating  the  posi 
tive  necessity  for  some  means  to  avert 
national  disgrace  and  bankruptcy,  their 
opponents,  reverting  to  the  language  of 
1775,  declared  it  incompatible  with  "liberty" 
that  any  authority  other  than  the  state's 
should  be  exercised  in  a  state's  territory. 
By  1787  it  was  clear  that  any  hope  of  specific 
amendments  was  vain.  Unanimity  from 
thirteen  legislatures  was  not  to  be  looked  for. 
On  the  other  hand,  where  the  states  chose 
to  act  they  produced  important  results. 
The  cessions  of  western  lands,  which  had 
been  exacted  by  Maryland  as  her  price 
for  ratifying  the  Articles,  were  carried  out 
by  New  York,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut, 
and  Virginia  until  the  title  to  all  territory 


136    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

west  of  Pennsylvania  and  north  of  the 
Ohio  was  with  the  Confederation.  Then,  al 
though  nothing  in  the  Articles  authorized 
such  action,  Congress,  in  1787,  adopted  an 
Ordinance  establishing  a  plan  for  settling 
the  new  lands.  After  a  period  of  provin 
cial  government,  substantially  identical  with 
that  of  the  colonies,  the  region  was  to  be 
divided  into  states  and  admitted  into  the 
union,  under  the  terms  of  an  annexed  "com 
pact"  which  prohibited  slavery  and  guar 
anteed  civil  rights.  But  where  the  states 
did  not  cooperate,  confusion  reigned.  Legis 
latures  laid  such  tariffs  as  they  saw  fit,  which 
led  to  actual  interstate  commercial  dis 
criminations  between  New  York  and  its 
neighbors.  Connecticut  and  Pennsylvania 
wrangled  over  land  claims.  The  inhabitants 
of  the  territory  west  of  New  Hampshire 
set  up  a  state  government  under  the  name 
of  Vermont  and  successfully  maintained 
themselves  against  the  state  of  New  York, 
which  had  a  legal  title  to  the  soil,  while  the 
frontier  settlers  in  North  Carolina  were 
prevented  only  by  inferior  numbers  from 
carrying  through  a  similar  secession. 

Finally,  in  the  years  1785-7,  the  number  of 
those  who  found  the  unrestrained  self-gov 
ernment  of  the  separate  states  another 
name  for  anarchy  was  enormously  increased 
by  a  sudden  craze  for  paper  money,  tender 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    137 

laws  and  stay  laws  which  swept  the  country. 
The  poorer  classes,  especially  the  farmers,  de 
nounced  the  courts  as  agents  of  the  rich, 
clamored  for  more  money  to  permit  the 
easy  payment  of  obligations,  and  succeeded 
in  compelling  more  than  half  of  the  states 
to  pass  laws  hindering  the  collection  of  debts 
and  emitting  bills  of  credit,  which  promptly 
depreciated.  Worse  remained.  In  New 
Hampshire  armed  bands  tried  to  intimidate 
the  legislature,  and  in  Massachusetts  the 
rejection  of  such  laws  brought  on  actual 
insurrection.  Farmers  assembled  under  arms, 
courts  were  broken  up,  and  a  sharp  little 
civil  war,  known  as  Shays'  Rebellion,  was 
necessary  before  the  state  government  could 
reestablish  order. 

Under  the  circumstances,  a  sudden  strong 
reaction  against  mob  rule  and  untrammelled 
democracy  ran  through  the  country,  swing 
ing  all  men  of  property  and  law-abiding 
habits  powerfully  in  favor  of  the  demand  for 
a  new,  genuinely  authoritative  national  gov 
ernment,  able  to  compel  peace  and  good 
order.  So  the  leaders  of  the  reform  party 
struck,  and  at  a  meeting  at  Annapolis  in 
October,  1786,  summoned  originally  to  dis 
cuss  the  problem  of  navigating  the  Poto 
mac  River,  they  issued  a  call  for  a  convention 
of  delegates  from  all  the  states  to  meet  at 
Philadelphia  in  May,  1787,  for  the  purpose 


138    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

of  recommending  provisions  "intended  to 
render  the  federal  government  adequate 
to  the  exigencies  of  the  Union."  This  move 
ment,  reversing  the  current  of  American  his 
tory,  gained  impetus  in  the  winter  of  1787. 
Congress  seconded  the  call,  and,  after  Vir 
ginia  had  shown  the  way  by  nominating  its 
foremost  men  as  delegates,  the  other  states 
fell,  into  line  and  sent  representatives, — 
all  but  Rhode  Island,  which  was  the  scene 
of  an  orgy  of  paper-money  tyranny,  and 
would  take  no  part  in  any  such  meeting. 
Of  the  fifty-five  men  present  at  the  Phila 
delphia  convention,  not  more  than  half  a 
dozen  were  of  the  old  colonial  type,  which 
clung  to  individual  state  independence  as 
the  palladium  of  liberty.  All  the  others 
felt  that  the  time  had  come  to  lay  the  most 
thoroughgoing  limitations  upon  the  states, 
with  the  express  purpose  of  preventing  any 
future  repetition  of  the  existing  interstate 
wrangles,  and  especially  of  the  financial 
abuses  of  the  time;  and  they  were  ready  to 
gain  this  end  by  entrusting  large  powers  to  the 
central  government.  They  divided  sharply, 
however,  on  one  important  point,  namely, 
whether  the  increased  powers  were  to  be  exer 
cised  by  a  government  similar  to  the  exist 
ing  one  or  by  something  wholly  new  and  far 
more  centralized,  and  over  this  question  the 
convention  ran  grave  danger  of  breaking  up. 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    139 

Discussion  began  in  June,  1787,  behind 
carefully  closed  doors,  with  a  draft  plan 
agreed  upon  by  the  Virginia  members  as 
the  working  project.  This  was  a  bold  scheme, 
calling  for  the  creation  of  a  single  great 
state,  relying  on  the  people  for  its  authority, 
superior  to  the  existing  states,  and  able,  if 
necessary,  to  coerce  them;  in  reality  a 
fusion  of  the  United  States  into  a  single 
commonwealth.  In  opposition  to  this  the 
representatives  of  the  smaller  states, —  Del 
aware,  New  Jersey,  Maryland  and  Connec 
ticut,  —  aided  by  the  conservative  members 
from  New  York,  announced  that  they 
would  never  consent  to  any  plan  which  did 
not  safeguard  the  individuality  and  equal 
ity  of  their  states,  and,  although  the  Virginia 
plan  commanded  a  majority  of  those  present, 
its  supporters  were  obliged  to  permit  a  com 
promise  in  order  to  prevent  an  angry  dis 
solution  of  the  convention.  In  keeping  with 
a  suggestion  of  the  Connecticut  members, 
it  was  agreed  that  one  house  of  the  proposed 
legislature  should  contain  an  equal  represen 
tation  of  the  states  while  the  other  should  be 
based  on  population. 

The  adoption  of  this  compromise  put  an 
end  to  the  danger  of  disruption,  for  all  but 
a  few  irreconcilables  were  now  ready  to  co 
operate,  and  in  the  course  of  a  laborious 
session  a  final  draft  was  hammered  out,  with 


140    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

patchings,  changes,  and  additional  com 
promises  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  the 
plantation  states  in  the  institution  of  slavery. 
When  the  convention  adjourned,  it  placed 
before  the  people  of  America  a  document 
which  was  a  novelty  in  the  field  of  govern 
ment.  In  part  it  aimed  to  establish  a 
great  state,  on  the  model  of  the  American 
states,  which  in  turn  derived  their  features 
from  the  colonial  governments.  It  had 
a  Congress  of  two  houses,  an  executive 
with  independent  powers,  and  a  judiciary 
authorized  to  enforce  the  laws  of  the  United 
States.  Congress  was  given  full  and  ex 
clusive  power  over  commerce,  currency, 
war  and  peace  and  a  long  list  of  enumerated 
activities  involving  interstate  questions,  and 
was  authorized  to  pass  all  laws  necessary 
and  proper  to  the  carrying  out  of  any  of 
the  powers  named  in  the  constitution.  Fur 
ther,  the  constitution,  the  federal  laws  and 
treaties  were  declared  to  be  the  supreme 
law  of  the  land,  anything  in  a  state  law  or 
constitution  notwithstanding.  In  addition, 
the  states  were  expressly  forbidden  to 
enter  the  fields  reserved  to  the  federal  gov 
ernment  and  were  prohibited  from  infringing 
the  rights  of  property.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  new  government  could  not  exist  without 
the  cooperation  of  the  states  in  providing  for 
the  election  of  electors, — to  choose  a  presi- 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    141 

dent, — of  senators  and  of  congressmen.  It 
was  a  new  creation,  a  federal  state. 

There  now  followed  a  sharp  and  ^decisive 
contest  to  gain  the  necessary  ratification 
by  nine  commonwealths.  At  first  the  advo 
cates  of  strong  government,  by  a  rapid  cam 
paign,  secured  the  favorable  votes  of  half  a 
dozen  states  in  quick  succession,  but  when 
it  came  the  turn  of  New  York,  Massachusetts 
and  Virginia,  the  conservative,  localistic 
instincts  of  the  farmers  and  older  people 
were  roused  to  make  a  strenuous  resistance. 
The  "  Federalists,"  as  the  advocates  of  the 
new  government  termed  themselves,  had 
to  meet  charges  that  the  proposed  scheme 
would  crush  the  liberties  of  the  states,  re 
duce  them  to  ciphers,  and  set  up  an  imita 
tion  of  the  British  monarchy.  But  by  the 
eager  urging  of  the  foremost  lawyers  and 
most  influential  men  of  the  day  the  tide  was 
turned  and  ratification  carried,  although 
with  the  utmost  difficulty  and  usually  with 
the  recommendation  of  amendments  to 
perfect  the  constitution.  In  June,  1788,  the 
contest  ended,  and  although  Rhode  Island 
and  North  Carolina  remained  unreconciled 
the  other  eleven  states  proceeded  to  set  up 
the  new  government. 

In  the  winter  of  1789,  in  accordance  with 
a  vote  of  the  Congress  of  the  Confederation, 
the  states  chose  electors  and  senators  and 


142    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

the  people  voted  for  representatives.  But 
one  possible  candidate  existed  for  the  presi 
dency,  namely,  the  hero  of  the  Revolu 
tionary  War,  and  hence  Washington  re 
ceived  the  unanimous  vote  of  the  whole 
electoral  college.  With  him  John  Adams 
was  chosen  vice-president,  by  a  much  smaller 
majority.  The  Congress,  which  slowly  as 
sembled,  was  finally  able  to  count  and 
declare  the  votes,  the  two  officers  were  in 
augurated  and  the  new  government  was 
ready  to  assume  its  functions. 

There  followed  a  period  of  rapid  and 
fundamental  legislation.  In  the  new  Con 
gress  were  a  body  of  able  men,  by  far  the 
greater  number  of  them  zealous  to  establish 
a  strong  authoritative  government,  and  to 
complete  the  victory  of  the  Federalists. 
The  defeated  States'  Rights  men  now  stood 
aside,  watching  their  conquerors  carry  their 
plan  to  its  conclusion.  Accordingly,  led 
for  the  most  part  by  James  Madison  of 
the  House,  Congress  passed  acts  creating 
executive  departments  with  federal  officials; 
establishing  a  full  independent  federal  judici 
ary,  resident  in  every  state,  with  a  supreme 
court  above  all;  imposing  a  tariff  for  revenue 
and  for  protection  to  American  industries, 
and  appropriating  money  to  settle  the  debts 
of  the  late  confederation.  In  addition  it 
framed  and  submitted  to  the  states  a  series 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    143 

of  constitutional  amendments  whose  object 
was  to  meet  Anti-federalist  criticisms  by 
securing  the  individual  against  oppression 
from  the  federal  government.  When  Con 
gress  adjourned  in  September,  1789,  after 
its  first  session,  it  had  completed  a  thorough 
going  political  revolution.  In  place  of  a 
loose  league  of  entirely  independent  states, 
there  now  existed  a  genuine  national  gov 
ernment,  able  to  enforce  its  will  upon  indi 
viduals  and  to  perform  all  the  functions  of 
any  state. 

That  the  American  people,  with  their 
political  inheritance,  should  have  consented 
even  by  a  small  majority  to  abandon  their 
traditional  lax  government,  remains  one 
of  the  most  remarkable  political  decisions 
in  history.  It  depended  upon  the  concur 
rence  ofj  circumstances  which,  for  the  mo 
ment,  forced  all  persons'of  property  and  law- 
abiding  instincts  to  join  together  in  all  the 
states  to  remedy  an  intolerable  situation. 
The  leaders,  as  might  be  expected,  were  a 
different  race  of  statesmen,  on  the  whole, 
from  those  who  had  directed  events  prior 
to  1776.  Washington  and  Franklin  favored 
the  change,  but  Richard  Henry  Lee  and  Pat 
rick  Henry  were  eager  opponents,  Samuel 
Adams  was  unfriendly,  and  Thomas  Jeffer 
son,  in  Paris,  was  unenthusiastic.  The 
main  work  was  done  by  Hamilton,  Madison, 


144    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

John  Marshall,  Gouverneur  Morris,  Fisher 
Ames, — men  who  were  children  in  the  days 
of  the  Stamp  Act.  The  old  agitators  and 
revolutionists  were  superseded  by  a  new 
type  of  politicians,  whose  interests  lay  in 
government,  not  opposition. 

But  the  fundamental  American  instincts 
were  not  in  reality  changed;  they  had  only 
ebbed  for  the  moment.  No  sooner  did 
Congress  meet  in  its  second  session  in 
January,  1790,  and  undertake  the  task  of 
reorganizing  the  chaotic  finances  of  the 
country,  than  political  unanimity  vanished 
and  new  sectional  and  class  antagonisms 
came  rapidly  to  the  front  in  which  could  be 
traced  the  return  of  the  old-time  colonial 
habits.  The  central  figure  was  no  longer 
Madison,  but  Hamilton,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  who  aspired  to  be  a  second  William 
Pitt,  and  submitted  an  elaborate  scheme  for 
refunding  the  entire  American  debt.  In 
addition  he  called  for  an  excise  tax,  and 
later  recommended  the  chartering  of  a 
National  Bank  to  serve  the  same  function 
in  America  that  the  Bank  of  England  per 
formed  in  Great  Britain. 

Daring,  far-sighted,  based  on  the  methods 
of  English  financiers,  Hamilton's  plans 
bristled  with  points  certain  to  arouse  an 
tagonism.  He  proposed  to  refund  and  pay 
the  debt  at  its  face  value  to  actual  holders, 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    145 

regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  nearly 
worthless  federal  stock  and  certificates  of  in 
debtedness  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  spec 
ulators;  he  recommended  that  the  United 
States  assume,  fund  and  pay  the  war  debt 
of  the  states,  disregarding  the  fact  that, 
while  some  states  were  heavily  burdened, 
others  had  discharged  their  obligations. 
He  urged  an  excise  tax  on  liquors,  although 
such  an  internal  tax  was  an  innovation  in 
America  and  was  certain  to  stir  intense  op 
position;  he  suggested  the  chartering  of  a 
powerful  bank,  in  spite  of  the  absence  of 
any  clause  in  the  constitution  authorizing 
such  action.  Hamilton  was,  in  fact,  a  great 
admirer  of  the  English  constitution  and 
political  system,  and  he  definitely  intended 
to  strengthen  the  new  government  by  mak 
ing  it  the  supreme  financial  power  and  en 
listing  in  its  support  all  the  moneyed  in 
terests  of  the  country.  Property,  as  in 
England,  must  be  the  basis  of  government. 
Against  his  schemes  there  immediately 
developed  a  rising  opposition  which  made 
itself  felt  in  Congress,  in  state  legislatures, 
in  the  newspapers  and  finally  in  Washington's 
own  cabinet.  All  the  farmer  and  debtor 
elements  in  the  country  disliked  and  dreaded 
the  financial  manipulations  of  the  brilliant 
secretary,  and  the  Virginian  planters,  uni 
versally  borrowers,  who  had  been  the  strong- 


146    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

est  single  power  in  establishing  the  new  con 
stitution,  now  swung  into  opposition  to  the 
administration.  Madison  led  the  fight  in 
the  House  against  [Hamilton's  measures,  and 
Jefferson,  in  the  cabinet,  laid  down,  in  a 
memorandum  of  protest  against  the  proposed 
bank,  the  doctrine  of  "strict  construction" 
of  the  constitution  according  to  which  the 
powers  granted  to  the  federal  government 
ought  to  be  narrowly  construed  in  order  to 
preserve  the  state  governments,  the  source 
of  liberty,  from  encroachment.  He  de 
nounced  the  bank,  accordingly,  as  unwar 
ranted  by  the  constitution,  corrupt  and 
dangerous  to  the  safety  of  the  country.  In 
the  congressional  contest  Hamilton  was 
successful,  for  all  his  recommendations  were 
adopted,  but  at  the  cost  of  creating  a  lasting 
antagonism  in  the  southern  states  and  in 
the  western  regions. 

;  In  the  year  1791  Jefferson  and  Madison 
cooperated  to  establish  a  newspaper  at 
Philadelphia  whose  sole  occupation  consisted 
in  denouncing  the  corrupt  and  monarchical 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Hamilton  re 
torted  by  publishing  letters  charging  Jefferson 
with  responsibility  for  it,  and  Washing 
ton,  who  steadily  approved  Hamilton's  pol 
icies,  found  his  cabinet  splitting  into  two 
factions.  By  the  year  1792,  when  the  second 
presidential  election  took  place,  the  opposi- 


FORMATION  OF  UNITED  STATES    147 

tion,  styling  itself  "Republican,"  was  suffi 
ciently  well  organized  to  run  George  Clin 
ton,  formerly  the  Anti-federalist  leader  of 
New  York,  for  Vice-President  against  d  ° 
"monarchical"  Adams.  Washington  was 
not  opposed,  but  no  other  one  of  the  Hamil- 
tonian  supporters  escaped  attack.  There 
was,  in  short,  the  beginning  of  the  definite 
formation  of  political  parties  on  lines  akin 
to  those  which  existed  in  the  period  before 
1787.  Behind  Jefferson  and  Madison  were 
rallying  all  the  colonial-minded  voters,  to 
whom  government  was  at  best  an  evil  and 
to  whom,  under  any  circumstances,  strong 
authority  and  elaborate  finance  were  utterly 
abhorrent.  Around  Hamilton  gathered  the 
men  whose  interests  lay  in  building  up  a  gen 
uine,  powerful,  national  government, — the 
merchants,  shipowners,  moneyed  men  and 
creditors  generally  in  the  northern  states, 
and,  of  course,  all  Tories. 

Up  to  1793  the  Federalist  administration 
successfully  maintained  its  ground,  and,  when 
the  Virginian  group  tried  in  the  House  to  prove 
laxity  and  mismanagement  against  Hamil 
ton,  he  was  triumphantly  vindicated.  Had 
the  United  States  been  allowed  to  develop  in 
tranquillity  and  prosperity  for  a  generation 
it  is  not  unlikely  that  the  Federalist  party 
might  have  struck  its  roots  so  deeply  as  to 
be  impervious  to  attacks.  But  it  needed 


148    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

time,  for  in  contrast  to  the  Jeffersonian 
party,  whose  origin  is  manifestly  in  the  old- 
time  colonial  political  habits  of  democracy, 
^o^al  independence  and  love  of  lax  finance, 
the  Federalist  party  was  a  new  creation, 
with  no  traditions  to  fall  back  upon.  Re 
flecting  in  some  respects  English  views, 
notably  in  its  distrust  of  the  masses  and  its 
respect  for  property  and  wealth,  it  far  sur 
passed  any  English  party  of  the  period,  ex 
cept  the  small  group  led  by  William  Pitt, 
in  its  demand  for  progressive  and  vigorous 
legislation.  In  1793,  when  matters  were  in 
this  situation,  the  state  of  European  and 
English  politics  suddenly  brought  the  United 
States  into  the  current  of  world  politics  and 
subjected  the'  new  administration  to  diffi 
culties  which  were  ultimately  to  cause  its 
downfall. 

„  CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  FIRST  PERIOD    OF  COMMERCIAL   ANTAGO 
NISM,   1783-1795 

WHILE  the  United  States  had  been  under 
going  the  important  changes  of  the  period, 
1783-1793,  England  had  passed  through  an 
almost  equally  significant  political  trans 
formation,  in  the  course  of  which  the  two 
countries  entered  upon  a  long  history  of 
difficult  and  unfriendly  diplomatic  relations. 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      149 

The  treaty  of  peace  ended  the  political 
union  of  the  two  communities,  but  it  left 
the  nature  of  their  commercial  relations  to 
be  settled,  and  this,  for  the  United  States, 
was  a  problem  second  only  in  importance 
to  that  of  federal  government.  If  the  pros 
perity  of  the  thirteen  states  was  to  be  re 
stored  the  old-time  trade  routes  of  the  co 
lonial  days  must  be  reestablished.  The 
West  India  market  for  fish,  grain  and  lum 
ber,  the  English  or  European  market  for 
plantation  products  must  be  replaced  on  a 
profitable  basis  and  the  United  States  must 
be  prepared  to  purchase  these  privileges 
by  whatever  concessions  lay  in  its  power 
to  grant.  It  rested  chiefly  with  England 
to  decide  whether  to  permit  the  former 
colonies  to  resume  their  earlier  commercial 
system  or  begin  a  new  policy,  for  it  was 
with  England  and  the  English  colonies  that 
seven  eighths  of  American  commerce  natu-* 
rally  was  carried  on. 

Unfortunately  for  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  and  unfortunately  for  the  harmony 
of  the  two  countries,  the  prevailing  beliefs 
of  English  merchants,  shipowners,  naval 
authorities  and,  in  general,  the  official  classes 
were  such  as  to  render  a  complete  resump 
tion  of  the  former  trade  relations  almost 
impossible.  According  to  the  political  and 
economic  doctrines  underlying  the  Acts  of 


150    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Trade,  the  moment  that  the  two  countries 
became  separated  their  intexe.sts  automati 
cally  beca^ne  antagonistic.  American  ship 
ping,  formerly  fostered  when  under  the  flag, 
now  assumed  the  aspect  of  a  formidable 
rival  to  the  British  merchant  marine  and, 
as  such,  ought  to  be  prevented  from  taking 
any  profit  which  by  any  device  could  be 
turned  toward  English  ships. 

The  treaty  of  peace  had  scarcely  been 
signed  when  there  appeared  a  pamphlet 
by  Lord  Sheffield,  early  in  1783,  which 
won  instant  success,  passing  through  several 
editions.  This  announced  that  henceforward 
it  was  the  duty  of  the  British_government  to 
discourage  a^I^c7ush_Ame.ricari_  navigation 
to  the  extent  of  its  power  in  order  to_cjieck 
a  dangerous  .rival,  taking  especial  care  to 
reserve  the  West  Indies. for  exclusive  British 
control.  J  At  the  possibility  of  losing  the 
Stable  American  market  through  re- 

liatory  measures,  Sheffield  laughed  in 
scorn.  "We  might  as  reasonably  dread  the 
effect  of  combinations  among  the  German 
as  among  the  American  States,"  he  sneered, 
"and  deprecate  the  resolves  of  the  Diet 
as  those  of  Congress. "  There  were  elements, 
of  course,  to  whom  these  arguments  of  Shef 
field  were  unwelcome,  particularly  the  West 
India  planters  themselves,  and  to  a  degree 
the  British  manufacturers,  who  would  gladly 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      151 

have  resumed  the  trade  of  the  years  before 
1776;  but  so  far  as  the  great  majority  of 
Englishmen  was  concerned  it  seems  impos 
sible  to  doubt  that  Lord  Sheffield  was  a  true 
spokesman  of  their  deepest  convictions. 

In  addition  to  the  economic  theories  of 
the  time,  the  temper  of  the  English  people 
was  sullen,  hostile  and  contemptuous  to 
ward  the  former  colonies.  The  bulk  of  the 
nation  had  come  to  condemn  the  policies  of 
the  North  ministry,  which  had  led  to  the 
loss  of  the  plantations,  but  they  did  not 
love  the  Americans  any  the  more  for  that. 
The  sharp  social  distinctions,  which  prior 
to  1776  had  rendered  the  nobility,  the  gentry, 
the  clergy  and  the  professions  contemptuous 
toward  the  colonists,  still  reigned  unchecked; 
and  the  Tories  and  most  of  the  ruling  classes, 
regarding  the  Americans  as  a  set  of  ungrate 
ful  and  spiteful  people,  whom  it  was  well 
to  have  lost  as  subjects,  ceased  to 
any  interest  in  their  existence.  The  Uni 
States  was  dropped,  as  an  unpleasant 
ject  is  banished  from  conversation,  and  the 
relations  of  the  two  countries  became  a 
matter  of  national  concern  only  when  the 
interests  of  shipowners,  merchants  or  naval 
authorities  were  sufficiently  strong  to  com 
pel  attention  from  the  governing  classes. 

The  Whig  leaders  "should  of  course  be  ex- 
cepted  from  this  general  statement,  for  they 


152    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

and  their  followers, — both  their  parliamen 
tary  coterie  and  their  middle-class  adherents 
outside, — retained  a  friendly  attitude  and 
tried  to  treat  the  United  States  with  a  con 
sideration  which  usually  had  no  place  in 
Tory  manners.  But  Whigs  as  well  as  Tories 
held  the  prevailing  conceptions  of  naval 
and  economic  necessities,  and  only  scattered 
individuals,  such  as  William  Pitt,  were 
affected  by  the  new  doctrines  of  Adam 
Smith.  Their  commercial  policy  tended  to 
differ  only  in  degree  from  that  of  the  more 
rigid  Tories.. 

To  make  it  certain  that  the  United  States 
should  fail  to  secure  favorable  commercial 
rights,  the  ascendancy  of  the  Whigs  came  to 
a  sudden  end  within  a  year  from  its  begin 
ning.  The  Shelburne  ministry,  which  made 
the  peace,  had  to  meet  the  opposition  not 
only  of  the  Tories  but  of  the  group  led  by 
Fox.  In  the  session  of  1783  the  Whig  party 
was  thus  openly  split,  and  presently  all 
England  was  scandalized  to  see  Fox  enter 
into  a  coalition  with  no  less  a  person  than 
Lord  North  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  office. 
Shelburne  resigned  on  February  24,  after 
the  passage  of  a  resolution  of  censure  on  the 
Peace,  and  George  III,  after  trying  every 
expedient  to  avoid  what  he  considered  a 
personal  disgrace,  was  forced,  on  April  2, 
to  admit  Fox  and  North  as  ministers  under 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      153 

the  nominal  headship  of  the  Duke  of  Port 
land.  So  Tories  were  restored  to  a  share 
in  the  government,  since  nearly  half  of 
the  coalition's  majority  depended  upon 
Tory  votes.  In  December,  1783,  the  King, 
by  a  direct  exercise  of  his  influence,  caused 
the  Lords  to  throw  out  a  ministerial  bill 
for  the  government  of  India  and,  dismissing 
the  coalition  ministers,  he  appealed  to 
William  Pitt.  That  youthful  politician,  who 
had  first  entered  office  as  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  under  Shelburne,  succeeded,  after 
a  sharp  parliamentary  contest,  in  breaking 
down  the  opposition  majority  in  the  House, 
and  in  a  general  election  in  March,  1784, 
won  a  great  victory.  Then,  at  the  head  of  a 
mixed  cabinet,  supported  by  Tories  and 
King's  Friends  as  well  as  by  his  own  fol 
lowers  from  among  the  Whigs,  Pitt  main 
tained  himself,  secure  in  the  support  of 
George  III,  but  in  no  sense  his  agent  or 
tool.  In  the  next  few  years  he  made  his  hold 
secure  by  his  skill  in  parliamentary  leadership 
and  his  success  in  carrying  financial  and  ad 
ministrative  reforms.  This  was  the  first 
peace  ministry  since  that  of  Pelham,  1746- 
1754,  which  won  prestige  through  efficient 
government.  It  was,  however,  mainly  Tory 
in  temper,  and  as  such  distinctly  cold  and 
unfriendly  toward  America.  Pitt  himself 
was  undoubtedly  in  favor  of  liberal  commer- 


154    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

cial  relations  but  in  that  respect,  as  in  the 
question  of  parliamentary  reform,  he  followed 
the  opinions  of  his  supporters  and  of  the 
nation. 

The  British  policy  toward  the  United 
States,  under  the  circumstances,  was  dic 
tated  by  a  strict  adherence  to  the  principles 
set  forth  by  Lord  Sheffield.  Pitt,  while 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  under  Shel- 
burne,  introduced  a  very  liberal  bill,  which, 
if  enacted,  would  have  secured  full  commer 
cial  reciprocity,  including  the  West  India 
trade.  This  failed  to  pass,  however,  and 
was  abandoned  when  Pitt  left  office  in  April, 
1783.  The  Fox-North  ministry  followed  a 
different  plan  by  causing  Parliament  to  pass 
a  bill  authorizing  the  Crown  to  regulate 
the  trade  with  the  West  Indies.  They  then, 
by  proclamation,  allowed  the  islands  to 
import  certain  articles  from  the  United 
States,  not  including  fish  or  lumber,  and 
only  in  British  bottoms.  It  was  hoped  that 
Qanada  would  take  the  place  of  the  United 
$tates  in  supplying  the  West  India  colonies, 
id  that  British  vessels  would  monopolize 
te  carrying.  In  1787  this  action  was 
ratified  by  Parliament  and  the  process  of 
discouraging  American  shipping  was  adopted 
as  a  national  policy.  American  vessels 
henceforward  came  under  the  terms  of  the 
Navigation  Acts  and  could  take  part  only 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      155 

in  the  direct  trade  between  their  own  country 
and  England.  When  John  Adams,  in  1785, 
arrived  at  London  as  minister  and  tried  to 
open  the  subject  of  a  commercial  treaty 
he  was  unable  to  secure  the  slightest  atten 
tion  to  the  American  requests  and  felt  him 
self  to  be  in  an  atmosphere  of  hostility 
and  social  contempt.  The  British  policy 
proved  in  a  few  years  fairly  successful.  It 
reduced  American  shipping  trading  with 
England,  it  drove  American  vessels  from  the 
British  West  Indies,  and,  owing  to  the  impos 
sibility  of  the  states  retaliating  separately, 
it  did  not  diminish  the  British  market  in 
America.  Up  to  1789,  when  the  first  Con 
gress  of  the  United  States  passed  a  navi 
gation  act  and  adopted  discriminating  duties, 
America  remained  commercially  helpless. 
The  profit  went  to  British  shipowners  and 
merchants. 

The  American  government  naturally 
turned  to  the  other  powers  having  American 
possessions,  France  and  Spain,  hoping  to 
secure  from  them  compensating  advantages. 
So  far  as  France  was  concerned,  the  govern 
ment  of  Louis  XVI  was  friendly,  but  its 
finances  were  in  such  confusion  and  its 
administration  so  unsteady  after  1783  that 
Jefferson,  minister  to  France,  could  secure 
no  important  concessions  save  one.  In 
1784,  as  though  to  step  into  the  place  left 


156    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

vacant  by  the  English,  the  French  crown, 
by  royal  order,  permitted  direct  trade  between 
the  United  States  and  the  French  West 
Indies  in  vessels  of  less  than  sixty  tons 
burden.  The  result  was  striking.  In  a  few 
years  the  American  molasses  trade,  driven 
from  the  English  islands,  took  refuge  at 
San  Domingo,  building  up  a  tremendous 
sugar  export  and  more  than  filling  the 
place  of  the  British  trade.  In  1790  the 
commerce  of  San  Domingo  surpassed  that 
of  all  the  British  islands  together.  Here 
again  French  friendship  shone  in  contrast 
to  English  antagonism.  Every  American 
shipowner  felt  the  difference,  and  remem 
bered  it. 

With  Spain  the  United  States  was  less 
successful.  Jay,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
undertook  negotiations  through  Diego  Gardo- 
qui,  a  Spaniard  who,  during  the  Revolution, 
had  furnished  many  cargoes  of  supplies.  He 
found  that  country  sharply  dissatisfied  over 
the  boundary  assigned  to  the  United  States. 
The  British,  in  ceding  Florida  to  Spain,  had 
not  turned  over  all  of  their  province  of  1763, 
but  had  handed  that  part  of  it  north  of  thirty- 
two  degrees  to  the  United  States,  and  further 
had  granted  the  latter  the  free  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi,  through  Spanish  territory. 
Gardoqui  offered  in  substance  to  make 
a  commercial  treaty  provided  the  United 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      157 

States  would  surrender  the  claim  to  navigate 
the  Mississippi  for  twenty  years.  Jay,  to 
whose  mind  the  interests  of  the  seaboard 
shipowners  and  producers  far  outweighed 
the  desires  of  the  few  settlers  of  the  interior 
waters,  was  willing  to  make  the  agreement. 
But  an  angry  protest  went  up  from  the 
southern  states,  whose  land  claims  stretched 
to  the  Mississippi,  and  he  could  secure, 
in  1787,  a  vote  of  only  seven  states  to  five  in 
Congress.  Since  all  treaties  required  the 
consent  of  nine  states,  this  vote  killed  the  ne 
gotiations.  Spain  remained  unfriendly  and 
continued  to  intrigue  with  the  Indian  tribes 
in  the  southwestern  United  States  with  a 
view  to  retaining  their  support. 

Further  north  the  United  States  found 
itself  mortified  and  helpless  before  English 
antagonism.  After  1783  the  country  had 
Canada  on  its  northern  border  as  a  small 
but  actively  hostile  neighbor,  for  there 
thousands  of  proscribed  and  ruined  Tories 
had  taken  refuge.  The  governors  of  Canada, 
Carl  ton  and  Simcoe,  as  well  as  the  men  com 
manding  the  frontier  posts,  had  served 
against  the  Americans  and  regarded  them 
as  rivals.  To  secure  the  western  fur  trade 
and  to  retain  a  hold  over  the  western  Indians 
was  recognized  as  the  correct  and  necessary 
policy  for  Canada,  and  the  British  govern 
ment,  in  response  to  Canadian  sugges- 


158    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

tions,  decided  to  retain  their  military  posts 
along  the  Great  Lakes  within  the  boundaries 
of  the  United  States.  To  justify  them  in  so 
doing  they  pointed  with  unanswerable  truth 
to  the  fact  that  the  United  States  had  not 
carried  out  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of 
1783  regarding  British  debts,  and  that 
Tories,  contrary  to  the  letter  and  spirit  of 
that  treaty,  were  still  proscribed  by  law. 
The  state  courts  felt  in  no  way  bound  to 
enforce  the  treaty,  nor  did  state  legislatures 
choose  to  carry  it  out.  British  debts  re 
mained  uncollectible,  and  the  British  there 
fore  retained  their  western  posts  and  through 
them  plied  a  lucrative  trade  with  the  Indians 
to  the  south  of  the  Great  Lakes. 

In  the  years  after  the  war  a  steady  flow 
of  settlers  entered  the  Ohio  valley,  resum 
ing  the  movement  begun  before  the  Revo 
lution,  and  took  up  land  in  Kentucky  and 
the  Northwest  territory.  By  1792  Kentucky 
was  ready  to  be  admitted  as  a  state,  and  Ten 
nessee  and  Ohio  were  organized  as  terri 
tories.  Now  these  settlers  naturally  found 
the  Indians  opposing  theirjadvance,  and  the 
years  1783-1794  are  a  chronicle  of  smoulder 
ing  border  warfare,  broken  by  intermittent 
truces.  During  all  this  time  it  was  the  firm 
belief  of  the  frontiersmen  that  the  Indian 
hostility  was  stimulated  by  the  British  posts, 
and  hatred  of  England  and  the  English  grew 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM       159 

into  an  article  of  faith  on  their  part.  Ul 
timately  the  new  government  under  Wash 
ington  undertook  a  decisive  campaign.  At 
first,  in  1791,  General  St.  Clair,  invading 
Ohio  with  raw  troops,  was  fearfully  defeated, 
with  butchery  and  mutilation  of  more  than 
two-thirds  of  his  force;  but  in  1794  General 
Wayne,  with  a  more  carefully  drilled  body, 
compelled  the  Indians  to  retreat.  Yet 
with  the  British  posts  still  there,  a  full 
control  was  impossible. 

The  new  constitution,  which  gave  the 
United  States  ample  powers  of  enforcing 
treaties  and  making  commercial  discrimi 
nations,  did  not  at  once  produce  any  alter 
ation  in  the  existing  unsatisfactory  sit 
uation.  Spain  remained  steadily  indiffer 
ent  and  unfriendly.  France,  undergoing 
the  earlier  stages  of  her  own  revolution,  was 
incapable  of  carrying  out  any  consistent 
action.  The  Pitt  ministry,  absorbed  in  the 
game  of  European  politics  and  in  internal 
legislation,  sent  a  minister,  Hammond,  but 
was  content  to  let  its  commercial  and  frontier 
policies  continue.  But  when  in  1792  the 
French  Revolution  took  a  graver  character, 
with  the  overthrow  of  the  monarchy,  and 
when  in  1793  England  joined  the  Euro 
pean  powers  in  the  war  against  France,  while 
all  Europe  watched  with  horror  and  panic 
the  progress  of  the  Reign  of  Terror  in  the 


160    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

French  Republic,  the  situation  of  the  United 
States  was  suddenly  changed. 

In  the  spring  of  1793  there  came  to  the 
United  States  the  news  of  the  war  between 
England  and  France,  and  following  it,  by  a 
few  days  only,  an  emissary  from  the  French 
Republic,  One  and  Indivisible,  "Citizen 
Edmond  Genet,"  arrived  at  Charleston, 
South  Carolina,  April  15.  There  now  ex 
ploded  a  sudden  overwhelming  outburst 
of  sympathy  and  enthusiasm  for  the  French 
nation  and  the  French  cause.  A*l  the  re 
membered  help  of  the  days  of  Yorktown, 
all  the  tradition  of  British  oppression  and 
ravages,  all  the  recent  irritation  at  the 
British  trade  discrimination  and  Indian 
policy,  coupled  with  appreciation  of  French 
concessions,  swept  crowds  in  every  state 
and  every  town  into  a  tempest  of  welcome 
to  Genet.  Shipowners  rushed  to  apply  for 
privateers'  commissions,  crowds  adopted 
French  democratic  jargon  and  manners. 
Democratic  clubs  were  formed  on  the  model 
of  the  Jacobin  society,  and  "Civic  Feasts," 
at  which  Genet  was  present,  made  the  coun 
try  resound.  It  looked  as  though  the 
United  States  was  certain  to  enter  the 
European  war  as  an  ally  of  France  out  of 
sheer  gratitude,  democratic  sympathy  and 
hatred  for  England.  The  French  minister, 
feeling  the  people  behind  him,  hastened  to 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      161 

send  out  privateers  and  acted  as  though  the 
United  States  were  already  in  open  alliance. 

It  now  fell  to  the  Washington  administra 
tion  to  decide  a  momentous  question.  Re 
gardless  of  the  past,  regardless  of  the  British 
policy  since  the  peace,  was  it  worth  while 
to  allow  the  country  to  become  involved 
in  war  at  this  juncture?  Decidedly  not. 
Before  Genet  had  presented  his  credentials, 
Washington  and  Jefferson  had  framed  and 
issued  a  declaration  of  neutrality  forbidding 
American  citizens  to  violate  the  law  of 
nations  by  giving  aid  to  either  side.  But 
it  was  not  merely  caution  which  led  to 
this  step.  The  Federalist  leaders  and  most 
of  their  followers, — men  of  property,  stand 
ing  and  law-abiding  habits, — were  distinctly 
shocked  at  the  horrors  of  the  Reign  of  Terror, 
and  felt  with  Burke,  their  old  friend  and 
defender  in  Revolutionary  days,  that  such 
liberty  as  the  French  demanded  was  some 
thing  altogether  alien  to  that  known  in  the 
United  States  or  in  England.  And  as  the 
news  became  more  and  more  ghastly,  the 
Federalists  grew  rapidly  to  regard  Eng 
land,  with  all  its  unfriendliness,  with  all  its 
commercial  selfishness,  as  the  saving  power 
of  civilization,  and  France  as  the  chief 
enemy  on  earth  of  God  and  man.  The 
result  was  to  precipitate  the  United  States 
into  a  new  contest,  a  struggle  on  the  part  of 


162    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

the  Federalist  administration,  led  by  Ham 
ilton  and  Washington,  to  hold  back  the 
country  from  being  hurled  into  alliance  with 
France  or  into  war  with  England.  In  this 
they  had  to  meet  the  attack  of  the  already 
organizing  Republican  party,  and  of  many 
new  adherents,  who  flocked  to  it  during 
the  years  of  excitement. 

The  first  contest  was  a  short  one.  Genet, 
his  head  turned  by  his  reception,  resented 
the  strict  neutrality  enforced  by  the  ad 
ministration,  tried  to  compel  it  to  recede, 
endeavored  to  secure  the  exit  of  privateers- 
men  in  spite  of  their  prohibition,  and  ulti 
mately  in  fury  appealed  to  the  people 
against  their  government.  This  conduct 
lost  him  the  support  of  even  the  most 
sanguine  democrats,  and,  when  the  adminis 
tration  asked  for  his  recall,  he  fell  from 
his  prominence  unregretted.  But  his  suc 
cessor,  Fauchet,  a  less  extreme  man,  was 
warmly  welcomed  by  the  opposition  leaders, 
including  Madison  and  Randolph,  Jeffer 
son's  successor  as  Secretary  of  State,  and  was 
admitted  into  the  inmost  councils  of  the 
party. 

Hardly  was  Genet  disposed  of  when  a  more 
dangerous  crisis  arose,  caused  by  the  naval 
policy  of  England.  When  war  broke  out, 
the  British  cruisers,  as  was  their  custom, 
fell  upon  French  commerce,  and  especially 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      163 

upon  such  neutral  commerce  as  could,  under 
the  then  announced  principles  of  interna 
tional  law,  be  held  liable  to  capture.  Conse 
quently  American  vessels,  plying  their  lucra 
tive  trade  with  the  French  West  Indies, 
were  seized  and  condemned  by  British  West 
India  prize  courts.  It  was  a  British  dogma, 
known  as  the  Rule  of  1756,  that  if  trade  by  a 
neutral  with  enemies'  colonies  had  been  pro 
hibited  in  peace,  it  became  contraband  in 
time  of  war,  otherwise  belligerents,  by  sim 
ply  opening  their  ports,  could  employ  neu 
trals  to  do  their  trading  for  them.  Now 
in  this  case  the  trade  between  the  French 
West  Indies  and  America  had  not  been  pro 
hibited  in  peace,  but  the  seizures  were  made 
none  the  less,  causing  a  roar  of  indignation 
from  the  entire  American  seacoast.  Late 
in  1793  the  British  ministry  added  fresh 
fuel  to  the  fire  by  declaring  provisions 
taken  to  French  territory  to  be  contra 
band  of  war.  If  an  intention  to  force  the 
United  States  into  alliance  with  France  had 
been  guiding  the  Pitt  ministry,  no  better 
steps  could  have  been  devised  to  accomplish 
the  end.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Pitt  min 
istry  thought  very  little  about  it  in  the 
press  of  the  tremendous  European  cataclysm. 
When  Congress  met  in  December,  1793, 
the  old  questions  of  Hamilton's  measures 
and  the  "monarchism"  of  the  administration 


164    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

were  forgotten  in  the  new  crisis.  Appar 
ently  a  large  majority  in  the  House,  led  by 
Madison,  were  ready  to  sequester  British 
debts,  declare  an  embargo,  build  a  navy,  and 
in  general  prepare  for  a  bitter  contest;  but 
by  great  exertions  the  administration 
managed  to  stave  off  these  drastic  steps 
through  promising  to  send  a  special  diplo 
matic  mission  to  prevent  war.  During  the 
summer  the  excitement  grew,  for  it  was  in 
this  year  that  Wayne's  campaign  against 
the  western  Indians  took  place,  which  was 
generally  believed  to  be  rendered  necessary 
by  the  British  retention  of  the  posts;  and 
also  in  this  same  summer  the  inhabitants 
of  western  Pennsylvania  broke  into  insur 
rection  against  the  hated  excise  tax.  This 
lawlessness  was  laid  by  the  Federalists, 
including  Washington  himself,  to  the  de 
moralizing  influence  of  the  French  Revo 
lution,  and  was  therefore  suppressed  by  no 
less  than  15,000  militia,  an  action  denounced 
by  the  Republicans, — as  Randolph  con 
fided  to  the  French  minister, — as  an  example 
of  despotic  brutality.  Men  were  fast  com 
ing  to  be  incapable  of  cool  thought  on 
party  questions. 

The  special  mission  to  England  was  under 
taken  by  the  Chief  Justice,  Jay,  who  was 
the  most  experienced  diplomat  in  America 
since  the  death  of  Franklin.  Upon  arriving 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      165 

in  England  he  found  the  country  wild 
with  excitement  and  horror  over  the  French 
Revolution  and  with  all  its  interest  concen 
trated  upon  the  effort  to  carry  on  land  and 
naval  war.  The  Pitt  ministry  was  now 
supported  by  all  Tories,  representing  the 
land-holding  classes,  the  clergy  and  the  pro 
fessions,  and  by  nearly  all  the  aristocratic 
Whigs.  Burke,  one-time  defender  of  the 
American  Revolution,  was  exhausting  his 
energies  in  eloquent  and  extravagant  denun 
ciations  of  the  French.  Only  a  handful  of 
radicals,  led  by  Fox,  Sheridan  and  Camden, 
and  representing  a  few  constituents,  still 
dared  to  proclaim  liberal  principles.  In  all 
other  classes  of  society  democracy  was 
regarded  as  synonymous  with  bestial  anarchy 
and  infidelity.  Clearly  the  United  States, 
from  its  very  nature  as  a  republic,  could 
hope  for  no  favor,  in  spite  of  the  noticeably 
English  prepossessions  of  Hamilton's  party. 
Jay  dealt  directly  and  informally  with 
William  Grenville,  the  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  seems  rapidly  to  have  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  it  was  for  the  interest 
of  the  United  States  to  get  whatever  it 
could,  rather  than  to  endeavor  to  haggle 
over  details  with  an  immovable  and  indif 
ferent  ministry,  thereby  hazarding  all  success. 
On  his  part  Grenville  clearly  did  his  best 
to  establish  a  practicable  working  arrange- 


166    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

ment,  agreeing  with  Jay  in  so  framing  the 
treaty  as  to  waive  "principles"  and  "claims" 
and  to  include  precise  provisions.  The  upshot 
was  that  when  Jay  finished  his  negotiations 
he  had  secured  a  treaty  which  for  the  first 
time  established  a  definite  basis  for  commer 
cial  dealings  and  removed  most  of  the  dan 
gerous  outstanding  difficulties.  British  debts 
were  to  be  adjusted  by  a  mixed  commission, 
and  American  claims  for  unjust  seizures 
in  the  West  Indies  were  to  be  dealt  with  in 
similar  fashion.  The  British  were  to  evac 
uate  the  northwestern  military  posts,  and, 
while  they  did  not  withdraw  or  modify  the 
so-called  "rule  of  1756,"  they  agreed  to  a 
clear  definition  of  contraband  of  war.  They 
were  also  ready  to  admit  American  vessels  of 
less  than  seventy  tons  to  the  British  West 
Indies,  provided  the  United  States  agreed 
not  to  export  West  India  products  for  ten 
years.  Here  Jay,  as  in  his  dealings  with  Gar- 
doqui,  showed  a  willingness  to  make  a  con 
siderable  sacrifice  in  order  to  gain  a  definite 
small  point.  On  the  whole,  the  treaty  com 
prised  about  all  that  the  Pitt  ministry,  en 
gaged  in  a  desperate  war  with  the  French 
Republic,  was  likely  to  concede. 

The  treaty  left  England  in  the  winter  of 
1795  and  reached  America  after  the  adjourn 
ment  of  Congress.  Although  it  fell  far  short 
of  what  was  hoped  for,  it  still  seemed  to 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      167 

Washington  wholly  advisable  to  accept  it  un 
der  the  circumstances  as  an  alternative  to 
further  wrangling  and  probable  war.  Sent 
under  seal  of  secrecy  to  the  Senate,  in  special 
session,  its  contents  were  none  the  less  re 
vealed  by  an  opposition  senator  and  a  temp 
est  of  disappointment  and  anger  swept  the 
country.  In  every  seaport  Jay  was  execrated 
as  a  fool  and  traitor  and  burned  in  effigy, 
but  Washington  was  unmoved.  The  Senate 
voted  ratification  by  a  bare  two-thirds,  but 
struck  out  the  West  India  article,  prefer 
ring  to  retain  the  power  of  reexporting 
French  West  India  produce  rather  than  to 
acquire  the  direct  trade  with  the  English 
islands.  Washington  added  his  signature,  the 
British  government  accepted  the  amendment, 
and  the  treaty  went  into  effect.  The  West 
India  privilege  was  in  fact  granted  by  the 
Pitt  ministry,  as  in  the  treaty,  owing  to  the 
demands  of  the  West  India  planters.  In 
America  the  storm  blew  itself  out  in  a  few 
weeks  of  noise  and  anger  and  the  country 
settled  down  to  make  the  best  of  the  privi 
leges  gained,  which,  however  incomplete, 
were  well  worth  the  effort. 

So  the  Federalist  administration  kept  the 
United  States  neutral  and  gave  it  at  last  a 
definite  commercial  status  with  England. 
It  did  more,  for  in  August,  1795,  the  north 
western  Indians,  beaten  in  battle  and  de- 

V 


168    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

prived  of  the  presence  of  their  protectors, 
made  a  treaty  abandoning  all  claims  to 
the  region  south  of  Lake  Erie.  Still  further, 
the  Spanish  government,  on  hearing  of  the 
Jay  treaty,  came  to  terms  in  October,  1795, 
agreeing  to  the  boundaries  of  1783,  granting 
a  "right  of  deposit"  to  American  trades  down 
the  Mississippi  at  or  near  New  Orleans,  and 
promising  to  abandon  Indian  intrigues. 
The  diplomatic  campaign  of  the  Federalists 
seemed  to  be  crowned  with  general  success. 
But  in  the  process  the  passions  of  the 
American  people  had  become  deeply  stirred, 
and  by  the  end  of  1795  the  Federalist  party 
could  no  longer,  as  at  the  outset,  count  on 
the  support  of  all  the  mercantile  elements  and 
all  the  townspeople,  for,  by  their  policy 
toward  France  and  England,  Washington, 
Hamilton  and  their  associates  had  set  them 
selves  against  the  underlying  prejudices  and 
beliefs  of  the  American  voters.  The  years 
of  the  strong  government  reaction  were  at 
an  end.  The  time  had  come  to  fight  for 
party  existence. 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE  TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY  IN  THE  UNITED 
STATES    1795-1805 

WITH  the  temporary  shelving  of  English 
antagonism   the    Federalist    administration 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       169 

passed  its  second  great  crisis;  but  it  was 
immediately  called  upon  to  face  new  and 
equally  serious  differences  with  France  which 
were  ultimately  to  prove  the  cause  of  its 
downfall.  The  fundamental  difficulty  in  the 
political  situation  in  America  was  that  the 
two  parties  were  now  so  bitterly  opposed  as 
to  render  every  governmental  act  a  test  of 
party  strength.  The  Republicans,  who  ac 
cepted  the  leadership  of  Jefferson  or  of  Clin 
ton  of  New  York,  now  comprised  all  who  fav 
ored  democracy  in  any  sense, — whether 
that  of  human  equality,  or  local  self-gov 
ernment,  or  freedom  from  taxes,  or  sympathy 
with  France, — and  all  who  had  any  griev 
ance]  against  the  administration,  from  fron 
tiersmen  whose  cabins  had  not  been  pro 
tected  against  Indians  or  who  had  been 
forced  to  pay  a  whiskey  tax,  to  seamen 
whose  ships  had  not  been  protected  by  the 
Jay  treaty.  In  short,  all  in  whom  still  per 
sisted  the  deep-rooted  old  colonial  traditions 
of  opposition  to  strong  government  and  dis 
like  of  any  but  local  authorities  were  sum 
moned  to  oppose  an  administration  on 
the  good  familiar  ground  that  it  was  work 
ing  against  their  liberties  by  corruption, 
usurpation,  financial  burdens  and  gross 
partisanship  for  England  and  against  France. 
On  the  other  side  the  Federalists  were 
rapidly  acquiring  a  state  of  mind  sub- 


170    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

stantially  Tory  in  character.  They  were 
coming  to  dread  and  detest  "democracy" 
as  dangerous  to  the  family  and  to  society 
as  well  as  to  government,  and  to  identify 
it  with  the  guillotine  and  the  blasphemies 
of  the  Worship  of  Reason.  In  the  furious 
attacks  which,  after  the  fashion  of  the  day 
the  opposition  papers  hurled  against  every 
act  of  the  Federalist  leaders  and  which 
aimed  as  much  to  defile  their  characters  as 
to  discredit  their  policies,  they  saw  a  pit 
of  anarchy  yawning.  Between  parties  so 
constituted  no  alternative  remained  but 
a  fight  to  a  finish,  and  from  the  moment  the 
Federalists  became  genuinely  anti-demo 
cratic  they  were  doomed.  Only  accident 
or  conspicuous  success  on  the  part  of  their 
leaders  could  delay  their  destruction.  A 
single  false  step  on  their  part  meant  ruin. 
With  the  ratification  of  the  Jay  treaty, 
a  long  period  of  peaceful  relations  began 
between  England  and  the  United  States. 
The  American  shipowners  quickly  adapted 
themselves  to  the  situation,  and  soon  were 
prosperously  occupied]  in  neutral  commerce. 
In  England  American  affairs  dropped  wholly 
out  of  public  notice  during  the  exciting 
and  anxious  years  of  the  war  of  the  second 
coalition.  The  Pitt  ministry  ended,  leaving 
the  country  under  the  grip  of  a  rigid  repres 
sion  of  all  liberal  thought  or  utterance,  and 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       171 

was  followed  by  the  commonplace  Toryism 
of  Addington  and  his  colleagues.  Then  came 
the  Treaty  of  Amiens  with  France,  the  year 
of  peace,  the  renewed  war  in  1803  and,  after 
an  interval  of  confused  parliamentary  wrang- 
lings,  the  return  to  power  of  Pitt  in  1804, 
called  by  the  voice  of  the  nation  to  meet  the 
crisis  of  the  threatened  French  invasion. 
The  United  States  was  forgotten,  diplo 
matic  relations  sank  to  mere  routine.  Such 
were  the  unquestionable  benefits  of  the 
execrated  treaty  made  by  Jay  and  Gren- 
ville. 

With  France,  however,  American  rela 
tions  became  suddenly  strained,  as  a  result 
of  the  same  treaty.  The  French  Republic, 
in  the  year  1795,  was  finally  reorganized 
under  a  definite  constitution  as  a  Directorate, 
— a  republic  with  a  plural  executive  of 
five.  This  government,  ceasing  to  be  merely 
a  revolutionary  body,  undertook  to  play 
the  game  of  grand  politics  and  compelled 
all  the  neighboring  smaller  states  to  submit 
to  democratic  revolutions,  accept  a  con 
stitution  on  the  French  model  and  become 
dependent  allies  of  the  French  Republic. 
The  local  democratic  faction,  large  or  small, 
was  in  each  case  utilized  to  carry  through 
this  program,  which  was  always  accompanied 
with  corruption  and  plunder  to  swell  the 
revenues  of  France  and  fill  the  pockets  of  the 


172    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

directors  and  their  agents.  Such  a  policy  the 
Directorate  now  endeavored,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  to  carry  out  with  the  United 
States,  expecting  to  ally  themselves  with 
the  Jeffersonian  party  and  to  bribe  or  bully 
the  American  Republic  into  a  lucrative  al 
liance.  The  way  was  prepared  by  the  in 
fatuation  with  which  Randolph,  Jefferson, 
Madison  and  other  Republican  leaders  had 
unbosomed  themselves  to  Fauchet,  and  also 
by  an  unfortunate  blunder  which  had  led 
Washington  to  send  James  Monroe  as 
minister  to  France  in  1794.  This  man  was 
known  to  be  an  active  sympathizer  with 
France,  and  it  was  hoped  that  his  influence 
would  assist  in  keeping  friendly  relations; 
but  his  conduct  was  calculated  to  do  nothing 
but  harm.  When  the  news  of  the  Jay 
treaty  came  to  France  the  Directorate 
chose  to  regard  it  as  an  unfriendly  act,  and 
Monroe,  sharing  their  feelings,  exerted  him 
self  rather  to  mollify  their  resentment  than 
to  justify  his  country. 

In  1796  a  new  minister,  Adet,  was  sent 
to  the  United  States  to  remain  only  in  case 
the  government  should  adopt  a  just  policy 
toward  France.  This  precipitated  a  party 
contest  squarely  on  the  issue  of  French  rela 
tions.  In  the  first  place  Congress,  after  a 
bitter  struggle  and  by  a  bare  [majority,  voted 
to  appropriate  the  money  to  carry  the  Jay 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       173 

treaty  into  effect.  This  was  a  defeat  for  the 
French  party.  In  the  second  place,  in  spite  of 
a  manifesto  issued  by  Adet,  threatening 
French  displeasure,  the  presidential  electors 
gave  a  majority  of  three  votes  for  Adams 
over  Jefferson  to  succeed  Washington.  The 
election  had  been  a  sharp  party  struggle, 
the  whole  theory  of  a  deliberate  choice  by 
electors  vanishing  in  the  stress  of  partisan 
excitement.  After  this  second  defeat  the 
French  minister  withdrew,  severing  dip 
lomatic  relations,  and  French  vessels  began 
to  capture  American  merchantmen,  to 
impress  the  country  with  the  serious  re 
sults  of  French  irritation.  The  Washing 
ton  administration  now  recalled  Monroe 
and  sent  C.  C.  Pinckney  to  replace  him, 
but  the  directorate,  while  showering  Monroe 
with  compliments,  refused  to  receive  Pinck 
ney  at  all  and  virtually  expelled  him  from 
the  country.  In  the  midst  of  these  annoy 
ing  events  Washington's  term  closed  and 
the  sorely  tried  man,  disgusted  with  party 
abuse  and  what  he  felt  to  be  national  in 
gratitude,  retired  to  his  Virginia  estates, 
no  longer  the  president  of  the  whole  country, 
but  the  leader  of  a  faction.  His  Farewell 
Address  showed,  under  its  stately  phrases, 
his  detestation  of  party  controversy  and  his 
fears  for  the  future. 

Washington's   successor,   Adams,    was   a 


174    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

man  of  less  calmness  and  steadiness  of  soul; 
independent,  but  with  a  somewhat  petu 
lant  habit  of  mind,  and  nervously  afraid 
of  ceasing  to  be  independent;  a  man  of  sound 
sense,  yet  of  a  too  great  personal  vanity.  His 
treatment  of  the  French  situation  showed 
national  pride  and  dignity  as  well  as  an 
adherence  to  the  traditional  Federalist  pol 
icy  of  avoiding  war.  Unfortunately  his 
handling  of  the  party  leaders  was  so  deficient 
in  tact  as  to  assist  in  bringing  quick  and  final 
defeat  upon  himself  and  upon  them. 

The  relations  with  France  rapidly  devel 
oped  into  an  international  scandal.  Adams, 
supported  by  his  party,  determined  to  send 
a  mission  of  three,  including  Pinckney,  in 
order  to  restore  friendly  relations,  as  well 
as  to  protest  against  depredations  and  seiz 
ures  which  the  few  French  cruisers  [at  sea 
were  now  beginning  to  make.  In  the  spring 
of  1798,  however,  the  commission  reported 
that  its  efforts  had  failed  and  Adams  was 
obliged  to  lay  its  correspondence  before 
Congress.  This  showed  that  the  great 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  carrying  on  negotia 
tions  with  the  French  had  been  the  per 
sistent  demands  on  the  part  of  Talleyrand, — 
the  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs, —  for 
a  preliminary  money  payment,  either  under 
the  form  of  a  so-called  "loan"  or  as  a  bribe 
outright.  Such  a  revelation  of  venality 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       175 

struck  dumb  the  Republican  leaders  who  had 
kept  asserting  their  distrust  of  Adams's 
sincerity  and  accusing  the  administration 
of  injustice  toward  France.  For  the  moment 
a  storm  of  disgust  and  anger  against  the 
bullying  French  Republic  swept  over  the 
country,  taking  all  heart  out  of  the  opposi 
tion  members  of  Congress  and  encouraging 
the  Federalists  to  commit  the  government 
to  actual  hostilities  with  the  hated  Demo 
crats  and  Jacobins.  Declaring  the  treaties 
of  1778  to  bejibrogated,  Congress  authorized 
naval  reprisals,  voted  money  and  a  loan, 
and  so  began  what  was  called  a  "quasi- 
war,"  since  neither  side  made  a  formal 
declaration.  Adams,  riding  on  the  crest  of  a 
brief  wave  of  popularity,  declared  in  a  mes 
sage  to  Congress  that  he  would  never  send 
another  minister  to  France  without  receiv 
ing  assurances  that  he  would  be  received 
as  "befitted  the  representative  of  a  great, 
free,  powerful  and  independent  nation." 
"Millions  for  defence  but  not  a  cent  for 
tribute!"  became  the  Federalist  watch 
word,  and,  when  the  little  navy  of  a  few  frig 
ates  and  sloops  began  to  bring  in  French 
men-of-war  and  privateers  as  prizes,  the 
country  actually  felt  a  thrill  of  pride  and 
manhood.  For  the  moment  the  United 
States  stood  side  by  side  with  England  in 
fighting  the  dangerous  enemy  of  civili- 


176    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

zation.  American  Federalist  and  English 
Tory  were  at  one;  Adams  and  Pitt  were 
carrying  on  the  same  war. 

But  unfortunately  for  the  Federalists 
they  failed  to  appreciate  the  fundamental 
differences  between  the  situation  in  England 
and  in  the  United  States,  for  they  went 
on  to  imitate  the  mother  country,  not  merely 
in  fighting  the  French,  but  in  seeking  to 
suppress  what  they  felt  to  be  dangerous 
"Jacobinical"  features  of  American  poli 
tics.  In  the  summer  of  1798  three  laws  were 
enacted  which  have  become  synonymous 
with  party  folly.  Two, — the  Alien  Acts, — 
authorized  the  President  at  his  discretion 
to  imprison  or  deport  any  alien,  friend  or 
enemy;  the  third, — the  Sedition  Act, — pun 
ished  by  fine  and  imprisonment  any  utter 
ance  or  publication  tending  to  cause  op 
position  to  a  federal  law  or  to  bring  into  con 
tempt  the  federal  government  or  any  of  its 
officers.  Such  statutes  had  stood  in  England 
since  1793  and  were  used  to  suppress  demo 
cratic  assailants  of  the  monarchy;  but  such 
a  law  in  the  United  States  could  mean 
nothing  more  than  the  suppression  by  Fed 
eralist  courts  of  criticisms  upon  the  admin 
istration  made  by  Republican  newspapers. 
It  furnished  every  opposition  agitator  with 
a  deadly  weapon  for  use  against  the  adminis 
tration,  and  when  the  Sedition  Law  was  ac- 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       177 

tually  enforced  and  a  half-dozen  Republican 
editors  were  subjected  to  fine  or  imprison 
ment  [for  scurrilous  but  scarcely  dangerous 
utterances,  the  demonstration  of  the  in 
herently  tyrannical  nature  of  the  Federalists 
seemed  to  be  complete.  It  was  an  unpardon 
able  political  blunder. 

Equally  damaging  to  the  prosperity  of  the 
Federalist  party  was  the  fact  that  the  French 
Republic,  instead  of  accepting  the  issue, 
showed  a  complete  unwillingness  to  fight 
and  protested  in  public  that  it  was  having 
a  war  forced  upon  it.  Talleyrand  showered 
the  United  States  through  every  channel, 
official  or  unofficial,  with  assurances  of 
kindly  feelings,  and,  so  soon  as  he  learned 
of  Adams's  demand  for  a  suitable  reception 
for  an  American  minister,  gave  the  re 
quired  assurance  in  his  exact  words.  Under 
the  circumstances  the  war  preparations  of 
the  Federalists  became  visibly  superfluous, 
especially  a  provisional  army  which  Congress 
had  authorized  under  Hamilton  as  active 
commander.  The  opposition  press  and 
speakers  denounced  this  as  a  Federalist 
army  destined  to  act  against  the  liberties 
of  the  people,  and  the  administration  could 
point  to  no  real  danger  to  justify  its  existence. 

So  high  ran  party  spirit  that  the  Virginian 
leaders  thought  or  affected  to  think  it  neces 
sary  to  prepare  for  armed  resistance  to 


178    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  ^ 

Federalist  oppression,  and  Madison  and 
Jefferson,  acting  through  the  state  legisla 
tures  of  Virginia  and  Kentucky  respectively, 
caused  the  adoption  of  two  striking  series 
of  resolutions  stating  the  crisis  in  Republican 
phraseology.  In  each  case,  after  denouncing 
the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws  as  unconstitu 
tional,  the  legislatures  declared  that  the 
constitution  was  nothing  more  than  a  com 
pact  between  sovereign  states;  that  the 
federal  government,  the  creature  of  the  com 
pact,  was  not  the  final  judge  of  its  powers, 
and  that  in  case  of  a  palpable  usurpation 
of  powers  by  the  federal  government  it  was 
the  duty  of  the  states  to  "interpose,"  in 
the  words  of  Madison,  or  to  "nullify" 
the  federal  law,  as  Jefferson  phrased  it.  Such 
language  seemed  to  Washington,  Adams 
and  their  party  to  signify  that  the  time 
was  coming  when  they  must  fight  for  national 
existence;  but  to  the  opposition  it  seemed 
no  more  than  a  restatement  of  time-hallowed 
American  principles  of  government,  neces 
sary  to  save  liberty  from  a  reactionary 
faction.  Party  hatred  now  rivalled  that 
between  revolutionary  Whigs  and  Tories. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  election 
of  1800  took  place.  The  Federalist  party 
leaders,  feeling  the  ground  quaking  under 
them,  clung  the  more  desperately  to  the 
continuance  of  the  French  "quasi- war" 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       179 

as  their  sole  means  for  rallying  popular  sup 
port.  But  at  this  stage  President  Adams, 
seeing  the  folly  of  perpetuating  a  sham  war 
for  mere  party  advantage,  determined  to 
reopen  negotiations.  This  precipitated  a 
bitter  quarrel,  for  the  members  of  his  cabinet 
and  the  leading  congressmen  still  regarded 
Hamilton,  now  a  private  citizen  in  New  York, 
as  the  real  leader,  and  followed  him  in  urging 
the  continuance  of  hostilities.  Adams,  un 
able  to  manage  his  party  opponents  openly, 
took  refuge  in  sudden,  secret  and,  as  they 
felt,  treacherous  conduct  and  sent  nomina 
tions  for  a  new  French  mission  without 
consulting  his  advisers.  The  Federalist 
Senate,  raging  at  Adams's  stupidity,  could 
not  refuse  to  ratify  the  appointments,  and 
so  in  1799  the  new  mission  sailed,  was  re 
spectfully  received  by  Bonaparte  and  was 
promptly  admitted  to  negotiations. 

The  Federalist  party  now  ran  straight 
toward  defeat;  for,  while  the  leaders  could 
not  avoid  supporting  Adams  for  a  second 
term,  they  hated  him  as  a  blunderer  and 
marplot.  On  his  part,  his  patience  exhausted, 
Adams  dismissed  two  of  his  secretaries,  in 
a  passion,  in  1800.  Later,  through  the  wiles 
of  Aaron  Burr,  Republican  leader  in  New 
York,  a  pamphlet,  written  by  Hamilton  to 
prove  Adams's  utter  unfitness  for  the  Presi 
dency,  was  brought  to  light  and  circulated. 


180    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Against  this  discredited  and  disorganized 
party  the  Republicans,  supporting  Jeffer 
son  again  for  President  and  thundering 
against  the  Sedition  Law,  triumphantly  car 
ried  a  clear  majority  of  electoral  votes  in  the 
autumn,  but  by  a  sheer  oversight  they  gave 
an  equal  number  for  Jefferson  and  for  Burr, 
who  was  only  intended  for  Vice-president. 
Hence  under  the  terms  of  the  constitution 
it  became  necessary  for  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  to  make  the  final  selection, 
voting  by  states.  It  fell  thus  to  the  lot  of  the 
Federalist  House  of  1800-1801  to  choose  the 
next  President,  and  for  a  while  the  members 
showed  an  inclination  to  support  Burr, 
as  at  least  a  Northerner,  rather  than  Jeffer 
son.  But  better  judgments  ruled  and 
finally  Jefferson  was  awarded  the  place 
which  he  had  in  fairness  won.  The  last 
weeks  of  Federalist  rule  were  filled  with  a 
discreditable  effort  to  save  what  was  possible 
from  the  wreck.  New  offices  were  estab 
lished,  including  a  whole  system  of  circuit 
judgeships,  and  Adams  spent  his  time  up  to 
the  last  hour  of  his  term  in  signing  com 
missions,  stealing  away  in  the  e^arly  morning 
in  order  not  to  see  the  inauguration  of  his 
rival. 

So  fell  the  Federalist  party  from  power. 
It  had  a  brilliant  record  in  legislation  and 
administration;  it  had  created  a  new  United 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       181 

States;  it  had  shown  a  statesmanship  never 
equalled  before  or  since  on  this  continent; 
but  it  ruined  itself  by  endeavoring  openly 
to  establish  a  system  of  government  founded 
on  distrust  of  the  people,  and  modelled  after 
English  precedents.  For  a  few  years  England 
and  the  United  States  approached  nearer 
in  government  and  policy  than  at  any  other 
time.  But  while  in  England  the  bulk  of 
society, — the  nobility,  gentry,  middle  classes; 
the  professions,  the  church  and  all  strong 
political  elements — supported  Pitt  in  'sup 
pressing  free  speech  and  individual  liberty, 
the  Federalists  represented  only  a  minority, 
and  their  social  principles  were  abhorrent 
to  the  vast  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  United  States. 

The  Republican  party,  which  conquered 
by  what  Jefferson  considered  to  be  a  revo 
lution  no  less  important  than  that  of  1776, 
represented  a  reaction  to  the  old  ideals  of 
government  traditional  in  colonial  times, 
— namely  as  little  taxation  as  possible,  as 
much  local  independence  as  could  exist 
and  the  minimum  of  federal  authority. 
Jefferson  professed  to  believe  that  the  con 
duct  of  foreign  relations  was  the  only 
important  function  of  the  central  government, 
all  else  properly  belonging  to  the  states.  So 
complete  was  the  Republican  victory  that 
the  party  had  full  power  to  put  its  principles 


182    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

into  effect.  It  controlled  both  houses  of 
Congress,  and  was  blessed  with  four  years 
of  peace  and  prosperity.  But  Thomas  Jef 
ferson,  for  all  his  radicalism  in  language, 
was  a  shrewd  party  leader,  whose  actions 
were  uniformly  cautious  and  whose  entire 
habit  of  mind  favored  avoidance  of  any 
violent  change.  "Scientific"  with  the  gen 
eral  interests  of  a  French  eighteenth  cen 
tury  "philosopher,"  he  was  limited  in  his 
views  of  public  policies  by  his  education 
as  a  Virginia  planter,  wholly  out  of  sym 
pathy  with  finance,  commerce  or  business. 
Under  his  guidance,  accordingly,  the  United 
States  government  was  subjected  to  what  he 
called  "a  chaste  reformation,"  rather  than 
to  a  general  overturning. 

All  expenses  were  cut  down,  chiefly  at 
the  cost  of  the  army  and  navy;  all  appro 
priations  were  rigorously  diminished,  and 
all  internal  taxes  were  swept  away.  Since 
commerce  continued  active,  there  still  re 
mained  a  surplus  revenue,  and  this  Gallatin, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  applied  to 
extinguishing  the  debt.  A  few  of  the  more 
important  federal  offices  were  taken  from 
embittered  Federalists  and  given  to  Re 
publicans,  but  there  was  no  general  pro 
scription  of  officeholders.  The  only  action 
at  all  radical  in  character  was  the  repeal  of 
the  law  establishing  new  circuit  judge- 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       183 

ships,  a  step  which  legislated  a  number  of 
Federalists  out  of  office.  The  repeal  was 
denounced  by  fervid  Federalist  orators  as  a 
violation  of  the  constitution  and  a  death 
blow  to  the  Union,  but  the  appointments 
under  the  law  itself  had  been  so  grossly 
partisan  that  the  country  was  unalarmed. 
With  these  steps  the  Republican  reaction 
ended.  Jefferson  and  his  party  carried 
through  no  alteration  of  the  central  depart 
ments;  they  abandoned  no  federal  power 
except  that  of  laying  an  excise;  they  did 
not  even  repeal  the  charter  of  the  National 
Bank.  The  real  change  lay  in  the  more 
strictly  economical  finances  and  in  the 
general  spirit  of  government.  The  Federal 
ist  opposition,  criticising  every  act  with 
bitterness  and  continually  predicting  ruin, 
found  that  under  the  "Jacobins"  the  country 
remained  contented  and  prosperous  and 
was  in  no  more  danger  of  atheism  or  the 
guillotine  than  it  had  been  under  Adams. 
So  matters  went  on,  year  after  year,  the 
federal  government  playing  its  part  quietly 
and  the  American  people  carrying  on  their 
vocations  in  peace  and  prosperity. 

Jefferson 's  general  theory  of  foreign  affairs 
was  based  on  the  idea  that  diplomacy 
was  mainly  a  matter  of  bargain  and  sale, 
with  national  commerce  as  the  deciding 
factor.  He  believed  so  firmly  that  national 


184    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

self-interest  would  lead  all  European  powers 
to  make  suitable  treaties  with  the  United 
States  that  he  considered  the  navy  as 
wholly  superfluous  and  would  have  been 
glad  to  sell  it.  But  when  circumstances 
arose  calling  for  a  different  sort  of  diplomacy, 
he  was  ready  to  modify  his  methods,  and  he 
so  far  recognized  the  unsuitability  of  peaceful 
measures  in  dealing  with  the  Barbary  cor 
sairs  as  to  permit  the  small  American  navy 
to  carry  on  extensive  operations  during 
1801-3,  which  ended  in  the  submission^  of 
Tripoli  and  Algiers. 

Simultaneously  Jefferson  was  brought  face 
to  face  with  a  diplomatic  crisis,  arising 
from  the  peculiar  actions  of  his  old  ally, 
France.  At  the  outset  of  his  administration 
Jefferson  found  the  treaty  made  by  Adams 's 
commissioners  in  1800  ready  for  ratification, 
and  thus  began  his  career  with  all  questions 
settled,  thanks  to  his  predecessor.  But  he 
had  been  in  office  only  a  few  months  when 
the  behavior  of  the  Spanish  officials  at  New 
Orleans  gave  cause  for  alarm;  for  they  sud 
denly  terminated  the  right  of  deposit, 
granted  in  1795.  It  was  quickly  rumored 
that  the  reason  was  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  France,  now  under  the  first  consul, 
Napoleon,  had  regained  Louisiana.  It  was, 
in  fact,  true.  Bonaparte  overthrew  the 
Directorate  in  1799  and  established  himself, 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       185 

under  the  thin  disguise  of  "First  Consul/' 
as  practical  military  despot  in  France.  He 
had  immediately  embraced  the  idea  of  es 
tablishing  a  western  colonial  empire  which 
should  be  based  on  San  Domingo,  now 
controlled  by  insurgent  negroes,  and  which 
should  include  Louisiana.  By  a  treaty  of 
October  1,  1800,  he  compelled  Spain  to  retro- 
cede  the  former  French  province  in  return 
for  a  promise  to  establish  a  kingdom  of 
"Etruria"  for  a  Spanish  prince.  During 
1802  large  armaments  sailed  to  San  Domingo 
and  began  the  process  of  reconquest.  It 
needed  only  the  completion  of  that  task  for 
Napoleon  to  be  ready  to  take  over  Louisiana 
and  thereby  to  gain  absolute  control  over 
the  one  outlet  from  the  interior  territories  of 
the  United  States. 

Jefferson  at  once  recognized  the  extreme 
gravity  of  the  situation.  During  the  years 
after  the  English,  Spanish  and  Indian  treat 
ies,  emigrants  had  steadily  worked  their  way 
into  the  inner  river  valleys.  Western  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania  were  rapidly  filling, 
Ohio  was  settled  up  to  the  Indian  treaty 
line,  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  were  doubling 
in  population,  and  fringes  of  pioneer  com 
munities  stretched  along  the  Ohio  and  Missis 
sippi  rivers.  In  1796  Tennessee  was  admitted 
as  a  state,  and  Ohio  was  now,  in  1801,  on  the 
point  of  asking  admission.  For  France 


186    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

to  shut  the  only  possible  outlet  for  these 
communities  would  be  a  sentence  of  eco 
nomic  death,  and  Jefferson  was  so  deeply 
moved  as  to  write  to  Livingston,  his  minister 
to  France,  that  if  the  rumor  of  the  cession 
were  true,  "We  must  marry  ourselves  to  the 
British  fleet  and  nation. "  The  United  States 
must  fight  rather  than  submit.  He  sent 
Monroe  to  France,  instructed  to  buy  an 
outlet,  but  the  latter  only  arrived  in  time 
to  join  with  Livingston  in  signing  a  treaty 
for  the  purchase  of  the  whole  of  Louisiana, 
This  startling  event  was  the  result  of  the 
failure  of  Napoleon's  forces  to  reconquer 
San  Domingo.  Foreseeing  the  loss  of  Loui 
siana  in  case  of  the  probable  renewal*of  war 
with  England,  and  desirous  of  money  for 
immediate  use,  the  Corsican  adventurer  sud 
denly  threw  Louisiana  into  the  astonished 
hands  of  Livingston  and  Monroe.  He  had 
never,  it  is  true,  given  Spain  the  promised 
compensation;  he  had  never  taken  possession, 
and  he  had  promised  not  to  sell  it;  but  such 
trifles  never  impeded  Napoleon,  nor,  -in 
this  case,  did  they  hinder  Jefferson.  When 
the  treaty  came  to  America,  Congress  was 
quickly  convened,  the  Senate  voted  to  ratify, 
the  money  was  appropriated  and  the  whole 
vast  region  bought  for  the  sum  of  sixty  million 
francs.  Jefferson  himself,  the  apostle  of  a 
strict  construction  of  the  constitution,  could 


TRIUMPH  OF  DEMOCRACY       187 

not  discover  any  clause  authorizing  such  a 
purchase,  but  his  party  was  undisturbed, 
and  the  great  annexation  was  carried  through, 
Jefferson  acquiescing  in  the  inconsistency. 
The  chagrin  of  the  Federalists  at  this 
enormous  southwestward  extension  of  the 
country  was  exceeded  only  by  their  alarm 
when  an  attempt  was  made  to  eject  certain 
extremely  partisan  judges  from  their  offices 
in  Pennsylvania  and  on  the  federal  bench 
by  the  process  of  impeachment.  In  the 
first  two  cases  the  effort  was  successful, 
one  Pennsylvania  judge  and  one  federal 
district  judge  being  ejected;  but  when,  in 
1805,  the  attack  was  aimed  at  the  Pennsyl 
vania  supreme  justices  and  at  Justice  Chase 
of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  the 
process  broke  down.  The  defence  of  the 
accused  judges  was  legally  too  strong  to  be 
overcome,  and  each  impeachment  failed. 
With  this  the  last  echo  of  the  party  contest 
seemed  to  end,  for  by  this  time  the  Federal 
ists  were  too  discredited  and  too  weak  to 
make  a  political  struggle.  Their  member 
ship  in  Congress  had  shrunk  to  small  figures, 
they  had  lost  state  after  state,  and  in  1804 
they  practically  let  Jefferson's  reelection 
go  by  default.  He  received  all  but  14 
electoral  votes,  oiit~bf  176.  Some  of  the 
New  England  leaders  plotted  secession,  but 
they  were  not  strong  enough  for  that.  The 


188    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

party  seemed  dead.  In  1804  its  ablest 
mind,  Hamilton,  was  killed  in  a  duel  with 
Burr,  the  Vice-president,  and  nobody  re 
mained  capable  of  national  leadership. 

So  the  year  1805  opened  in  humdrum 
prosperity  and  national  self-satisfaction. 
Jefferson  could  look  upon  a  country  in 
which  he  held  a  position  rivalled  only  by 
that  of  a  European  monarch  or  an  Eng 
lish  prime  minister.  The  principles  of 
Republican  equality,  of  states'  rights,  of 
economy  and  retrenchment,  of  peace  and 
local  self-government  seemed  triumphant 
beyond  reach  of  attack.  While  Europe  re 
sounded  with  battles  and  marches,  America 
lived  in  contented  isolation,  free  from  the 
cares  of  unhappy  nations  living  under  the 
ancient  ideals. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  SECOND  PERIOD  OF  COMMERCIAL  ANTAG 
ONISM  1805-1812 

IN  the  year  1805  the  happy  era  of  Repub 
lican  prosperity  and  complacency  came 
suddenly  and  violently  to  an  end,  for  by 
this  time  forces  were  in  operation  which  drew 
the  United  States,  in  utter  disregard  of  Jeffer 
son 's  theories,  into  the  sweep  of  the  tremen 
dous  political  cyclone  raging  in  Europe.  In 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      189 

1803  Napoleon  forced  England  into  renewed 
war,  and  for  two  years  endeavored  by  elabo 
rate  naval  manoeuvres  to  secure  control  of 
the  channel  for  a  sufficient  time  to  permit 
him  to  transport  his  "Grand  Army"  to  the 
British  shore.  In  1805,  however,  these 
plans  broke  down,*and  the  crushing  defeat 
of  the  allied  French  and  Spanish  navies  at 
Trafalgar  marked  the  end  of  any  attempt 
to  challenge  the  English  maritime  supremacy. 
The  great  military  machine  of  the  French 
army  was  then  turned  eastward  against  the 
armies  of  the  coalition  which  England,  under 
Pitt,  was  forming,  and  in  a  series  of  aston 
ishing  campaigns  it  was  used  to  beat  down 
the  Austrians  in  1805  at  Austerlitz;  to  over 
whelm  the  Prussians  in  1806  at  Jena  and 
Auerstadt;  and  to  force  the  Russians,  after 
a  severe  winter  campaign  in  East  Prussia, 
to  come  to  terms  in  1807.  Napoleon  and 
the  Tsar,  Alexander,  meeting  on  the  bridge 
at  Tilsit,  July  7,  divided  Europe  between 
them  by  agreeing  upon  a  policy  of  spheres 
of  interest,  which  left  Turkey  and  the  Orient 
for  Russian  expansion  and  all  the  beaten 
western  monarchies  for  French  domina 
tion.  The  Corsican  captain,  trampling  on 
the  ruins  both  of  the  French  monarchy  and 
the  French  Republic,  stood  as  the  most 
terrible  and  astounding  figure  in  the  world, 
invincible  by  land,  the  master  of  Europe. 


190    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

But  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  from 
any  attempt  to  contest  the  sea  left  England 
the  equally  undisputed  master  of  all  oceans, 
and  rendered  the  French  wholly  dependent 
upon  neutral  nations  for  commerce.  As 
French  conquests  led  to  annexations  of  ter 
ritory  in  Italy  and  in  Germany,  these  re 
gions  also  found  themselves  unable  to  im 
port  with  their  own  vessels,  and  so  neutral 
commerce  found  ever  increasing  markets 
dependent  upon  its  activity.  Now  the 
most  energetic  maritime  neutral  power  was 
the  United  States,  whose  merchantmen 
hastened  to  occupy  the  field  left  vacant  by 
the  practical  extinction  of  the  French  carry 
ing  trade.  Until  1807  they  shared  [this  with 
the  Scandinavian  countries,  but  after  that 
year  Napoleon,  by  threats  and  the  terror 
of  his  name,  forced  an  unwelcome  alliance 
upon  all  the  states  of  Europe,  and  the  United 
States  became  the  sole  important  neutral. 

Under  the  circumstances  the  merchant 
shipping  of  the  United  States  flourished  enor 
mously,  the  more  especially  since,  by  im 
porting  and  immediately  reexporting  West 
India  products  from  the  French  islands,  Yan 
kee  skippers  were  able  to  avoid  the  dangerous 
"Rule  of  1756"  and  send  sugar  and  cocoa 
from  French  colonies  to  Europe  and  to 
England  under  the  guise  of  American  prod 
uce.  By  1805  the  whole  supply  of  Euro- 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      191 

pean  sugar  was  carried  in  American  bottoms, 
to  the  enormous  profit  of  the  United  States. 
American  ships  also  shared  largely  in  the 
coasting  trade  of  Europe,  carrying  goods 
between  ports  where  British  ships  were 
naturally  excluded.  In  fact  the  great  pros 
perity  and  high  customs  receipts  to  which 
the  financial  success  of  the  Jeffersonians 
was  due  depended  to  a  great  extent  on  the 
fortunate  neutral  situation  of  the  United 
States. 

By  1805  the  British  shipowners  felt  that 
flesh  and  blood  could  not  endure  the  situ 
ation.  Here  were  France  and  her  allies 
easily  escaping  the  hardships  of  British 
naval  pressure  by  employing  neutrals  to 
carry  on  their  trade.  Worse  still,  the  Ameri 
cans,  by  the  device  of  entering  and  clearing 
French  sugar  at  an  American  port,  were 
now  able  calmly  to  take  it  to  England  and 
undersell  the  West  Indian  planters  in  their 
own  home  market.  Pamphleteers  began  to 
criticise  the  government  for  permitting  such 
unfair  competition,  Lord  Sheffield,  as  in 
1783,  leading  the  way.  But  in  October, 
1805,  James  Stephen,  a  far  abler  writer, 
summed  up  the  anger  of  the  British  ship 
owners  and  naval  officers  in  a  pamphlet 
entitled,  "  War  in  disguise,  or  the  Frauds  of 
the  Neutral  Trade."  He  asserted  that  the 
whole  American  neutral  commerce  was  noth- 


192    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

ing  more  nor  less  than  an  evasion  of  the  Rule 
of  1756  for  the  \joint  benefit  of  France  and 
the  United  States,  and  he  called  upon  the 
government  to  ptit  a  stop  to  this  practical 
alliance  of  America  with  Napoleon.  This 
utterance  seems  to  have  made  a  profound  im 
pression,  and  for  a  time  his  views  became  the 
fixed  beliefs  of  influential  public  men  as  well 
as  of  the  naval  and  ship-owning  interests. 

The  first  steps  indicating  British  rest 
lessness  were  taken  by  the  Pitt  ministry, 
which  began,  in  1804,  a  policy  of  rigid 
naval  search  for  contraband  cargoes,  largely 
carried  on  off  American  ports.  Whatever 
friendly  views  Pitt  may  once  have  enter 
tained  toward  the  Americans,  his  ministry 
now  had  for  its  sole  object  the  contest  with 
France  and  the  protection  of  British  in 
terests.  In  July,^1805,  a  severe  blow  was 
suddenly  struck  by  Sir  William  Scott,  who 
as  chief  Admiralty  judge  rendered  a  decision 
to  the  effect  that  French  sugar,  entered  at  an 
American  custom-house  and  reexported  with 
a  rebate  of  the  duty,  was  good  prize  under 
the  Rule  of  1756.  This  placed  all  American 
reexportation  of  French  West  Indian  prod 
ucts  at  the  mercy  of  British  cruisers, 
and  the  summer  of  1805  saw  a  sudden 
descent  of  naval  officers  upon  their  prey, 
causing  an  outcry  of  anger  from  every 
seaport  between  Maine  and  Maryland.  The 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM 

day  of  reckoning  had  come,  and  Jefferson 
and  Madison,  his  Secretary  of  State,  were 
compelled  to  meet  the  crisis.  Fortunately, 
as  it  appeared  for  the  United  States,  the 
Pitt  ministry  ended  with  the  death  of  its 
leader  on  January  23,  1806,  and  was  suc 
ceeded  by  a  coalition  in  which  Lord  Gren- 
ville,  author  of  the  Jay  treaty,  was  prime 
minister,  and  Fox,  an  avowed  jriend  of 
America,  was  foreign  secretary.  While  it 
was  not  reasonably  to  be  expected  that  any 
English  ministry  would  throw  over  the  tra 
ditional  naval  policy  of  impressments  or 
venture  to  run  directly  counter  to  the  de 
mands  of  the  British  shipping  interests,  it 
was  open  to  anticipation  that  some  such 
compromise  as  the  Jay  treaty  might  be 
agreed  upon,  which  would  relieve  the  United 
States  from  arbitrary  exactions  during  the 
European  war.  The  Grenville  ministry 
showed  its  good  intentions  by  abandon 
ing  the  policy  of  captures  authorized  by  Scott 
and  substituting,  on  May  16,  1806,  a  block 
ade  of  the  French  coast  from  Ostend  to  the 
Seine.  This  answered  the  purpose  of  hin 
dering  trade  with  France  without  raising 
troublesome  questions,  and  actually  allowed 
American  vessels  to  take  sugar  to  Northern 
Europe. 

Between    1804    and    1806   Jefferson   had 
brought  the  United  States  to  the  verge  of 


194    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

war  with  Spain  through  insisting  that 
Napoleon's  cession  of  Louisiana  had  in 
cluded  West  Florida.  At  the  moment  when 
British  seizures  began,  he  was  attempting 
at  once  to  frighten  Spain  by  warlike  words 
and  at  the  same  time,  by  a  payment  of  two 
million  dollars,  to  induce  France  to  compel 
Spain  to  acknowledge  the  American  title 
to  the  disputed  territory.  For  this  reason, 
during  a  number  of  years  and  until  the 
scheme  fell  through,  Jefferson  cultivated 
especially  friendly  relations  with  the  gov 
ernment  of  Napoleon,  not  from  any  of  the 
former  Republican  enthusiasm,  but  solely 
on  diplomatic  grounds.  Hence,  although 
nominally  neutral  in  the  great  war,  he  bore 
the  appearance  to  the  English  of  a  French 
partisan,  which  rendered  their  diplomacy 
suspicious  and  defensive. 

Jefferson  felt  that  he  had  in  his  possession 
a  thoroughly  adequate  means  to  secure 
favorable  treatment  from  England  by  simply 
threatening  commercial  retaliation.  The 
American  trade,  he  believed,  was  so  neces 
sary  to  the  prosperity  of  England  that 
for  the  sake  of  retaining  it  that  country 
would  make  any  reasonable  concession. 
That  there  was  a  basis  of  truth  in  this 
belief  it  would  be  impossible  to  deny; 
for  England  consumed  American  cotton 
and  exported  largely  to  American  markets. 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      195 

With  this  trade  cut  off,  manufacturers  and 
exporters  would  suffer,  as  they  had  suffered 
in  the  revolutionary  period.  But  Jefferson 
ignored  what  every  American  merchant 
knew,  that  military  and  naval  considerations 
weighed  fully  as  heavily  with  England  as 
mercantile  needs,  and  that  a  country  which 
had  neither  a  ship  of  the  line,  nor  a  single 
army  corps  in  existence,  commanded,  in 
an  age  of  world  warfare,  very  slight  respect. 
Jefferson's  prejudice  against  professional 
armed  forces  and  his  ideal  of  war  as  a  purely 
voluntary  matter,  carried  on  as  in  colonial 
times,  was  sufficiently  proclaimed  by  him 
to  be  well  understood  across  the  Atlantic. 
Openly  disbelieving  in  war,  accordingly, 
avowedly  determined  not  to  fight,  he  ap 
proached  a  nation  struggling  for  life  with 
the  greatest  military  power  on  earth  and 
called  upon  it  to  come  to  terms  for  business 
reasons. 

His  first  effort  was  made  by  causing  Con 
gress  to  pass  a  Nonjniportation  Act^  ex 
cluding  certain  British  goods,  which  was  not 
to  go  into  effect  until  the  end  of  1806. 
With  this  as  his  sole  weapon,  he  sent  Mon 
roe  to  make  a  new  treaty,  demanding  free 
commerce  and  the  cessation  of  the  impress 
ment  of  seamen  from  American  vessels  in  re 
turn  for  the  continued  non-enforcement  of 
the  Non-importation  Act.  Such  a  task  was 


196    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

more  difficult  than  that  laid  upon  Jay  twelve 
years  before,  and  Monroe,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  he  was  dealing  with  the  same  minister, 
failed  to  accomplish  even  so  much  as  his 
predecessor.  From  August  to  December  he 
negotiated,  first  with  Lord  Holland,  then, 
after  Fox's  death,  with  Lord  Ho  wick,  but 
the  treaty  which  he  signed  December  1, 
1806,  contained  not  one  of  the  points  named 
in  his  instructions.  Monroe  found  the  Eng 
lish  willing  to  make  only  an  agreement  like 
the  Jay  treaty  which,  while  containing  special 
provisions  to  make  the  situation  tolerable, 
should  refuse  to  yield  any  British  contentions. 
That  was  the  Whig  policy  as  much  in  1806 
as  it  had  been  in  1766.  But  the  concessions 
were  slight,  and  the  chief  one,  regarding  the 
reexportation  of  French  West  Indian  prod 
ucts,  permitted  it  only  on  condition  that 
the  goods  were  bonafide  of  American  owner 
ship  and  had  paid  in  the  United  States  a 
duty  of  at  least  two  per  cent.  Jefferson  did 
not  even  submit  the  treaty  to  the  Senate. 

After  this  failure  the  situation  grew  graver. 
Napoleon,  in  December,  1806,  issued  from 
Berlin  a  decree  declaring  that,  in  retalia 
tion  for  the  aggressions  of  England  upon 
neutral  commerce,  the  British  Isles  were 
in  blockade  and  all  trade  with  them  was  for 
bidden.  British  goods  were  to  be  absolutely 
excluded  from  the  continent.  The  reply  of 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      197 

the  Grenville  ministry  to  this  was  an  Order 
in  Council,  January,  1807,  prohibiting  neu 
tral  vessels  from  trading  between  the  ports  of 
France  or  her  allies;  but  this  was  denounced 
as  utterly  weak  by  Perceval  and  Canning 
in  opposition.  In  April,  1807,  the  Grenville 
ministry,  turned  out  of  office  by  the  half 
insane  George  III,  was  replaced  by  a  tho 
roughly  Tory  cabinet,  under  the  Duke  of 
Portland,  whose  chief  members  in  the  Com 
mons  were  George  Canning  and  Spencer 
Perceval,  Foreign  Secretary  and  Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer  respectively.  The  United 
States  was  now  to  undergo  treatment  of  a 
new  kind  at  the  hands  of  Tories,  who  de 
spised  its  institutions,  felt  only  contempt  for 
the  courage  of  its  government,  and  were 
guided  as  regards  American  commerce  by 
the  doctrines  of  Lord  Sheffield  and  James 
Stephen. 

An  Order  in  Council  of  November  11, 
1807,  drafted  by  Perceval  and  endorsed 
by  all  the  rest  of  the  cabinet,  declared  that 
no  commerce  with  France  or  her  allies 
was  henceforward  to  be  permitted  unless 
it  had  passed  through  English  ports.  To 
this  Napoleon  retorted  by  the  Milan  De 
cree  of  December,  1807,  proclaiming  that 
all  vessels  which  had  been  searched  by 
English,  or  which  came  by  way  of  England, 
were  good  prize.  Henceforth,  then,  neutral 


198    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

commerce  was  positively  prohibited.  The 
merchantmen  of  the  United  States  could 
continue  to  trade  at  all  only  by  definitely 
siding  with  one  power  or  the  other.  The 
object  of  the  British  order  was  declared  to 
be  retaliation  on  Napoleon,  but  its  actual 
effect  was  to  place  American  trade  once 
more  under  the  rule  of  the  Navigation 
Acts.  As  in  the  days  before  1776,  American 
vessels  must  make  England  their  "staple" 
or  "entrepot,"  and  could  go  only  where 
permitted  to  by  English  orders  under  pen 
alty  of  forfeiture.  This  measure  was  sharply 
attacked  in  Parliament  by  the  Whigs,  es 
pecially  by  Grenville  and  Howick,  of  the 
late  ministry,  but  was  triumphantly  sus 
tained  by  the  Tories. 

At  this  time  the  chronic  grievance  of  the 
impressment  of  seamen  from  American  ves 
sels  grew  suddenly  acute.  In  the  years  of 
the  great  war  the  American  merchant  marine, 
with  its  safe  voyages  and  good  pay,  offered 
a  highly  attractive  prospect  for  English 
sailors,  who  dreaded  the  danger,  the  mo 
notony  and  the  severe  discipline  of  British 
men-of-war.  They  swarmed  by  thousands 
into  American  service,  securing  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  not  infrequently  by  fraudulent 
means,  the  naturalization  papers  by  which 
they  hoped  to  escape  the  press-gang.  Ever 
since  1793  British  naval  officers,  recog- 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      199 

nizing  no  right  of  expatriation,  systematic 
ally  impressed  English  seamen  found  on 
American  ships  and,  owing  to  the  difficulty 
in  distinguishing  the  two  peoples,  numerous 
natives  of  New  England  and  the  middle 
states  found  themselves  imprisoned  on  the 
"floating  hell"  of  a  British  ship-of-the-line 
in  an  epoch  when  brutality  characterized 
naval  discipline.  In  August,  1807,  the 
United  States  was  stirred  to  fury  over  the 
forcible  seizure  by  the  British  Leopard  of 
three  Englishmen  from  the  U.  S.  S.  Chesa 
peake,  which,  unprepared  for  defence,  had  to 
suffer  unresisting.  So  hot  was  the  general 
anger  that  Jefferson  could  easily  have  led 
Congress  into  hostile  measures,  if  not  an 
actual  declaration  of  war,  over  the  multi 
plied  seizures  and  this  last  insult. 

But  Jefferson  clung  to  peace,  and  satis 
fied  himself  by  ordering  British  men-of- 
war  out  of  American  ports  and  sending  a 
demand  for  reparation,  with  which  he  linked 
a  renunciation  of  the  right  of  impressment. 
When  Congress  met  in  December,  he  in 
duced  it  to  pass  a  general  Embargo,  posi 
tively  prohibiting  the  departure  of  American 
vessels  to  foreign  ports.  Since  at  the  same 
time  the  Non-importation  Act  went  into 
effect,  all  imports  and  exports  were  practically 
suspended.  His  idea  was  that  the  total 
cessation  of  American  commerce  would 


200    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

inflict  such  discomfort  upon  English  and 
French  consumers  that  each  country  would 
be  forced  to  abandon  its  oppressive  measures. 

Rarely  has  a  country,  at  the  instance  of 
one  man,  inflicted  a  severer  strain  upon  its 
citizens.  The  ravages  of  French  and  English 
together,  since  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1793, 
did  not  do  so  much  damage  as  the  Embargo 
did  in  one  year,  for  it  threatened  ruin  to 
every  shipowner,  importer  and  exporter  in 
the  United  States.  Undoubtedly  Jefferson 
and  his  party  had  in  mind  the  success  of 
the  non-importation  agreements  against  the 
Stamp  Act  and  the  Townshend  duties,  but 
what  was  then  the  voluntary  action  of  a 
great  majority  was  now  a  burden  imposed 
by  one  part  of  the  country  upon  another. 
The  people  of  New  York  and  New  England 
simply  would  not  obey  the  act.  To  enforce 
it  against  Canada  became  an  impossibility, 
and  to  prevent  vessels  from  escaping  a 
matter  of  great  difficulty.  Jefferson  per 
sisted  doggedly  and  induced  Congress  to 
pass  laws  giving  revenue  collectors  extraor 
dinary  powers  of  search  and  seizure,  but 
without  results. 

And  now,  under  this  intolerable  grievance, 
the  people  of  the  oppressed  regions  rapidly 
lost  their  enthusiasm  for  the  democratic 
administration.  Turning  once  more  to  the 
Federalist  party,  which  had  seemed  prac- 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      201 

tically  extinct,  they  threw  state  after  state 
into  its  hands  and  actually  threatened  the 
Republican  control  in  the  Presidential  elec 
tion  of  1808.  Had  a  coalition  been  arranged 
between  the  disgusted  Republican  factions 
of  New  York  and  Pennsylvania  and  the 
Federalists  of  New  England,  Delaware  and 
Maryland,  James  Madison  might  well  have 
been  beaten  for  successor  to  Jefferson.  But 
worse  remained  behind.  The  outraged  New 
Englanders,  led  by  Timothy  Pickering  and 
others,  began  to  use  again,  in  town-meetings 
and  legislatures,  the  old-time  language  of 
1774,  once  employed  against  the  Five  Intol 
erable  Acts,  and  to  threaten  secession.  As 
Jefferson  said  later,"!  felt  the  foundations 
of  the  government  shaken  under  my  feet 
by  the  New  England  townships." 

By  this  time  it  was  definitely  proved  that 
as  a  means  of  coercion  the  Embargo  was 
worthless.  English  manufacturers  and  their 
workmen  complained,  but  English  ship 
owners  profited,  and  crowds  of  British  sea 
men  returned  perforce  to  their  home,  even 
at  times  into  the  royal  navy.  Canning,  for 
the  Portland  ministry,  sarcastically  de 
clined  to  be  moved,  observing  that  the  Em 
bargo,  whatever  its  motives,  was  practically 
the  same  as  Napoleon's  system,  and  Eng 
land  could  not  submit  to  being  driven  to 
surrender  to  France  even  to  regain  the 


202    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

American  market  or  relieve  the  Americans 
from  their  self-inflicted  sufferings.  Napo 
leon  now  gave  an  interesting  taste  of  his 
peculiar  methods,  for  on  April  17,  1808, 
he  issued  the  Bayonne  Decree,  ordering  the 
confiscation  of  all  American  vessels  found  in 
French  ports,  on  the  ground  that  since  the 
embargo  prohibited  the  exit  of  American 
ships  these  must,  in  reality,  be  English! 
Thus  he  gathered  in  about  eight  million 
dollars'  worth.  The  policy  had  to  be 
abandoned,  and  in  the  utmost  ill-humor 
Congress  repealed  the  Embargo,  March  1, 
1809,  substituting  non-intercourse  with  Eng 
land  and  France.  Thus  Jefferson  left  office 
under  the  shadow  of  a  monumental  fail 
ure.  His  theory  of  commercial  coercion 
had  completely  broken  down,  and  he  had 
damaged  his  own  and  his  party's  prestige 
to  such  an  extent  that  the  moribund  Feder 
alist  organization  had  sprung  to  life  and 
threatened  the  existence  of  the  Union. 

From  this  time  onward  the  New  Eng- 
landers  assumed  the  character  of  British 
sympathizers  and  admirers  to  a  degree 
hardly  credible.  It  was  true  that  their  ves 
sels  were  the  sufferers  from  British  seizures, 
but  no  British  confiscations  had  done  them 
such  harm  as  the  Embargo,  or  taken  such 
discreditable  advantage  of  a  transparent 
pretext  as  the  Bayonne  Decree.  Belonging 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      203 

to  the  wealthy  classes,  they  admired  and 
respected  England  as  defender  of  the  world 's 
civilization  against  Napoleon,  and  they  de 
tested  Jefferson  and  Madison  as  tools  of 
the  enemy  of  mankind.  They  justified 
impressments,  spoke  respectfully  of  the 
British  doctrines  of  trade  and  corresponded 
freely  with  British  public  men.  They  stood, 
in  short,  exactly  where  the  Republicans  had 
stood  in  1793,  supporters  of  a  foreign  power 
with  which  the  Federal  administration  was 
in  controversy.  In  Congress  and  outside 
they  made  steady,  bitter  and  menacing  at 
tacks  on  the  integrity  and  honesty  of  the 
Republicans. 

s  Under  Jefferson's  successor  the  policy  of 
commercial  pressure  was  carried  to  its 
final  impotent  conclusion.  At  first  the 
action  of  the  British  government  seemed  to 
crown  Madison  with  triumph.  In  the  winter 
of  1809  the  majority  in  Congress  had  talked 
freely  of  substituting  war  for  the  Embargo, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  Whigs  in  Parlia 
ment,  led  by  Grenville,  had  attacked  Can 
ning  for  his  insolence  toward  the  United 
States  as  likely  to  cause  war.  Whitbread 
called  attention  to  the  similarity  between 
the  conditions  in  1809  and  1774,  when  "the 
same  infatuation  seemed  to  prevail,"  the 
same  certainty  existed  that  the  Americans 
would  not  fight,  and  the  same  confident 


204    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

assertions  were  made  that  they  could  not 
do  without  England.  The  comparison  pos 
sessed  much  truth,  for  the  Tories  of  1809 
were  fully  as  indifferent  to  American  feel 
ings  as  those  of  1774,  and  pushed  ahead 
with  their  commercial  policy  just  as  North 
had  done  with  his  political  system,  in  the 
same  contemptuous  certainty  that  the  Amer 
icans  would  never  fight.  Yet  Canning 
showed  sufficient  deference  to  his  assailants 
to  instruct  Erskine,  British  minister  at 
Washington,  to  notify  Madison  that  the 
Orders  would  be  withdrawn  in  case  the 
United  States  kept  its  non-intercourse  with 
France,  recognized  the  Rule  of  1756  and 
authorized  British  men-of-war  to  enforce 
the  Non-intercourse  Act. 

The  immediate  result  was  surprising, 
for  Erskine,  eager  to  restore  harmony,  did 
not  disclose  or  carry  out  his  instructions, 
but  accepted  the  continuance  by  the  United 
States  of  non-intercourse  against  France 
as  a  sufficient  concession.  He  announced 
that  the  Orders  in  Council  would  be  with 
drawn  on  June  10;  Madison  in  turn  promptly 
issued  a  proclamation  reopening  trade,  and 
swarms  of  American  vessels  rushed  across 
the  Atlantic.  But  Canning,  in  harsh  lan 
guage,  repudiated  the  arrangement  of  his 
over-sanguine  agent,  and  Madison  was  forced 
to  the  mortifying  step  of  reimposing  non- 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      205 

intercourse  by  a  second  proclamation.  Still 
worse  remained,  for  when  F.  J.  Jackson, 
the  next  British  minister,  arrived,  the 
President  had  to  undergo  the  insult  of  being 
told  that  he  had  connived  with  Erskine 
in  violating  his  instructions.  The  refusal 
to  hold  further  relations  with  the  blunt 
emissary  was  a  poor  satisfaction.  All  this 
time,  moreover,  reparation  for  the  Chesa 
peake  affair  was  blocked,  since  it  had  been 
coupled  with  a  demand  for  the  renunciation 
of  impressments,  something  that  no  British 
ministry  would  have  dared  to  yield. 

On  the  part  of  Napoleon  the  Non-inter 
course  Act  offered  another  opportunity  for 
plunder.  When  he  first  heard  of  Erskine 's 
concessions  he  was  on  the  point  of  meeting 
them,  but  on  learning  of  their  failure  he 
changed  about,  commanded  the  sequestra 
tion  of  all  American  vessels  entering  Euro 
pean  ports,  and  in  May,  1810,  by  the 
Rambouillet  Decree,  he  ordered  their  con 
fiscation  and  sale.  The  ground  assigned 
was  that  the  Non-intercourse  Act  forbade 
any  French  or  English  vessel  to  enter  Amer 
ican  ports  under  penalty  of  confiscation. 
None  had  been  confiscated,  but  they  might 
be.  Hence  he  acted.  Incidentally  he  helped 
fill  his  treasury  and  seized  about  ten  mil 
lions  of  American  property.  By  this  time 
it  was  clear  to  most  Americans  that,  how- 


206    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

ever  unfriendly  the  British  policy,  it  was 
honesty  itself  compared  to  that  of  the 
Emperor,  whose  sole  aim  seemed  to  be  to 
ensnare  American  vessels  for  the  purpose 
of  seizing  them.  The  Federalists  in  Con 
gress  expatiated  on  his  perfidy  and  bare 
faced  plunder,  but)  nothing  could  shake  the 
intention  of  Madison  to  stick  to  commercial 
bargaining.  Congress  now  passed  another 
act,  destined  to  be  the  last  effort  at  peaceful 
coercion.  Trade  was  opened,  but  the  Presi 
dent  was  authorized  to  reimpose  non-in 
tercourse  with  either  nation  if  the  other 
would  withdraw  its  decrees.  This  act, 
known  always  as  the  Macon  Bill  No.  2,  be 
came  '  law  in  May,  1810,  and  Napoleon 
immediately  seized  the  occasion  for  further 
sharp  practice.  He  caused  an  unofficial, 
unsigned  letter  to  be  shown  to  the  American 
minister  at  Paris  stating  that  the  French 
decrees  would  be  withdrawn  on  November 
2,  1810,  "it  being  understood  that  the  Eng 
lish  should  withdraw  theirs  by  that  time 
or  the  United  States  should  cause  its  rights 
to  be  respected  by  England."  Madison 
accordingly  reimposed  non-intercourse  with 
England  on  the  date  named  and  con 
sidered  the  French  decrees  withdrawn.  The 
situation  was  regarded  by  him  as  though  he 
had  entered  into  a  contract  with  Napoleon, 
which  compelled  him  to  assert  that  the 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      207 

decrees  were  at  an  end,  although  he  had  no 
other  evidence  than  the  existence  of  the  situ 
ation  arising  from  the  Macon  Bill.  There 
followed  a  period  during  which  the  American 
minister  at  London,  William  Pinkney,  en 
deavored  without  success  to  convince  the 
British  government  that  the  decrees  actually 
were  withdrawn.  The  Portland  ministry 
had  fallen  in  1809,  and  the  sharp-tongued 
Canning  was  replaced  in  the  foreign  office 
by  the  courteous  Marquess  Wellesley;  but 
Spencer  Perceval,  author  of  the  Orders 
in  Council,  was  prime  minister  and  stiffly 
determined  to  adhere  to  his  policy.  James 
Stephen  and  George  Rose,  in  Parliament, 
stood  ready  to  defend  them,  and  the  Tory 
party  as  a  whole  accepted  their  necessity. 
When  therefore  Pinkney  presented  his  re 
quest  to  Wellesley,  the  latter  naturally 
demanded  something  official  from  Napo 
leon,  which  neither  Pinkney  nor  Madison 
could  supply.  Finally,  in  February,  1811, 
Pinkney  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  and 
returned  home,  having  played  his  difficult 
part  with  dignity.  To  aggravate  the  situ 
ation  Napoleon's  cruisers  continued,  when 
ever  they  had  a  chance,  to  seize  and  burn 
American  vessels  bound  for  England,  and 
his  port  authorities  to  sequester  vessels 
arriving  from  England,  The  decrees  were 
not  in  fact  repealed. 


208    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Madison  had  committed  himself,  however, 
to  upholding  the  honor  of  Napoleon, — a 
task  from  which  any  other  man  would  have 
recoiled, — and  the  United  States  continued 
to  insist  on  a  fiction.  Madison's  conduct 
in  this  affair  was  that  of  a  shrewd  lawyer-like 
man  who  tried  to  carry  on  diplomacy  be 
tween  two  nations  fighting  to  the  death  as 
though  it  were  a  matter  of  contracts,  words 
and  phrases  of  legal  meaning.  To  Napo 
leon  legality  was  an  incomprehensible  idea. 
To  the  Tory  ministries,  struggling  to  main 
tain  their  country  against  severe  economic 
pressure,  facts,  not  words,  counted,  and 
facts  based  on  naval  force.  Upon  the 
Jeffersonian  and  Madisonian  attempts  at 
peaceful  coercion  they  looked  with  mingled 
annoyance  and  contempt,  believing,  as  they 
did,  that  the  whole  American  policy  was 
that  of  a  weak  and  cowardly  nation  trying 
by  pettifogging  means  to  secure  favorable 
trade  conditions.  The  situation  had  reached 
a  point  where  the  United  States  had  nothing 
to  hope  from  either  contestant,  by  contin 
uing  this  policy. 

At  this  juncture  a  new  political  force 
assumed  control.  By  1811  the  old-time 
Republican  leaders,  trained  in  the  school 
of  Jeffersonian  ideals,  were  practically  bank 
rupt.  Faction  paralyzed  government,  and 
Congress  seemed,  by  its  timid  attitude,  to 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      209 

justify  the  taunt  of  Quincy  of  Massachu 
setts  that  the  Republican  party  could  not  be 
kicked  into  a  war.  But  there  appeared  on 
the  stage  a  new  sort  of  Republican.  In  the 
western  counties  of  the  older  states  and  in 
the  new  territories  beyond  the  mountains, 
the  frontier  element,  once  of  small  account 
in  the  country  and  wholly  disregarded  under 
the  Federalists,  was  multiplying,  forming 
communities  and  governments,  where  the 
pioneer  habits  had  created  a  democracy 
that  was  distinctly  pugnacious.  Years  of 
danger  from  Indians,  of  rivalry  with  white 
neighbors  over  land  titles,  of  struggle  with 
the  wilderness,  had  produced  a  half-lawless 
and  wholly  self-assertive  type  of  man,  as 
democratic  as  Jefferson  himself,  but  with  a 
perfect  willingness  to  fight  and  with  a  great 
respect  for  fighters.  To  these  men  the 
tameness  with  which  the  United  States 
had  submitted  to  insults  and  plundering 
was  growing  to  be  unendurable.  Plain 
masculine  anger  began  to  obscure  other 
considerations. 

These  western  men,  moreover,  had  a 
special  cause  for  indignation  with  England, 
which  was  ignored  by  the  seacoast  commu 
nities,  in  the  close  connection  which  they 
firmly  believed  to  exist  between  the  British 
administration  of  upper  Canada  and  the 
northwestern  Indians.  In  the  years  after 


210    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

1809  the  Indian  question  again  began  to 
assume  a  dangerous  form.  Settlers  were 
coming  close  to  the  treaty  lines,  and,  to 
satisfy  their  demands  for  the  bottom  lands 
along  the  Wabash  River,  Governor  Harrison 
of  Indiana  Territory  made  an  extensive 
series  of  land  purchases  from  the  small  tribes 
on  the  coveted  territory. 

But  there  now  appeared  two  remarkable 
Indians,  Tecumseh  and  his  brother,  the 
Prophet,  of  the  Shawnee  tribe,  who  saw 
in  the  occupation  of  the  red  men's  hunting 
lands  and  the  inroads  of  frontier  corn  whiskey 
the  death  of  all  their  race.  These  leaders 
began  to  hold  their  own  tribe  together 
against  the  purchase  of  whiskey  or  the 
sale  of  lands;  then,  with  wider  vision,  they 
tried  to  organize  an  alliance  of  all  the 
northwestern  Indians  to  prevent  further 
white  advance.  They  even  went  so  far  as  to 
visit  the  southwestern  Indians,  Creeks  and 
Cherokees,  to  induce  them  to  join  in  the 
grand  league.  The  very  statesmanship 
involved  in  this  vast  scheme  rendered  it 
dangerous  in  the  eyes  of  all  Westerners, 
who  were  firmly  convinced  that  the  backing 
of  this  plan  came  from  the  British  posts 
in  Canada.  There  was,  in  reality,  a  good 
understanding  between  the  Canadian  officers 
and  the  Shawnee  chiefs.  In  1811  hostilities 
broke  out  at  Tippecanoe,  where  Governor 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      211 

Harrison  had  a  sharp  battle  with  the 
Shawnees;  but  Tecumseh  exerted  himself  to 
restore  peaceful  relations,  although  the  fron 
tier  was  in  great  excitement. 

From  the  states  of  Kentucky,  Ohio  and 
Tennessee,  and  from  the  inner  counties  of 
the  southern  states  there  came  to  the  first 
session  of  the  Eleventh  Congress,  in  Dec 
ember,  1811,  a  group  of  young  politicians, — 
Henry  Clay,  John  Calhoun,  Langdon  Cheves, 
Felix  Grundy, — who  felt  that  the  time  for 
talk  was  at  an  end.  Unless  England  im 
mediately  revoked  its  decrees,  ceased  im 
pressing  seamen  and  refrained  from  instiga 
ting  Indian  plots  there  must  be  war.  Assum 
ing  control  of  the  House,  with  Clay  in  the 
Speaker's  chair,  they  transformed  the  Re 
publican  party  and  the  policy  of  the  country. 
They  pushed  through  measures  for  raising 
troops,  arming  ships  and  borrowing  money. 
Congress  rang  with  fiery  speeches  as  month 
after  month  went  by  and  the  Perceval  min 
istry  obstinately  refused  to  stir  from  its 
commercial  policy. 

Yet  at  this  time,  when  a  rising  storm  of 
anger  was  sweeping  the  United  States  govern 
ment  into  war,  the  feeling  of  the  English 
public  was  undergoing  a  change.  By  1812 
the  pretence  that  the  Orders  in  Council  were 
maintained  for  the  purpose  of  starving  out 
France  was  growing  transparent  when  thou- 


ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

sands  of  licenses,  granted  freely  to  British 
vessels,  permitted  a  vast  fleet  to  carry  on 
the  supposedly  forbidden  trade.  Although 
Perceval  and  Canning  still  insisted  in  Parlia 
ment  that  the  orders  were  retaliatory,  the 
fact  was  patent  that  their  only  serious 
effect  was  to  cause  the  loss  of  the  American 
trade  and  the  American  market.  At  the 
threat  of  war,  the  exporters  of  England, 
suffering  severely  from  glutted  markets, 
began  a  vigorous  agitation  against  Per 
ceval's  policy  and  bombarded  the  ministry, 
through  Henry  Brougham  as  their  mouth 
piece,  with  petitions,  memorials,  and  motions 
which  put  the  Tories  on  the  defensive. 
Speakers  like  Alexander  Baring  held  up 
the  system  of  Orders  in  Council  as  rid 
dled  with  corruption,  and  only  the  per 
sonal  authority  of  Perceval  and  Castlereagh 
kept  the  majority  firm.  At  the  height  of 
this  contest  Perceval  was  assassinated  on 
May  11,  1812,  and  it  was  not  until  June  8 
that  hope  of  a  new  coalition  was  abandoned 
and  the  Tory  cabinet  definitely  reorganized 
under  Lord  Liverpool.  Almost  the  first 
act  of  that  ministry  was  to  bow  before  the 
storm  of  petitions,  criticisms  and  com 
plaints  and  to  announce  on  June  16  that 
they  had  decided  to  suspend  the  Orders. 
Thus  the  very  contingency  upon  which 
Jefferson  and  Madison  had  counted  came  to 


COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISM      213 

pass.  The  British  government,  at  the  in 
stance  of  the  importing  and  manufacturing 
classes,  yielded  to  the  pressure  of  American 
commercial  restrictions.  It  was  true  that 
the  danger  of  war  weighed  far  more,  ap 
parently,  than  the  Non-intercourse  Act, 
but  had  there  been  an  Atlantic  cable,  or 
even  a  steam  transit,  at  that  time,  or  had 
the  Liverpool  ministry  been  formed  a  little 
earlier,  the  years  1807-1812  might  have 
passed  into  history  as  a  triumphant  vindi 
cation  of  Jefferson's  theories. 
v  But  it  was  too  late.  Madison,  seeing 
apparently  that  his  plans  were  a  failure,  fell 
in  with  the  new  majority,  and  after  deliber 
ate  preparation  sent  a  message  to  Congress 
in  June,  1812,  which  was  practically  an  invi 
tation  to  declare  war.  In  spite  of  the  bitter 
opposition  of  all  Federalists  and  many 
eastern  Republicans,  Congress,  by  the  votes 
of  the  southern  and  western  members, 
adopted  a  declaration  of  war  on  June  18,  com 
mitting  the  United  States  to  a  contest  with 
the  greatest  naval  power  in  the  world  on  the 
grounds  of  the  Orders  in  Council,  the  impress 
ment  of  seamen,  and  the  intrigues  with  the 
northwestern  Indians.  At  the  moment 
when  Napoleon,  invading  Russia,  began  his 
last  stroke  for  universal  empire,  the  United 
States  entered  the  game  as  his  virtual  ally. 
This  was  something  the  Federalists  could 


214    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

not  forgive.  They  returned  to  their  homes, 
execrating  the  war  as  waged  in  behalf  of 
the  arch-enemy  of  God  and  man;  as  the 
result  of  a  dirty  pettifogging  bit  of  trickery 
on  the  part  of  Napoleon.  They  denounced 
the  ambitions  of  Clay  and  the  Westerners, 
who  predicted  an  easy  conquest  of  Canada, 
as  merely  an  expression  of  a  pirate's  desire 
to  plunder  England  of  its  colonies,  and 
they  announced  their  purpose  to  do  nothing 
to  assist  the  unrighteous  conflict.  In  their 
anger  at  Madison  they  were  even  willing  to 
vote  for  De  Witt  Clinton  of  New  York, 
who  ran  for  President  in  1812  as  an  Inde 
pendent  Republican,  and  the  coalition  carried 
the  electoral  vote  of  every  state  north  of 
Maryland  except  Pennsylvania  and  Vermont. 

When  the  news  of  the  repeal  of  the  Orders 
in  Council  crossed  the  Atlantic  some  efforts 
were  made  by  the  governor-general  of 
Canada  to  arrange  an  armistice,  hoping  to 
prevent  hostilities.  But  Madison  does  not 
seem  to  have  seriously  considered  aband 
oning  the  war,  even  though  the  original 
cause  had  been  removed.  Feeling  the  irre 
sistible  pressure  of  the  southern  and  western 
Democrats  behind  him,  he  announced  that 
the  contest  must  go  on  until  England  should 
abandon  the  practice  of  impressment.  So 
the  last  hope  of  peace  disappeared. 

The   war   thus   begun   need   never   have 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS " 

taken  place,  had  the'  Tory  ministries  of 
Portland  or  Percivat  cared  to  avert  it.  The 
United  States  only  lashed  itself  into  a  war 
like  mood  after  repeated  efforts  to  secure 
concessions,  and  after  years  of  submission 
to  British  rough  handling.  During  all  this 
time,  either  Madison  or  Jefferson  would 
gladly  have  accepted  any  sort  of  compromise 
which  did  not  shut  American  vessels  wholly 
out  from  some  form  of  independent  trade. 
But  the  enmity  of  the  British  shipowners 
and  naval  leaders  and  the  traditional  British 
commercial  policy  joined  with  contempt 
for  the  spiritless  nation  to  prevent  any  such 
action  until  the  fitting  time  had  gone  by. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS*'  AND  WEST 
WARD   EXPANSION,    1812-1815 

THE  second  war  between  the  United 
States  and  the  mother  country,  unlike  the 
first,  was  scarcely  more  than  a  minor  annoy 
ance  to  the  stronger  party.  In  the  years 
1812-1814  England  was  engaged  in  main 
taining  an  army  in  Spain,  in  preying  on 
French  commerce  by  blockade  and  cruising, 
and  in  spending  immense  sums  to  subsidize 
the  European  nations  in  their  final  struggle 
against  Napoleon.  The  whole  military  and 


216    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

financial  strength  of  the  country,  the  whole 
political  and  diplomatic  interest  were  ab 
sorbed  in  the  tremendous  European  contest. 
Whig  and  Tory,  landowner,  manufacturer 
and  laborer  were  united  in  the  unbending 
determination  to  destroy  the  power  of  the 
Corsican.  The  Liverpool  ministry  contained 
little  of  talent,  and  no  genius,  but  the  mem 
bers  possessed  certain  traits  which  sufficed  to 
render  others  unnecessary,  namely,  an  un 
shakable  tenacity  and  steady  hatred  of  the 
French.  The  whole  country  stood  behind 
them  on  that  score. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  English, 
when  obliged  to  fight  the  United  States,  were 
at  liberty  to  send  an  overwhelming  naval 
force  to  blockade  or  destroy  American  com 
merce,  but  were  in  great  straits  to  provide 
men  to  defend  Canada.  It  was  not  until  a 
full  year  after  the  declaration  of  war  that 
any  considerable  force  of  regular  troops  could 
be  collected  and  sent  there,  and  not  until 
two  years  that  anything  approaching  a  gen 
uine  army  could  be  directed  against  America. 
The  defence  of  Canada  had  to  be  left  to  the 
efforts  of  some  few  officers  and  men  and  such 
local  levies  as  could  be  assembled. 

On  the  side  of  the  United  States  the  war 
was  bound  to  take  the  form  of  an  effort  to 
capture  all  or  part  of  Canada,  for  that  was 
the  only  vulnerable  British  possession.  On  the 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS" 

sea  the  United  States  could  hope  at  most  to 
damage  British  commerce  by  the  few  national 
cruisers  and  by  such  privateers  as  the  ship 
owners  of  the  country  could  send  out.  With 
out  a  single  ship-of-the-line  and  with  only  five 
frigates  there  existed  no  possibility  of  actu 
ally  fighting  the  British  navy.  But  on  land 
it  seemed  as  though  a  country  with  a  popu 
lation  of  over  seven  millions  ought  to  be  able 
to  raise  armies  of  such  size  as  to  overrun,  by 
mere  numbers,  the  slender  resources  of 
Canada,  and  it  was  the  confident  expecta 
tion  of  most  of  the  western  leaders  that  within 
a  short  time  the  whole  region  would  be  in 
American  hands.  "The  acquisition  of  Canada 
this  year,"  wrote  Jefferson,  "as  far  as  the 
neighborhood  of  Quebec,  will  be  a  mere 
matter  of  marching,  and  will  give  us  experi 
ence  for  the  attack  on  Halifax,  the  next  and 
the  final  expulsion  of  England  from  the 
American  continent." 

Unfortunately  for  the  success  of  these 
dreams  the  policy  of  the  Republican  adminis 
trations  had  been  such  as  to  set  up  insuper 
able  difficulties.  The  regular  army,  reduced 
under  Jefferson's  "passion  for  peace"  to  a 
bare  minimum,  was  scattered  in  a  few  posts; 
the  War  Department  was  without  means  for 
equipping,  feeding  and  transporting  bodies 
of  troops;  the  whole  mechanism  of  war  ad 
ministration  had  to  be  created.  Further,  the 


218    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Secretary  of  the  Army  and  nearly  all  the  gen 
erals  were  elderly  men,  veterans  of  the  Revo 
lutionary  Army,  who  had  lost  whatever  en 
ergy  they  once  possessed.  The  problem  of  war 
finances  was  rendered  serious  by  the  fact  that 
revenue  from  the  tariff,  the  sole  important 
source  of  income,  was  sure  to  be  cut  off  by 
the  British  naval  power.  The  National  Bank 
had  been  refused  a  recharter  in  1811,  and  the 
government,  democratic  in  its  finances  as  hi 
other  matters,  relied  upon  a  hundred  odd 
state  banks  of  every  degree  of  solvency  for 
aid  in  carrying  on  financial  operations. 

In  addition  the  temper  of  the  American 
people  was  exactly  what  it  had  been  in 
colonial  days.  They  regarded  war  as  a 
matter  to  be  carried  on  at  the  convenience 
of  farmers  and  others,  who  were  willing  to 
serve  in  defence  of  their  homes,  but  strongly 
objected  to  enlisting  for  any  length  of  time. 
On  the  more  pugnacious  frontier  the  pre 
vailing  military  ideal  was  that  of  the  armed 
mob  or  crowd, — a  body  of  fighters  follow 
ing  a  chosen  leader  against  Indians.  Every 
where  the  elementary  conceptions  of  obedi 
ence  and  duty  were  unknown.  The  very 
men  who  wished  war  were  unwilling  to  fight 
except  on  their  own  terms. 

Still  more  fatal  to  military  efficiency  was 
the  fact  that  the  Federalists,  and  many  of 
the  northern  Republicans,  inhabiting  the 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS"     219 

regions  abutting  on  Canada  were  violently 
opposed  to  the  war,  wished  to  see  it  fail  and 
were  firmly  resolved  to  do  nothing  to  aid  the 
administration.  The  utmost  the  Federalists 
would  do  was  to  defend  themselves  if  at 
tacked,  but  they  would  do  that  on  their  own 
responsibility  and  not  under  federal  orders. 

The  only  exception  to  this  prevailing  un- 
military  condition  was  to  be  found  in  the 
navy,  where,  through  cruising  and  through 
actual  service  against  the  Barbary  corsairs, 
a  genuinely  trained  body  of  officers  and  men 
had  been  created.  Unable  to  do  more  than 
give  a  good  account  of  themselves  on  the 
ocean  in  single  combats,  these  officers  found 
a  chance  on  the  northern  lakes  to  display  a 
fighting  power  and  skill  which  is  one  of  the 
few  redeeming  features  of  the  war  on  the 
American  side. 

In  1812  hostilities  began  with  a  feeble  at 
tempt  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
invade  Canada,  an  effort  whose  details  are 
of  interest  only  in  showing  how  impossible 
it  is  for  an  essentially  unmilitary  people  to 
improvise  warfare.  Congress  had  authorized 
a  loan,  the  construction  of  vessels,  and  the 
enlistment  of  an  army  of  36,000  men;  but 
the  officers  appointed  to  assemble  a  military 
force  found  themselves  unable,  after  months 
of  recruiting  and  working,  to  gather  more 
than  half  that  number  of  raw  troops,  with  a 


220    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

fluctuating  body  of  state  militia.  With  these 
rudiments  of  a  military  force,  attempts  to 
"invade"  Canada  were  made  in  three  direc 
tions, — from  Detroit,  from  the  Niagara  River 
and  from  the  northern  end  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain. 

To  meet  these  movements  there  were  actu 
ally  less  than  2300  British  soldiers  west  of 
Montreal;  but  fortunately  they  were  com 
manded  by  Isaac  Brock,  an  officer  of  daring 
and  an  aggressive  temper.  He  at  once  entered 
into  alliance  with  Tecumseh  and  the  western 
Indians,  and  thus  brought  to  the  British 
assistance  a  force  of  hundreds  of  warriors 
along  the  Ohio  and  Kentucky  frontier. 
While  General  Hull,  with  about  2000  troops, 
mainly  volunteers  from  the  West,  marched 
under  orders  to  Detroit  and  then,  in  July, 
invaded  upper  Canada,  the  outlying  Ameri 
can  posts  at  Chicago  and  Mackinac  were 
either  captured  or  destroyed  by  the  Indians. 
Brock,  gathering  a  handful  of  men,  marched 
against  Hull,  terrified  him  for  the  safety  of 
his  communications  with  the  United  States, 
forced  the  old  man  to  retreat  to  Detroit,  and 
finally,  by  advancing  boldly  against  the  slight 
fortifications  of  the  post,  frightened  him  into 
surrender.  Hull  had  been  set  an  impossible 
task,  to  conquer  upper  Canada  with  no  sure 
means  of  getting  reinforcements  or  supplies 
through  a  region  swarming  with  Indians;  but 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS" 

his  conduct  indicated  no  spark  of  pugnacity, 
and  his  surrender  caused  the  loss  of  the  entire 
northwest.  Tecumseh  and  his  warriors  now 
advanced  against  the  Kentucky,  Indiana 
and  Ohio  frontiers,  and  the  nameless  horrors 
of  Indian  massacre  and  torture  surged  along 
the  line  of  settlements.  The  frontiersmen 
flew  to  arms.  General  Harrison,  with  a  com 
mission  from  Kentucky,  headed  a  large  ex 
pedition  to  regain  lost  ground,  but  he  only 
succeeded  in  building  forts  in  northwestern 
Ohio  and  waging  a  defensive  war  against  the 
raids  of  Tecumseh  and  the  British  general, 
Proctor,  Brock's  successor. 

At  Niagara  no  move  was  made  until  the 
late  autumn,  when  two  American  generals 
in  succession, — Van  Rensselaer  and  Smyth, 
tried  to  lead  a  motley  array  of  militia  and 
regulars  across  the  river.  Brock  met  the 
first  detachment  and  was  killed  in  a  skir 
mish,  but  his  men  were  none  the  less  able  to 
annihilate  the  main  attack,  on  the  brink  of 
the  river,  while  several  thousand  American 
militia,  refusing,  on  constitutional  grounds, 
to  serve  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  their 
state,  watched  safely  from  the  eastern  bank. 
The  second  effort  in  November,  under 
General  Smyth,  proved  an  even  worse  fiasco. 
Meanwhile  General  Dearborn,  the  supreme 
commander,  tried  to  invade  near  Lake 
Champlain,  but,  after  he  had  marched  his 


222    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

troops  to  the  Canadian  border,  the  militia  re 
fused  to  leave  the  soil  of  the  United  States, 
and  so  the  campaign  had  to  be  abandoned. 
The  military  efforts  of  the  United  States 
were,  as  the  Canadian  military  historian 
phrases  it,  "beneath  criticism." 

The  only  redeeming  feature  of  the  year 
was  the  creditable  record  of  the  little  Ameri 
can  navy  and  the  success  of  the  privateers, 
who  rushed  to  prey  upon  British  commerce. 
Upwards  of  two  hundred  British  vessels  were 
captured,  while  all  but  about  seventy  Ameri 
can  ships  reached  home  safely.  The  British 
sent  squadrons  of  cruisers,  but  were  unable  to 
begin  a  blockade.  Their  aim  was  to  capture 
American  men-of-war  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
to  prevent  their  doing  damage,  so  they  un 
hesitatingly  attacked  American  vessels  when 
ever  they  met  them,  regardless  of  slight  dif 
ferences  in  size  or  gun  power.  The  British 
sea-captain  of  the  day  had  a  hearty  contempt 
for  Americans,  and  never  dreamed  that  their 
navy  could  be  any  more  dangerous  than  the 
French.  To  the  unlimited  delight  of  the 
American  public,  and  the  stupefaction  of  all 
England,  five  American  cruisers  in  succes 
sion  captured  or  sank  five  British  in  the 
autumn  of  1812,  utilizing  superior  weight 
of  broadside  and  more  accurate  gunnery  with 
merciless  severity.  These  blows  did  no 
actual  damage  to  a  navy  which  comprised 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS"    223 

several  hundred  frigates  and  sloops,  but  the 
moral  effect  was  tremendous.  It  had  been 
proved  that  Americans,  after  all,  could  fight. 

In  1813  there  was  a  change  in  administra 
tive  officers.  Doctor  Eustis  was  replaced  in 
the  War  Department  by  John  Armstrong,  who 
had  served  in  the  Revolution,  and  William 
Jones  of  Philadelphia  succeeded  Paul  Hamil 
ton  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  Congress  au 
thorized  more  men,  to  the  number  of  58,000, 
and  more  ships,  and  voted  more  loans.  Fi 
nally,  in  the  summer  it  actually  was  driven  to 
impose  internal  taxes  like  those  which,  when 
laid  by  Federalists,  had  savored  of  tyranny. 

On  the  northern  frontier  renewed  efforts 
were  made  to  collect  a  real  army,  and,  with 
late  comprehension  of  the  necessities  of  the 
case,  naval  officers  were  sent  to  build  flotillas 
to  control  Erie,  Ontario  and  Champlain. 
On  their  part  the  British  ministry  sent  out 
a  few  more  troops  and  officers  to  Canada,  but 
relied  this  year  chiefly  upon  a  strict  blockade, 
which  was  proclaimed  first  in  December,  1812, 
and  was  extended,  before  the  end  of  the  year, 
to  cover  the  entire  coast,  except  New  Eng 
land.  Ships  of  the  line,  frigates  and  sloops 
patrolled  the  entrances  to  all  the  seaports, 
terminating  not  only  foreign  but  all  coast 
wise  commerce. 

Things  went  little  if  any  better  for  the 
United  States.  The  army  was  on  paper 


224    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

58,000,  but  the  people  of  the  north  and  west 
simply  would  not  enlist.  The  utmost  efforts 
at  recruiting  did  not  succeed  in  bringing  one- 
half  the  nominal  force  into  the  field.  The 
people  would  not  take  the  war  seriously  and 
the  administration  was  helpless.  To  make 
matters  worse,  not  only  did  the  northwest 
ern  frontier  agonize  under  Indian  warfare, 
but  the  southwest  became  involved,  when 
in  August,  1813,  the  Creek  Indians,  affected 
by  Tecumseh's  influence,  rose  and  began  a 
war  in  Tennessee  and  Georgia.  For  months 
Andrew  Jackson,  General  of  Tennessee  mil 
itia,  with  other  local  commanders,  carried  on 
an  exhausting  and  murderous  conflict  in  the 
swamps  and  woods  of  the  southwest.  The 
war  was  now  assuming  the  character  of  the 
last  stand  of  the  Indians  before  the  oncoming 
whites. 

In  the  northwest  decisive  blows  were  struck 
in  this  year  by  General  Harrison  and  Com 
mander  Perry.  The  latter  built  a  small  fleet 
of  boats,  carrying  in  all  fifty-four  guns,  and 
sailed  out  to  contest  the  control  of  Lake 
Erie.  Captain  Barclay,  the  British  com 
mander,  with  scantier  resources,  constructed 
a  weaker  fleet,  with  sixty-three  lighter  guns, 
and  gallantly  awaited  the  Americans  on  Sep 
tember  9.  In  a  desperately  fought  battle, 
Perry's  sloop,  the  Lawrence,  was  practically 
destroyed  by  the  concentrated  fire  of  the 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS5  RIGHTS'* 

British,  but  the  greater  gun  power  of  the 
Americans  told,  and  the  entire  British  flotilla 
was  compelled  to  surrender.  This  enabled 
Harrison,  who  had  been  waiting  for  months 
in  his  fortifications,  to  advance  and  pursue 
Proctor  into  upper  Canada.  On  October  5 
he  brought  him  to  action  near  the  river 
Thames,  winning  a  complete  .victory  and  kill 
ing  Tecumseh.  The  Americans  then  re 
turned  to  Detroit,  and  the  Indian  war  grad 
ually  simmered  down,  until  in  August,  1814, 
the  leading  tribes  made  peace.  To  the  east 
ward  no  such  decisive  action  took  place.  Sir 
James  Yeo  and  Commodore  Chauncey, 
commanding  the  British  and  American  ves 
sels  respectively  on  Lake  Ontario,  were  each 
unwilling  to  risk  a  battle  without  a  decisive 
superiority,  and  the  result  was  that  no  serious 
engagement  occurred.  This  rendered  it  im 
possible  for  either  side  to  attain  any  military 
success  in  that  region,  and  so  the  year  1813 
records  only  a  succession  of  raids,  a  species 
of  activity  in  which  the  British  proved  much 
the  more  daring  and  efficient.  During  one 
of  these  affairs  General  Dearborn  occupied 
the  Canadian  town  of  York,  now  Toronto, 
and  burned  the  public  buildings, — an  act  of 
needless  destruction,  for  which  the  United 
States  was  destined  to  pay  heavily.  Further 
eastward  General  Wilkinson  and  General 
Hampton  began  a  joint  invasion  of  lower 


£26    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

Canada,  Wilkinson  leading  a  force  of  over 
6000  down  the  St.  Lawrence,  Hampton  ad 
vancing  with  4000  from  Lake  Champlain 
toward  the  same  goal,  Montreal.  But  at 
Chrystler's  Farm,  on  November  11,  the 
rearguard  of  Wilkinson's  army  suffered  a 
thorough  defeat  at  the  hands  of  a  small 
pursuing  force,  and  Hampton  underwent  a 
similar  repulse  from  an  inferior  body  of 
French-Canadians  under  Colonel  de  Sala- 
berry,  'at  Chateauguy,  on  October  25. 
Finally  Hampton,  suspecting  that  Armstrong 
and  Wilkinson  intended  in  case  of  any 
failure  to  throw  the  blame  on  him,  decided 
to  withdraw,  November  11,  and  Wilkinson 
followed.  The  whole  invasion  came  to  an 
inglorious  conclusion. 

At  sea  the  uniform  success  of  American 
cruisers  came  to  a  stop,  for,  out  of  four  naval 
duels,  two  were  British  victories,  notably 
the  taking  of  the  unlucky  Chesapeake  by  the 
Shannon.  Only  where  privateers  and  sloops 
swept  West  Indian  waters  and  hung  about 
British  convoys  was  there  much  to  satisfy 
American  feelings,  and  all  the  while  the 
blockading  squadrons  cruised  at  their  ease 
in  Chesapeake  and  Delaware  bays  and  Long 
Island  Sound.  The  country  was  now  sub 
jected  to  increasing  distress  from  the  stop 
page  of  all  commerce,  for  not  only  was  the 
federal  government  sorely  pinched  from 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS"    227 

loss  of  tariff  revenue,  but  the  New  England 
towns  suffered  from  starvation  prices  for 
food  products,  while  in  the  middle  and  south 
ern  states  grain  was  fed  to  cattle  or  allowed 
to  rot. 

For  the  season  of  1814  it  was  necessary 
again  to  try  to  build  up  armies,  and  now  the 
time  was  growing  short  during  which  the 
United  States  could  hope  to  draw  advantage 
from  the  preoccupation  of  England  in  the 
European  struggle.  During  the  winter  of 
1814  the  final  crushing  of  Napoleon  took 
place,  ending  with  his  abdication  and  the 
restoration  of  the  Bourbons.  Simultaneously 
the  British  campaign  in  Spain  was  carried 
to  its  triumphant  conclusion,  and  after  April 
English  armies  had  no  further  European  oc 
cupation.  Unless  peace  were  made,  or  unless 
the  United  States  gained  such  advantages 
in  Canada  as  to  render  the  British  ready  to 
treat,  it  was  practically  certain  that  the 
summer  would  find  the  full  power  of  the 
British  army,  as  well  as  the  navy,  in  a  posi 
tion  to  be  directed  against  the  American 
frontier  and  the  American  seacoast. 

Congress,  however,  did  nothing  new.  It 
authorized  a  loan,  raised  the  bounty  for 
enlistments,  voted  a  further  increase  of  the 
army  and  adjourned.  Armstrong,  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  succeeded  in  replacing  the  worn- 
out  veterans  who  had  mismanaged  the  cam- 


ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

fmigns  of  1812-1813  with  fighting  generals, 
younger  men,  such  as  Jacob  Brown,  Scott, 
Ripley  and  Jackson,  the  Indian  fighter;  but 
he  could  not  induce  men  to  enlist  any  more 
freely,  nor  did  he  show  any  ability  in  plan 
ning  operations.  So  events  dragged  on 
much  as  before. 

On  Lake  Ontario  Chauncey  and  Yeo  con 
tinued  their  cautious  policy,  building  vessels 
continually  and  never  venturing  out  of  port 
unless  for  the  moment  in  overwhelming  force. 
The  result  was  that  first  one  then  the  other 
controlled  the  lake;  but  they  never  met. 
The  only  serious  fighting  took  place  near 
Niagara,  where  General  Brown,  with  a  little 
force  of  2600  men,  tried  to  invade  Canada, 
and  was  met  first  by  General  Riall,  and  later 
by  General  Drummond,  with  practically 
equal  forces.  Here  the  Americans  actually 
fought,  and  fought  hard,  winning  a  slight 
success  at  Chippawa  on  July  5,  and  engaging 
in  a  drawn  battle  at  Lundy's  Lane  on  July  25. 
Later  forced  to  take  refuge  in  Fort  Erie, 
Brown  made  a  successful  defence  against 
Drummond  and  obliged  him  to  abandon  an 
effort  at  siege.  Here,  as  in  the  naval  com 
bats,  the  military  showing  of  the  Americans 
was  at  last  creditable,  but  the  campaign  was 
on  too  trivial  a  scale  to  produce  any  results. 
In  the  southwest  this  year  Jackson  pushed 
through  his  attack  on  the  Creeks  to  a  trium- 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS"    229 

phant  conclusion,  and  in  spite  of  mutinous 
militia  and  difficult  forests  compelled  the 
Indians  on  August  9,  1814,  to  purchase  peace 
by  large  cessions  of  land. 

By  the  middle  of  the  summer,  however,  the 
British  were  ready  to  lay  a  heavy  hand  on 
the  United  States  and  punish  the  insolent 
country  for  its  annoying  attack  in  the  rear. 
New  England  was  now  subjected  to  the 
blockade,  and  troops  from  Wellington's  ir 
resistible  army  were  sent  across,  some  to  the 
squadron  in  the  Chesapeake,  others  to 
Canada,  and  later  still  others  in  a  well- 
equipped  expedition  to  New  Orleans  to  con 
quer  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi. 

The  Chesapeake  squadron  after  raiding 
and  provisioning  itself  at  i:he  expense  of  the 
Virginia  and  Maryland  farmers,  made  a  dash 
at  Washington,  sending  boats  up  the  Patux- 
ent  and  Potomac  rivers  and  landing  a  body 
of  about  2000  men.  On  August  24,  with  ab 
surd  ease,  this  force  scattered  in  swift  panic 
a  hasty  collection  of  militia  and  entered 
Washington,  sending  the  President  and 
cabinet  flying  into  the  country.  In  retalia 
tion  for  the  damage  done  at  York,  the  British 
officers  set  fire  to  the  capitol  and  other  public 
buildings,  before  retreating  swiftly  to  their 
ships.  A  similar  attack  on  Baltimore,  Septem 
ber  11,  was  better  met,  and  although  the 
British  routed  a  force  of  militia  the  attempt 


230    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

to  take  the  city  was  abandoned.  But  the 
humiliation  of  the  capture  of  Washington  led 
to  the  downfall  of  Armstrong  as  Secretary 
of  State,  although  not  until  after  he  had 
almost  ruined  another  campaign. 

While  the  British  were  threatening  Wash 
ington,  another  force  was  gathering  north  of 
Lake  Champlain,  and  a  large  frigate  was  be 
ing  built  to  secure  command  of  that  lake. 
By  the  end  of  August  nearly  16,000  men, 
most  of  them  from  Wellington's  regiments, 
were  assembled  to  invade  New  York,  prob 
ably  with  the  intention  of  securing  the  per 
manent  occupation  of  the  northern  part.  In 
the  face  of  this,  Armstrong  sent  most  of  the 
American  troops  at  Plattsburg  on  a  useless 
march  across  New  York  state,  leaving  a  bare 
handful  under  General  McComb  to  meet 
the  invasion.  When  Sir  George  Prevost, 
Governor-general  of  Canada,  advanced  to 
Plattsburg  on  September  6,  he  found  noth 
ing  but  militia  and  volunteers  before  him. 
Fortunately  for  the  United  States,  Prevost 
was  no  fighter,  and  he  declined  to  advance 
or  attack  unless  he  had  a  naval  control  of 
the  lake.  On  September  11  the  decisive 
contest  took  place.  McDonough,  the  Ameri 
can  commander,  with  a  small  squadron, 
entirely  defeated  and  captured  the  British 
flotilla  under  Downie.  It  was  Lake  Erie 
over  again,  with  the  difference  that  in  this 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS"    231 

battle  the  American  fleet  was  not  superior  to 
the  British.  It  was  a  victory  due  to  better 
planning  and  better  gunnery,  and  it  led  to  the 
immediate  retreat  of  Prevost,  who  tamely 
abandoned  the  whole  campaign,  to  the 
intense  mortification  of  his  officers  and  men. 
The  remaining  expedition,  under  General 
Pakenham,  comprising  16,000  Peninsular 
veterans,  under  convoy  of  a  strong  fleet, 
sailed  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  advanced 
to  capture  New  Orleans.  General  Andrew 
Jackson  was  at  hand,  and  with  him  a  mass  of 
militia  and  frontiersmen.  Driven  by  the 
furious  energy  of  the  Indian  fighter,  the 
Americans  showed  aggressiveness  and  cour 
age  in  skirmishes  and  night  attacks,  and 
finally  won  an  astounding  victory  on  Janu 
ary  8,  1815.  On  that  day  the  British  force 
tried  to  storm,  by  frontal  attack,  a  line  of  in- 
trenchments  armed  with  cannon  and  packed 
with  riflemen.  In  twenty-five  minutes  their 
columns  were  so  badly  cut  up  by  grapeshot 
and  musketry  that  the  whole  attack  was 
abandoned,  after  Pakenham  himself  had 
been  killed.  The  expedition  withdrew  and 
sailing  to  Mobile,  a  town  in  Spanish  territory, 
occupied  by  the  Americans,  retook  it  on 
February  11;  but  the  main  purpose  of  their 
invasion  was  foiled. 

In  this  year,  while  American  land  forces 
struggled  to  escape  destruction,  the  naval 


ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

vessels  were  for  the  most  part  shut  in  by  the 
blockade.  Occasional  captures  were  still 
made  in  single  combat,  but  British  frigates 
were  now  under  orders  to  refuse  battle  with 
the  larger  American  vessels,  and  the  captures 
by  sloops  were  counterbalanced  by  the 
British  capture  of  the  frigate  Essex  by  two 
antagonists  in  March,  1814.  Practically  the 
only  extensive  operations  carried  on  were  by 
American  privateers,  who  now  haunted  the 
British  Channel  and  captured  merchantmen 
within  sight  of  the  English  coasts.  The 
irritation  caused  by  these  privateers  was  ex 
cessive,  and  made  British  shipowners  and 
merchants  anxious  for  peace,  but  it  had  no 
effect  on  the  military  situation.  England 
was  not  to  be  subdued  by  mere  annoyance. 
Now,  by  the  end  of  1814,  the  time  seemed 
to  be  at  hand  when  the  United  States  must 
submit  to  peace  on  such  terms  as  England 
chose  to  dictate,  or  risk  disruption  and  ruin. 
The  administrative  weaknesses  of  the  coun 
try  culminated  in  actual  financial  bankruptcy, 
which  was  due  in  no  small  part  to  the  fact 
that  Federalist  financiers  and  bankers,  de 
termining  to  do  all  the  damage  possible, 
steadily  refused  to  subscribe  to  the  loans  or 
to  give  any  assistance.  The  powerful  New 
England  capital  was  entirely  withheld.  The 
result  was  that  the  strain  on  the  rest  of  the 
banks  became  too  great,  and  after  the  cap- 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS"    233 

ture  of  Washington  they  all  suspended 
specie  payment,  leaving  the  government  only 
the  notes  of  suspended  banks,  or  its  own  de 
preciated  treasury  notes  for  currency.  All 
the  coin  in  the  country  steadily  flowed  into 
the  vaults  of  New  England  banks  while  the 
federal  treasury  was  compelled,  on  Novem 
ber  9,  1814,  to  admit  its  inability  to  pay  in 
terest  on  its  loans.  Congress  met  in  the 
autumn  and  endeavored  to  remedy  the  situ 
ation  by  chartering  a  bank,  but  under  the 
general  suspension  of  specie  payments  it  was 
impossible  to  start  one  solvent  from  the  be 
ginning.  When  Congress  authorized  one 
without  power  to  suspend  specie  payments, 
Madison  vetoed  it  as  useless.  All  that  could 
be  done  was  to  issue  more  treasury  notes. 
As  for  the  army,  a  bill  for  compulsory  service 
was  brought  in,  showing  the  enormous  change 
in  Republican  ideals;  but  it  failed  to  pass. 
Congress  seemed  helpless.  The  American 
people  would  neither  enlist  for  the  war  nor 
authorize  their  representatives  to  pass  gen 
uine  war  measures. 

And  now  the  Federalists,  controlling  most 
of  the  New  England  states,  felt  that  the  time 
had  come  to  insist  on  a  termination  of  their 
grievances.  Their  governors  had  refused  to 
allow  militia  to  assist,  their  legislatures  had 
done  nothing  to  aid  the  war;  their  capitalists 
had  declined  to  subscribe,  and  their  farmers 


234    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

habitually  sold  provisions  to  the  British 
over  the  Canadian  boundary,  actually  sup 
plying  Sir  George  Prevost's  army  by  con 
tract.  Now  there  met,  at  Hartford,  on 
December  14,  1814,  a  convention  of  leading 
men,  officially  or  unofficially  representing 
the  five  New  England  states,  who  agreed 
upon  a  document  which  was  intended  to 
secure  the  special  rights  of  their  section. 
They  demanded  amendments  to  the  con 
stitution  doing  away  with  reckoning  slaves 
as  basis  for  congressional  representation, 
providing  for  the  partial  distribution  of 
government  revenues  among  the  states, 
prohibiting  embargoes  or  commercial  war 
fare,  or  the  election  of  successive  presi 
dents  from  the  same  state,  and  requiring  a 
two-thirds  vote  of  Congress  to  admit  new 
states  or  declare  war.  This  was  meant  for  an 
ultimatum,  and  it  was  generally  understood 
that  if  the  federal  government  did  not  sub 
mit  to  these  terms  the  New  England  states 
would  secede  to  rid  themselves  of  what  they 
considered  the  intolerable  oppression  of  Vir 
ginian  misgovernment. 

Such  was  the  state  of  things  in  the  win 
ter  of  1815.  The  administration  of  Madi 
son  had  utterly  failed  to  secure  any  of  the 
ends  of  the  war,  to  inflict  punishment  on 
Great  Britain  or  to  conquer  Canada.  It 
had  also  utterly  failed  to  maintain  financial 


WAR  FOR  "SAILORS'  RIGHTS "    235 

solvency,  to  enlist  an  army,  to  create  a  navy 
capable  of  keeping  the  sea,  or  to  prevent  a 
movement  in  New  England  which  seemed  to 
be  on  the  verge  of  breaking  the  country  into 
pieces.  But  to  lay  this  miserable  failure, — 
for  such  only  can  it  be  called, — to  the  per 
sonal  discredit  of  Jefferson  and  Madison  is 
unfair,  for  it  was  only  the  repetition  under 
new  governmental  conditions  of  the  old 
traditional  colonial  method  of  carrying  on 
war  as  a  local  matter.  The  French  and  In 
dian  War,  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of 
1812,  repeated  in  different  generations  the 
same  tale  of  amateur  warfare;  of  the  occa 
sional  success  and  usual  worthlessness  of  the 
militia,  the  same  administrative  inefficiency 
and  the  same  financial  breakdown.  Without 
authority  and  obedience  there  can  be  carried 
on  no  real  war,  and  authority  and  obedience 
were  no  more  known  and  no  better  appre 
ciated  in  1812  than  they  had  been  in  the 
days  of  Washington.  Jefferson,  Madison 
and  their  party  had  gone  with  the  current  of 
American  tradition;  that  was  their  only 
fault. 


236    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 
CHAPTER  XII 

THE  END  OF  THE  YEARS  OF  ANTAGONISM, 

1812-1815 

WHEN  the  American  war  began  the  English 
showed  a  tendency  to  blame  the  Tory  ad 
ministration  for  permitting  it  to  take  place, 
but  the  chief  feeling,  after  all,  was  one  of 
annoyance  at  Madison  and  his  party  for 
having  decided  to  give  their  assistance  to 
Napoleon  at  the  crisis  of  his  career.  The 
intercourse  between  Englishmen  and  New 
England  Federalists  had  given  English  society 
its  understanding  of  American  politics  and 
colored  its  natural  irritation  toward  the  Re 
publican  administration  with  something  of 
the  deeper  venom  of  the  outraged  New  Eng- 
landers,  who  saw  in  Jefferson  and  his  succes 
sors  a  race  of  half -Jacobins.  During  1812 
and  1813,  accordingly,  newspapers  and  min 
isterial  speakers,  when  they  referred  to  the 
contest,  generally  spoke  of  the  necessity  of 
chastising  an  impudent  and  presumptuous 
antagonist.  A  friendly  party  such  as  had 
defended  the  colonists  during  the  Revolution 
no  longer  existed,  for  the  Whigs,  however 
antagonistic  to  the  Liverpool  ministry,  were 
fully  as  firmly  committed  to  maintaining 
British  naval  and  commercial  supremacy. 

England's  chief  continental  ally,  however, 


END  OF  THE  ANTAGONISM      237 

the  Czar  Alexander,  considered  the  American 
war  an  unfortunate  blunder,  and,  as  early  as 
September,  1812,  he  offered  his  mediation 
through  young  John  Quincy  Adams,  min 
ister  at  St.  Petersburg.  The  news  reached 
America  in  March,  1813,  and  Madison 
revealed  his  willingness  to  withdraw  from  a 
contest,  already  shown  to  be  unprofitable, 
by  immediately  accepting  and  nominating 
Adams/jwith  Bayard  and  Gallatin,  to  serve  as 
peace  commissioners.  Without  waiting  to 
hear  from  England,  these  envoys  started  for 
Russia,  but  reached  there  only  to  meet  an 
official  refusal  on  the  part  of  England,  dated 
July  5,  1813.  The  Liverpool  ministry  did 
notiwish  to  have  the  American  war  brought 
within  the  range  of  European  consideration, 
since  its  settlement  under  such  circumstances 
might  raise  questions  of  neutral  rights  which 
would  be  safer  out  of  the  hands  of  a  Czar 
whose  [predecessors  had  framed  armed  neu 
tralities  in  1780  and  1801.  Accordingly  the 
British  government  intimated  politely  that 
it  would  be  willing  to  deal  directly  with  the 
United  States,  and  thus  waved  the  unwel 
come  Russian  mediation  aside.  Madison 
accepted  this  offer  in  March,  1814,  but  al 
though  the  American  commissioners  endeav 
ored  through  Alexander  Baring,  their  friend 
and  defender  in  Parliament,  to  get  the 
British  government  to  appoint  a  time  and 


238    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

place  for  meeting,  they  encountered  con 
tinued  delays. 

A  considerable  element  in  the  Tory  party 
felt  that  the  time  had  come  to  inflict  a  severe 
punishment  upon  the  United  States,  and 
newspapers  and  speakers  of  that  connection 
announced  freely  that  only  by  large  conces 
sions  of  territory  could  the  contemptible 
republic  purchase  peace.  When  the  ministry 
finally  sent  commissioners  to  Ghent,  August 
8,  1814,  it  was  not  with  any  expectation  of 
coming  to  a  prompt  agreement,  but  merely 
to  "amuse"  the  Americans  while  the  various 
expeditions  then  under  way  took  Washing 
ton  and  Baltimore,  occupied  northern  New 
York  and  captured  New  Orleans.  It  was 
generally  expected  that  a  few  months  would 
find  large  portions  of  the  United  States  in 
British  possession,  as  was  in  fact  the  sea- 
coast  of  Maine,  east  of  Penobscot  Bay,  after 
September  first. 

The  instructions  to  the  British  peace 
commissioners  were  based  on  the  uti  pos- 
sedetis,  as  the  British  government  intended  it 
to  be  by  the  end  of  the  year,  when  they  ex 
pected  to  hold  half  of  Maine,  the  northern 
parts  of  New  York,  New  Hampshire  and 
Vermont,  the  northwestern  post  of  Mackin- 
nac,  and  possibly  New  Orleans  and  Mobile. 
In  addition  there  was  to  be  an  Indian  terri 
tory  established  under  British  guarantee 


END  OF  THE  ANTAGONISM      239 

west  of  the  old  treaty  line  of  1795,  and  all 
American  fishing  rights  were  to  be  termi 
nated.  On  the  other  side,  the  American  in 
structions,  while  hinting  that  England  would 
do  well  to  cede  Canada,  made  the  abandon 
ment  of  the  alleged  right  of  impressments  by 
England  a  sine  qua  non.  Clearly  no  agree 
ment  between  such  points  of  view  was  pos 
sible,  and  the  outcome  of  the  negotiation  was 
bound  to  depend  on  the  course  of  events  in 
the  United  States.  The  first  interviews  re 
sulted  in  revealing  that  part  of  the  British  in 
structions  related  to  the  Indian  territory  with 
intimations  of  coming  demands  for  territorial 
cessions.  This  the  Americans  instantly  re 
jected  on  August  25,  and  the  negotiation 
came  to  a  standstill  for  several  weeks. 

The  three  British  negotiators,  Admiral 
Gambier,  Henry  Goulburn  and  Doctor  Adams 
were  men  of  slight  political  or  personal  au 
thority,  and  their  part  consisted  chiefly  in 
repeating  their  instructions  and  referring 
American  replies  back  to  Lord  Castlereagh, 
the  foreign  secretary,  or  to  Lord  Bathurst, 
who  acted  as  his  substitute  while  he  attended 
the  Congress  of  Vienna.  The  American  com 
missioners,  including  the  three  original  ones, 
Adams,  Bayard  and  Gallatin,  to  whom  Clay 
and  Russell  of  Massachusetts  were  now  added, 
clearly  understood  the  situation,  and  had^ 
already  warned  Madison  that  an  insistence\. 

^ >i 


240    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

on  the  abandonment  of  impressments  would 
result  in  the  failure  to  secure  any  treaty. 
In  October,  1814,  a  despatch  yielded  this 
point  and  left  the  negotiators  to  make  the 
best  fight  they  could,  unhampered  by  posi 
tive  instructions.  Undoubtedly  they  would 
have  been  compelled  to  submit  to  hard  terms, 
in  spite  of  their  personal  ability,  which  stood 
exceedingly  high,  had  not  news  of  the  repulse 
at  Baltimore,  of  the  treaty  of  July,  1814,  by 
which  the  northwestern  Indians  agreed  to 
fight  the  English,  and,  on  October  17,  of  the 
retreat  of  Sir  George  Prevost  after  the  defeat 
of  Plattsburg,  come  in  to  change  the  situation. 
Between  August  and  October  little  had 
been  accomplished,  during  a  slow  interchange 
of  notes,  beyond  a  withdrawal  by  the  British 
of  their  demand  for  an  Indian  territory  and 
an  acceptance,  in  its  place,  of  an  agreement 
to  include  the  Indians  in  a  general  peace. 
Then  the  cabinet,  seeing  that  after  Prevost's 
retreat  they  could  no  longer  claim  the  terri 
tory  outlined  in  the  first  instructions,  au 
thorized  the  negotiators  to  demand  only 
Mackinac  and  Niagara,  with  a  right  of  way 
across  Maine.  But  to  this  the  Americans, 
encouraged  by  the  news  from  Plattsburg,  re 
plied  on  October  23,  refusing  to  treat  on  the 
uti  possedetis,  or  on  any  terms  but  the  status 
quo  ante.  This  brought  the  Tory  govern 
ment  face  to  face  with  the  question  whether 


END  OF  THE  ANTAGONISM 

the  war  was  to  be  continued  another  year 
for  the  purpose  of  conquering  a  frontier  for 
Canada;  and  before  the  prospect  of  con 
tinued  war  taxation,  annoyance  from  priva 
teers  and  a  doubtful  outcome,  they  hesitated. 
Turning  to  Wellington  for  a  decision,  they 
asked  him  whether  he  would  accept  the 
command  in  America  for  the  purpose  of 
conquering  a  peace.  His  reply  showed  little 
interest  or  desire  to  go,  although  he  seemed 
confident  of  success;  but  he  observed  that,  on 
the  basis  of  the  military  situation,  they  had 
no  right  to  demand  any  territorial  cessions. 

The  ministry  then,  November  18,  definitely 
abandoned  the  claim  for  compensation  and 
accepted  as  a  basis  for  discussion  a  plan  sub 
mitted  by  the  American  commissioners. 
In  the  preparation  of  this  a  sharp  quarrel  had 
broken  out  between  Clay,  who  insisted  on 
terminating  the  British  right  to  navigate  the 
Mississippi,  and  Adams,  who  demanded  the 
retention  of  the  American  right  to  fish  in 
Canadian  waters.  Gallatin  pointed  out  that 
the  two  privileges  stood  together,  and  with 
great  difficulty  he  induced  the  two  men  to 
agree  to  the  omission  of  both  matters  from 
the  treaty,  although  Clay  refused  until  the 
last  to  sign.  So  the  commission  presented  a 
united  front  in  offering  to  renew  both  rights 
or  postpone  them  for  discussion,  and  the 
British  commissioners  finally  accepted  the 


242    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

last  alternative.  The  treaty  was  then  signed, 
December  24,  1814,  as  a  simple  cessation  of 
hostilities.  Not  a  word  related  to  any  of 
the  numerous  causes  of  the  war.  Impress 
ments,  blockades,  orders  in  council,  the  In 
dian  relations,  the  West  Indian  trade  rights, 
— all  were  abandoned.  So  far  as  the  United 
States  was  concerned  the  treaty  was  an 
acknowledgment  of  defeat,  a  recognition 
that  the  war  was  a  failure. 

In  view  of  the  hopes  of  Canadian  gains  the 
treaty  was  denounced  in  England  by  the  op 
position  journals  and  many  of  those  most  an 
tagonistic  to  America  as  a  cowardly  surrender. 
But  it  was  none  the  less  heartily  accepted 
by  both  peoples  and  both  governments.  It 
reached  the  United  States  February  11,  was 
sent  to  the  Senate  on  February  "  5,  and  rati 
fied  unanimously  the  next  day.  There  still 
remained  various  vessels  at  sea,  and  so  the 
winter  of  1815  saw  not  only  the  amazing 
victory  of  Jackson  at  New  Orleans,  but  also 
several  naval  actions,  in  which  the  United 
States  frigate  President  was  taken  by  a 
squadron  of  British  blockaders,  two  Ameri 
can  sloops  in  duels  took  two  British  smaller 
vessels,  and  the  American  Constitution,  in 
a  night  action,  captured,  together,  two  Brit 
ish  sloops.  Then  the  news  spread,  and  peace 
finally  arrived  in  fact. 

In  England  the  whole  affair  was  quickly 


END  OF  THE  ANTAGONISM      243 

forgotten  in  the  tremendous  excitement 
caused  by  the  return  of  Napoleon  from  Elba, 
the  uprising  of  Europe  and  the  dramatic 
meeting  of  the  two  great  captains,  Welling 
ton  and  Napoleon,  in  the  Waterloo  campaign. 
By  the  time  that  the  Empire  had  finally  col 
lapsed,  the  story  of  the  American  war  with 
its  maritime  losses  and  scanty  land  triumphs 
was  an  old  one,  and  the  British  exporters, 
rushing  to  regain  their  former  markets,  were 
happy  in  the  prospect  of  the  reopening  of 
American  ports.  By  October  trade  relations 
were  reestablished  and  the  solid  intercourse 
of  the  two  countries  was  under  way. 

In  America  all  disgraces  and  defeats  were 
forgotten  in  the  memories  of  New  Orleans, 
Plattsburg  and  Chippawa,  and  the  people  at 
large,  willing  to  forgive  all  its  failures  to  the 
Republican  administration,  resumed  with 
entire  contentment  the  occupations  of  peace. 
The  war  fabric  melted  like  a  cloud,  armies 
were  disbanded,  vessels  were  called  home, 
credit  rose,  prices  sprang  upward,  importa 
tions  swelled,  exportation  began. 

In  truth,  the  time  of  antagonism  was  at 
an  end,  for  with  the  European  peace  of  1814 
the  immediate  cause  for  irritation  was  re 
moved,  never  to  return.  The  whole  struc 
ture  of  blockades,  orders  in  council,  seizures 
and  restrictions  upon  neutrals  vanished; 
the  necessity  for  British  impressments  ceased 


244    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

to  exist;  and,  since  France  never  again  came 
into  hostility  with  England,  none  of  these 
grievances  was  revived.  But  in  a  broader 
way  the  year  1815  and  the  decades  following 
marked  the  end  of  national  hostility,  for  the 
fundamental  antagonisms  which,  since  1763, 
had  repeatedly  brought  about  irritation  and 
conflict,  began  after  this  time  to  die  out. 

In  the  first  place  the  defeat  of  the  Indians 
in  the  war  allowed  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  advance  unchecked  into  the  north 
west  and  southwest,  filling]  the  old  Indian 
lands  and  rendering  any  continuation  of  the 
restrictive  diplomacy  on  the  part  of  England 
for  the  benefit  of  Canadian  fur  traders 
patently  futile.  The  war  was  no  sooner 
ended  than  roads,  trails  and  rivers  swarmed 
with  westward-moving  emigrants,  and  within 
a  year  the  territory  of  Indiana,  which  the 
British  commissioners  at  Ghent  had  wished 
to  establish  as  an  Indian  reserve,  was  fram 
ing  a  state  constitution.  In  1819  Illinois 
followed.  As  though  to  recognize  the  end  of 
this  rivalry,  Great  Britain  agreed  in  1818  to 
a  convention  by  which  the  naval  force  on  the 
Great  Lakes  was  limited  to  one  small  gun 
boat  of  each  power  on  Champlain  and  On 
tario,  and  two  on  the  upper  lakes,  an  arrange 
ment  of  immense  value  to  both  Canada  and 
the  United  States. 

Still  more  important,  the  old-time  com- 


END  OF  THE  ANTAGONISM      245 

mercial  antagonism  was  destined  to  disap 
pear  in  a  few  years  after  the  close  of  the 
war.  At  first  England  clung  to  the  time- 
honored  West  Indian  policy,  and,  when  in 
1815  the  two  countries  adjusted  their  com 
mercial  relations,  American  vessels  were  still 
excluded,  although  given  the  right  to  trade 
directly  with  the  East  Indies.  But  already 
the  new  economic  thought,  which  regarded 
competition  and  reciprocal  trade  as  the  ideal, 
instead  of  legal  discriminations  and  universal 
protectionism,  was  gaining  ground,  as  Eng 
land  became  more  and  more  the  manufactur 
ing  centre  of  the  world.  Under  Huskisson, 
in  1825,  reciprocity  was  definitely  substituted 
for  exclusion,  and  a  few  years  later,  under  Peel 
and  Russell,  and  within  the  lifetime  of  men 
who  had  maintained  the  Orders  in  Council, 
the  whole  elaborate  system  of  laws  backed 
by  the  logic  of  Lord  Sheffield  and  James 
Stephen  was  cast  away  and  fell  into  for 
gotten  disrepute.  Thus  ended  the  possibility 
of  further  commercial  antagonism. 

In  America,  it  should  be  added,  the  rush 
of  settlers  into  the  West  and  the  starting  of 
manufactures  served,  within  a  few  years 
from  the  end  of  the  War  of  1812,  to  alter 
largely  the  former  dependence  of  the  United 
States  upon  foreign  commerce.  By  the  time 
that  England  was  ready  to  abandon  its  re 
strictive  policy,  the  United  States  was  be- 


246    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

ginning  to  be  a  manufacturing  nation  with 
its  chief  wealth  in  its  great  internal  trade, 
and  the  ancient  interest  in  the  West  Indies 
was  fast  falling  into  insignificance.  The 
same  men  who  raged  against  the  Jay  treaty 
and  the  Orders  in  Council  lived  to  forget  that 
they  had  ever  considered  the  West  India 
trade  important.  So  on  both  sides  the  end  of 
commercial  antagonism  was  soon  to  follow 
on  the  Treaty  of  Ghent. 

Finally,  and  more  slowly,  the  original 
political  and  social  antagonism  ceased  to  be 
active,  and  ultimately  died  out.  So  far  as 
the  United  States  was  concerned,  the  change 
wa3  scarcely  visible  until  three-quarters  of  a 
century  after  the  Treaty  of  Ghent.  The 
temper  of  the  American  people,  formed  by 
Revolutionary  traditions  and  nourished  on 
memories  of  battles  and  injuries,  remained 
steadily  antagonistic  toward  England,  and 
the  triumph  of  western  social  ideals  served  to 
emphasize  the  distinction  between  the  Ameri 
can  democrat  and  the  British  aristocrat, 
until  dislike  became  a  tradition  and  a  politi 
cal  and  literary  convention.  But  the  empti 
ness  of  this  nominal  national  hatred  of  John 
Bull  was  shown  in  1898,  when,  at  the  first 
distinct  sign  of  friendliness  on  the  part  of  the 
British  government  and  people,  the  whole 
American  anglophobia  vanished  and  the 
people  of  the  continent  realized  that  the  time 


END  OF  THE  ANTAGONISM      247 

had  come  for  a  recognition  of  the  essential 
and  normal  harmony  of  the  ancient  enemies. 
In  England  the  change  began  somewhat 
earlier,  for  within  less  than  a  generation 
after  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  the  exclusive  Tory 
control  collapsed,  and  the  Revolution  of  1832 
gave  the  middle  classes  a  share  of  political 
power.  A  few  years  later  the  radicals,  rep 
resenting  the  workingmen,  became  a  dis 
tinct  force  in  Parliament,  and  to  middle  class 
and  radicals  there  was  nothing  abhorrent 
in  the  American  Republic.  Aristocratic 
society  continued  of  course,  as  in  the  eight 
eenth  century,  to  regard  the  United  States 
with  scant  respect,  and  those  members  of 
the  upper  middle  classes  who  took  their 
social  tone  fron  the  aristocracy  commonly 
reflected  their  prejudices.  But  the  lower 
elements  in  England, — men  whose  relatives 
emigrated  steadily  to  the  western  land  of 
promise, — felt  a  genuine  sympathy  and 
interest  in  the  success  of  the  great  demo 
cratic  experiment,  a  sympathy  which  was 
far  deeper  and  more  effective  than  had  been 
that  of  the  eighteenth-century  Whigs.  From 
the  moment  that  these  classes  made  their 
weight  felt  in  government,  the  time  was  at 
hand  when  the  old  social  antagonism  was 
to  die  out,  and  with  it  the  deep  political 
antipathy  which,  since  the  days  of  1793,  had 
tinged  the  official  British  opinion  of  a  demo- 


248    ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  WARS 

cratic  state.  The  last  evidence  of  the  Tory 
point  of  view  came  when,  in  1861,  the  Ameri 
can  Civil  War  brought  out  the  unconcealed 
aversion  of  the  British  nobility  and  aristoc 
racy  for  the  northern  democracy;  but  on 
this  occasion  the  equally  unconcealed  sense  of 
political  and  social  sympathy  manifested  by 
the  British  middle  and  working  classes  served 
to  prevent  any  danger  to  the  United  States 
and  to  keep  England  from  aiding  in  the  dis 
ruption  of  the  Union.  Thus  the  Treaty  of 
Ghent,  marking  the  removal  of  immediate 
causes  of  irritation,  was  the  beginning  of  a 
period  in  which  the  underlying  elements  of 
antagonism  between  England  and  the  United 
States  were  definitely  to  cease. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  references  to  the  epoch  covered  in  this  volume  may 
be  rather  sharply  divided  into  those  which  deal  with  the 
years  before  1783,  and  those  which  relate  to  the  subsequent 
period.  In  the  first  group  there  are  both  English  and  Ameri 
can  works  of  high  excellence,  but  in  the  second  there  are  practi 
cally  none  but  American  authorities,  owing  to  the  preoccupa 
tion  of  all  English  writers  with  the  enormously  more  dramatic 
and  important  French  revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  wars, 
or  with  the  events  of  parliamentary  politics. 

For  the  years  1763-1783  the  best  American  history  is  E. 
CHANNING,  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  iii  (1912),  dis 
tinctly  independent,  thorough  and  impartial.  S.  G.  FISHER, 
The  Struggle  for  American  Independence,  2  vols.  (1908),  is 
cynically  critical  and  unconventional.  Three  volumes  of  the 
American  Nation  series,  —  G.  E.  HOWARD,  Preliminaries  of  the 
Revolution:  C.  H.  VAN  TYNE,  The  American  Revolution;  and 
A.  C.  MCLAUGHLIN,  The  Confederation  and  the  Constitution 
(1905),  are  equally  scholarly  and  less  detailed.  The  older 
American  works,  exhibiting  the  traditional  "patriotic"  view, 
are  best  represented  by  J.  FISKE,  American  Revolution,  2  vols. 
(1891);  and  G.  BANCROFT,  History  of  the  United  States,  6  vols. 
(ed.  1883-1885).  On  the  English  side  the  most  valuable 
study  is  in  W.  E.  H.  LECKY,  England  in  the  XVIII  Century, 
vol.  iii,  iv  (1878),  a  penetrating  and  impartial  analysis.  The 
English  Whig  view  appears  in  SIR  G.  O.  TREVELYAN,  The 
American  Revolution,  3  vols.  (1899-1907);  LORD  MAHON, 
England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vols.  v-vii  (1853-1854) ; 
and  M.  MARKS,  England  and  America,  2  vols.  (1907),  while 
W.  HUNT,  Political  History,  1760-1801  (1905),  alone  of  recent 
writers,  presents  a  Tory  version  of  events. 

Special  works  of  value  are  C.  STEDMAN,  The" American  War, 
2  vols.  (1794),  the  authoritative  English  contemporary  ac 
count  of  military  events,  and,  among  recent  studies,  J.  W. 
FORTESCUE,  History  of  the  British  Army,  vol.  iii  (1902),  which 
should  be  compared  with  H.  B.  CARRINGTON,  Battles  of  the 
Revolution  (1876);  E.  MC€RADY,  South  Carolina  in  the  Revo 
lution,  2  vols.  (1901-2);  E.  J.  LOWELL,  The  Hessians  in  the 
Revolution  (1884);  J.  B.  PERKINS,  France  in  the  American 


250         BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Revolution  (1911);  C.  H.  VAN  TYNE,  The  Loyalists  (1902),  and 
W.  HERTZ,  The  Old  Colonial  System  (1905).  Of  especial  value 
are  the  destructive  criticisms  in  C.  F.  ADAMS,  Studies  Mill- 
tary  and  Diplomatic  (1911).  The  authoritative  treatment  of 
naval  history  is  found  in  A.  T.  MAHAN,  Influence  of  Sea  Power 
(1890),  and  in  the  chapter  by  the  same  writer  in  W.  L. 
CLOWES,  History  of  the  Royal  Navy,  vol.  iii,  iv  (1898-1899). 

Among  leading  biographies  are  those  of  Washington  by 
H.  C.  LODGE  (2  vols.  1890),  by  W.  C.  FORD  (2  vols.  1900), 
and  by  GEN.  B.  T.  JOHNSON  (1894);  of  Franklin  by  J.  PAR- 
TON  (2  vols.  1864),  by  J.  BIGELOW  (3  vols.  1874),  and  by  J.  T. 
MORSE  (1889);  of  Henry  by  M.  C.  TYLER  (1887);  of  Samuel 
Adams  by  J.  K.  HOSMER  (1885);  of  Robert  Morris  by  E.  P. 
OBERHOLZER  (1903),  and  of  Steuben  by  F.  KAPP  (1859).  On 
the  English  side  the  Memoirs  of  Horace  Walpole  (1848);  the 
Correspondence  of  George  III  with  Lord  North,  ed.  by  W.  B. 
DONNE  (1867),  are  valuable  and  interesting,  and  some  material 
may  be  found  in  the  lives  of  Burke  by  T.  MCKNIGHT  (2  vols. 
1858) ;  of  Shelburne  by  E.  G.  FITZMAURICE  (2  vols.  1875) ;  of 
Chathamjby  F.  HARRISON  (1905)  and  A.  VON  RUVILLE  (3  vols. 
1907);  and  of  Fox  by  LORD  JOHN  RUSSELL  (3  vols.  1859). 
The  biographies  of  two  governors  of  Massachusetts,  C.  A. 
POWNALL,  Thomas  Pownall  (1908),  and  J.  K.  HOSMER,  Thomas 
Hutchinsom(l896'),  are  of  special  value'as  presenting  the  colonial 
Tory  viewpoint. 

For  the  period  after  1783  the  best  reference  and  the  only 
one  which  attempts  to  trace  in  detail  the  motives  of  English 
as  well  as  American  statesmen  is  HENRY  ADAMS,  History  of 
the  United  States,  9  vols.  (1891).  It  is  impartially  critical,  in 
a  style  of  sustained  and  caustic  vivacity.  Almost  equally 
valuable  is  A.  T.  MAHAN,  Sea  Power  in  Relation  to  the  War  of 
1812,  2  vols.  (1905)  which  contains  the  only  sympathetic 
analysis  of  British  naval  and  commercial  policy,  1783-1812, 
beside  being  the  authoritative  work  on  naval  happenings. 
The  standard  American  works  are  J.  SCHOULER,  History  of 
the  United  States,  vols.  i,  ii  (1882);  J.  B.  McMASTER, 
History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  vols.  i-iv  (1883- 
1895);  R.  HILDRETH,  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  ii-vi 
(1849-1852),  and  three  volumes  of  the  American  Nation 
Series,  J.  S.  BASSETT,  The  Federalist  System;  E.  CHANNING, 
The  Jeffersonian  System,  and  K.  C.  BABCOCK,  Rise  of  American 
Nationality  (1906).  On  the  English  side  there  is  practically 
nothing  in  the  general  histories  beyond  a  chapter  on  American 
relations  in  A.  ALISON,  Modern  Europe,  vol.  iv  (1848),  which 
accurately  represents  the  extreme  Tory  contempt  for  the 
United  States  but  has  no  other  merit.  Works  on  Canadian 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE         251 

history  fill  this  gap  to  a  certain  extent,  such  as  W.  KINGS- 
FORD,  History  of  Canada,  vol.  viii  (1895). 

Beside  the  work  of  Mahan  (as  above)  the  War  of  1812  is 
dealt  with  by  W.  JAMES,  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,  vols. 
v-vi.  (1823),  a  work  of  accuracy  as  to  British  facts  but  of 
violent  anti- American  temper;  and  on  the  other  side  by  J.  F. 
COOPER,  Naval  History  (1856),  and  T.  ROOSEVELT,  Naval  War 
of  1812  (1883).  Sundry  special  works  dealing  with  economic 
and  social  questions  involved  in  international  relations  are  T. 
ROOSEVELT,  Winning  of  the  West,  4  vols.  (1899-1902);  W. 
CUNNINGHAM,  Growth  of  English  Industry  and  Commerce,  vol. 
iii  (1893),  and  W.  SMART,  Economic  Annals  of  the  Nineteenth 
Century  (1910).  Biographical  material  is  to  be  found,  hi  the 
lives  of  Washington  (as  above) ;  of  Jefferson  by  J.  SCHOULER, 
(1897),  and  J.  T.  MORSE  (1883);  of  Hamilton  by  J.  T. 
MORSE  (1882),  and  F.  S.  OLIVER  (1907);  of  Gallatin  by  H. 
ADAMS  (1879);  of  Madison  by  G.  HUNT,  (1903);  of  Josiah 
Quincy  by  E.  QUINCY  (1869).  There  is  some  biographical 
material  to  be  found  in  BROUGHAM'S  Life  and  Times  of  Lord 
Brougham,  vol.  iii  (1872),  and  in  S.  WALPOLE,  Life  of  Spencer 
Perceval,  2  vols.  (1874),  but  for  the  most  part  the  English  ver 
sion  of  relations  with  America  after  1783  is  still  to  be  dis 
covered  only  in  the  contemporary  sources  such  as  the  Parlia 
mentary  History  and  Debates,  the  Annual  Register,  and  the 
partly  published  papers  of  such  leaders  as  Pitt,  Fox,  Grenville, 
Canning,  Castlereagh  and  Perceval. 

Documents  and  other  contemporary  material  for  the  whole 
period  may  be  conveniently  found  in  W.  MACDONALD,  Select 
Charters  (1904)  and  Select  Documents  (1898) ;  in  G.  CALLEN- 
DER,  Economic  History  of  the  United  States  (1909),  and  A.  B. 
HART,  American  History  told  by  Contemporaries,  vols.  ii,  iii 
(1898,  1901). 


INDEX 


Adams,  John,  in  Revolution,  48,  57, 
63,  71,  73,  118-124;  after  1783, 
142,  147,  155,  173-180 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  237-241 

Adams,  Samuel,  32,  41,  50,  57,  63, 
78,  131,  143 

Adet,  P.  A.,  172,  173 

Administrative  weakness,  78,  80, 
88,  131,  217,  232 

Alexander  I,  189,  236,  237 

Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,  176-180 

Antagonism,  of  England  and  Amer 
ica,  9-28,  243-248 

Anti-Federalists,  141,  143,  147 

Armstrong,  John,  223-230 

Army,  American,  64,  79,  80,  84-87, 
107,  134,  177,  218-223,  228,  233 

Army,  British,  76,  216,  227,  230, 
231 

Arnold,  Benedict,  67,  81,  85,  104 

Baltimore,  84,  229,  238,  240 

Bank  of  the  United  States,  144, 146, 

183,  218 

Banks,  State,  218,  232,  233 
Barbary  States,  184 
Baring,  Alexander,  212,  237 
Bayard,  James  A.,  237,  239 
Beaumarchais,  Caron  de,  94 
Bedford,  Duke  of,  46,  60 
Bills  of  Credit,  30,  31,  64,  106,  133, 

137,  138 
Blockade,  in  Revolution,  95,  108; 

in  1812,  216,  223,  226,  229 
Board  of  Trade,  23,  26,  27,  31,  43 
Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  American  re 
lations,  179,  184-186;  and  Ameri 
can  commerce,  189-197,  202-208, 
213-215,  227,  236,  243 
Boston,  27,  46-58,  61-66 
Boundaries,  118,  121,  122,  156 
Brock,  General  Isaac,  220,  221 
Brougham,  Henry,  212 
Brown,  General  Jacob,  228 
Bunker  Hill,  Battle  of,  64,  65,  78,  83 
Burgoyne,    General    John,    89-95, 

113,  114 
Burke,  Edmund,  52,  60,  68,  73,  74, 

96,  115,  161,  165 
Burr,  Aaron,  179,  180,  185 


Camden,  Battle  of,  102 
Canada,  British  policy  in,  29,  54, 
67,  72,  81,  85,  100,  118,  122,  127, 

154,  157,  158,  200,  209,  210;  de 
fence  of,  214-229,  239,  241,  244 

Canning,  George,  197,  201,  204,  207, 

212 

Carleton,  General  Guy,  81,  85,  157 
Carolina,  North,  67,  104,  136,  141 
Carolina,  South,  21,  23,  102,  103, 
P-109,  160 
Champlain,  Lake,  in  Revolution,  62, 

67,  81,  85,  89;  in  1812-1815,  214- 

229;  239,  241,  244 
Charleston,    South    Carolina,    102, 

110,  112,  126,  160 
Chauncey,  Commodore  Isaac,  225, 

228 
Chesapeake  Bay,  89,  109-112,  226, 

229 

Church  of  England,  17, 18 
Clark,  George  Rogers,  100,  105 
Clay,  Henry,  211,  214,  239,  241 
Clinton,  DeWitt,  214 
Clinton,  George,  147,  169 
Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  91,  99-103, 108- 

113 
Colonies,  Sentiment  of,  10,  14-20, 

27,  31-33,  41-45,  49,  56,  74 
Commerce,  American,  before  Inde 
pendence,  21,  23-25,  31,  80,  95, 

108;  after   1783,  132,   133,     149, 

155,  163,    167,    190-194;  during 
war  of  1812,  222,  226,  243,  245 

Commercial  Policy,  British,  20-25, 
154-161,  166,  192-204,  236,  245 

Commons,  House  of,  10,  11,  37,  38, 
41,45,60,97,  115,  116,  153 

Conciliatory   Propositions,    61,    64, 


Concord,  Battle  of,  61,  78 
Confederation,     Articles     of,     105, 

129-135 
Congress,  Continental,  66,  57,  60, 

63,  64,  70,  71,  78,  80,  84,  87-93, 

97,  104,  105,  118,  130 
Congress  of  the  Confederation,  108, 

124,  126,  130-138,  141,  157 
Congress,     United     States,     under 

Federalists,    140-145,    155,    163, 


252 


INDEX 


253 


172,175,177;  under  Republicans, 
182,  186,  187,  195,  199-208,  211, 
213,  219,f223,  227,  233,  234 
Congresses,  Provincial,  58,  62,  87 
Connecticut,  100,  134,  136,  139 
Constitution,   United   States,   139- 

141,  159,  180,  183,  234 
Constitutions,  State,  87,  130 
Contempt,   of  English  for   Ameri 
cans,  62,  53,  151-155,  197,  204, 
208,  215,  222,  236,  247,  248 
Convention,   Annapolis,   137;  Phil 
adelphia,  139-141 
Cornwallis,  Lord,  86,  102-113 
Corruption,  in  British  government, 

10-12,  35,  47, 115 

Crown,  British,  11,  15,  16,  42,  115 
Customs,  Commissioners  of,  41,  46, 

Dartmouth,  Earl  of,  47,  59 
Debts,  British,  123,  158,  166 
Declaration  of  Independence,  71,  98 
Decrees,  of  Napoleon,  196, 197,  202- 

208 

De  Grasse,  Admiral,  110-112,  125 
Delaware,  15,  139 
Delaware  Bay,  89-91,  226 
D'Estaing,  Admiral,  99-101 
Detroit,  100,  220,  225 
Dickinson,  John,  42,  50,  57,  64,  105 
Directorate,  French,  171-173, 184 

East  India  Company,  9,  48,  50-53 
Elections,    Presidential,    142,    147, 

173,  178-181,  187,  201,  214 
Embargo,  164,  199-203 
England,     Sentiment     of,    toward 
Colonies,  19,  26,  27,  31,  34,  37, 
44-46,  50-53,   60;  during  Revo 
lution,  70-75,  114,  125,  128;  after 
1783,  148-152,  159-170,  175, 176, 
181, 189-192;  during  French  wars, 
19-1-208,  211-215;  in  war  of  1812, 
215,  216,  227,  232,  244 
Erie,  Lake,  Battle  of,  225 
Erskine,  David  M.,  204,  205 
Excise,  145,  164,  169,  183,  223 

Fauchet,  J.  A.,  162,  172 

Federalist  Party,  origin,  141-148; 
in  power,  161,  164,  167-170,  174- 
181;  in  opposition,  183,  187,  200- 
206,  213,  214,  218-223,  232-236 

Finances,  of  Revolution,  16,  64,  106, 
123,  133-135;  under  Federalists, 
144-146;  under  Republicans,  182, 
191,  218-220,  227,  232,  233 

Fisheries,  121,  122,  239,  241 


Florida,  29,  99,  122,  125,  1£8,  194 
Fox,   Charles  James,   96,   115-121, 

152,  152,  165,  193 

France,  in  American  Revolution,  93, 

94,  97,   108,   117-122,   126,   155, 
156;  Revolution  in,  159-163, 166; 
relations  with  United  States,  168- 
179,    184-186;   under    Napoleon, 
189-194,  197,  201-204,  244 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  in  England,  38, 
44,  51,  52,  64;  in  France,  71,  83, 
93,  94,  106,  118-124 

Fur  Trade,  157,  158,  244 

Gage,  General  Thomas,  58,  61,  64- 

66 

Gallatin,  Albert,  182,  237,  239,  241 
Gates,  General  Horatio,  79,  89,  91, 

92,  102 

Genet,  Edmond  C.,  161-162 

George  III,  accession  of,  12,  34-40; 

opposes  Americans,  45,  47,  57,  60, 

63,  71,  74,  77,  96-99;  in  English 

politics,  115,  116,  119,  128,  162, 

153,  197 
Georgia,  51,  60,  101 

Germaine,  Lord  George,  58,  75,  77, 

88,  114 

Ghent,  Negotiations,  238-244 
Gibraltar,  99,  114,  122,  125 
Governors,  Colonial,  15-17,  26,  27, 

44,  62,  71 

Grafton,  Duke  of,  39,  40,  47 
Great  Lakes,  122,  158,  223-228,  244 
Greene,  General  Nathaniel,  79,  84, 

103,  104,  108 

Grenville,  George,  28,  30,  35,  44,  53 
Grenville,  William,  Lord,  165,  171, 

193,  198,  203 
Guilf ord  Court  House,  Battle  of,  108 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  132, 134, 144- 

147,  162,  163,  168,  177,  179,  188 
Harrison,  General  W.  H.,  210,  211, 

221-225 

Hartford  Convention,  234 
Hatred,  American,  for  England,  101, 

160,  209,  246 
Henry,  Patrick,  32,  42,  50,  57,  78, 

131,  143    » 

Hessians,  68,  69,  82,  86,  92 
Hillsborough,  Lord,  43-53 
Howe,  Admiral,  82,  83,  100,  114 
Howe,  General  Sir  William,  82-92, 

95,  113,  114 

Hudson  River,  83,  84,  89,  91,  100 
Hull,  General  William,  220 
Hutchinson,  Governor  Thomas,  49, 

n 


254 


INDEX 


Impressments,    193-199,   205,   213, 

214,  239-243 
Indiana,  210,  221,  244 

Indians,  of  Northwest,  British 
policy  toward,  29,  100,  157,  158, 
164,  167;  in  war  of  1812,  209- 
213,  218-225,  238-240,  244 

Indians,  Southwestern,  157,  167, 
210,  224,  228,  229 

Jackson,  Andrew,  224,  228,  231,  242 
Jay,  John,  42,  57, 118, 120-124,  156, 

157,  164-167,  171 
Jefferson,  Thomas,  in  Revolution, 
71,  78;  Republican  leader,  143- 
147,  155,  161,  169-173,  178,  180; 
President,  181-188, 193-196, 199- 
203,  209,  212-217,  235,  236 

Kentucky,  157,  178,  185,  211,  220, 

221 

King's  Friends,  89,  43,  153 
King's  Mountain,  Battle  of,  103 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  102 
Lee,  General  Charles,  79,  84,  99 
Lee,  Richard  Henry,  57,  143 
Legislatures,  of  colonies,  15,  16,  26, 
30,  32,  41-45,  71,  74;  of  states, 
87,  130-136,  145,  158,  201 
Livingston,  Robert  R.,  124,  186 
Long  Island,  Battle  of,  82,  83 
Louis  XVI,  93,  94,  155 
Louisiana,  184-186,  194 
Loyalty,  English  and  American,  18- 
20,  27,  50,  57,  70,  72-74 

Mackinac,  220,  233,  240 
Macon  Bill  No.  2,  206,  207 
Madison,  James,  Federalist  leader, 
132,     134,     142-144;  Republican 
leader,   146,   147,   162,   164,   172, 
178, 193;  President,  201-208,  212- 

215,  229,  233-239 
Maine,  67,  122,  192,  238,  240 
Manufacturers,  British,  20,  21,  132, 

195,  201,  212,  213,  243 
Maryland,  15,  62,  100, 105, 135, 139, 

192,  214 
Massachusetts,  41,  45,  46,  51,  58- 

61,  122,  135,  137, 141 
Military  Policy,  American,  27,  66, 

79,  80,  84,  87,  107,  218,  224,  233, 

235 
Military  Policy,  British,  77,  85,  88, 

92,  94,  99,  108,  112,  113,  216,  229, 

238 
Militia,   American,   61,   62,  77-85, 

164,  220-222 


Ministries,  British,  Bute,  35,  40; 
Grenville,  28,  35,  43;  First  Roek- 
ingham,  36,  39;|iGrafton,  39-45; 
North,  47-56,  60,  67-77,  88,  95- 
98,  114-117,  151;  Second  Rock- 
ingham,  117,  119;  Shelburne,  119- 

125,  152,    154;     Coalition,    125, 

126,  152-154;  Pitt,  153,  154,  159, 
163-170;     Addington,    171;    Sec 
ond    Pitt,    171,    192,    193;  Lord 
Grenville,    193,    196,    197;  Port 
land,    197,    201,    207;  Perceval, 
207,     211-215;  Liverpool,     212- 
216,  237-241 

Mississippi  River,  105, 122,  157,  229 
Mississippi,  Navigation  of,  123,  156, 

157,  168,  184,  241 
Monroe,  James,  172,  173,  186,  195, 

196 
Montgomery,  General  Richard,  67, 

Montreal,  67,  226 
Morgan,  Daniel,  67,  89,  104 
Morris,  Robert,  78,  106,  133,  134 

Navigation  Acts,  22-24,  29,  38,  55, 

71,  132,  149,  152,  154 
Navy,  American,  164,  175,  217,  219, 

222-226,  228,  230,  232,  242 
Navy,  British,  in  Revolution,  75,  98, 

99;  in  French  wars,  162,  189,  190, 

198,   199;  in   war   of   1812,   216, 

222-232,  242 
Neutral  Commerce,   163,  191,  198, 

215 
New  England,  14,  15,  17,  21,  25,  60, 

62, 84, 108, 197-201,  223,  227,  229 
New  Hampshire,  136-138 
New  Jersey,  83-89,  100,  139 
New  Orleans,   168,   184,  229,  231, 

238,  242,  243 

Newport,  100,  102,  109,  110 
New  York,  41,  42,  60,  71,  88,  105, 

135-141,  147,  169,  185,  214,  230, 

238 
New  York  City,  33,  81-84,  91,  92, 

99-102,  110,  112,  126,  179 
Niagara  River,  220,  221,  228,  240 
Non-importation    Agreements,    36, 

42,  200 

Non-importation  Act,  195-199 
Non-intercourse  Act,  202,  206,  213 
North,   Lord,   Tory  leader,   43-55, 

60,  61,  73-75;  in  Revolutionary 

war,  77,  96,  97,  115-117,  152 
Northwest  Territory,  105,  136,  158 

Ohio,  158,  159,  185,  211,  220,  221 
Orders  in  Council,   193,   197,   198, 
204,  207,  211-214,  243-246 


INDEX 


255 


Oswald,  Richard,  119-121 
Otis,  James,  27,  32 

Parliament,  during  Revolution,  10, 

12,  25,  35-38,  42,  46,  52,  55-61, 

68,    72,    75,    96,    114-116;  after 

1783,  121,  154,  203,  212,  237,  247 

Peaceful   Coercion,   194,   195,   202, 

206,  208,  213 
Pennsylvania,  15,  38,  51,  62,  71,  90, 

100,  110,  136,  164,  185,  187,  214 
Perceval,  Spenser,  197,  207,  212 
Perry,  Commander  O.  H.,  224 
Philadelphia,  56,  84-92,  99,  137 
Pinckney,  C.  C.,  173,  174 
Pitt,  William,  Earl  of  Chatham,  9, 

36,  38-40,  52,  60,  96-98 
Pitt,   William,    144,    148,   152-154, 

171,  176,  189,  192 
Plattsburg,  Battle  of,  230,  240,  243 
Political   Ideals,  American,  14,  18, 
81,  37-39,  49,  55,  74,  78,  107, 129, 
130,  135-138,  143-148,  168,  169, 
181,  195,  235 

Pownall,  Thomas,  41,  46,  52 
Prevost,  Sir  George,  230,  231,  234 
Privateers,    American,     108,     160- 

162,  217,  222,  232 
Proclamation  of  1763,  30,  122 
Proctor,  Colonel  Henry,  221,  225 

Quasi-War,  175,  178,  179 
Quebec,  57,  67,  80 
Quebec  Act,  54,  56 

Raiding  Policy,  British,  99-104, 109, 

110,  124 

Randolph,  Edmund,  162,  164,  172 
Reign  of  Terror,  French,  159,  161 
Representatives,  House  of,  162,  164, 

180,  211 
Republican  party,  origin,  144-148, 

162,  164,  169-175;  in  power,  181- 

183,  201,  203,  208-211,  236 
Restraining  Acts,  60,  68,  74 
Rhode  Island,  15,  48,  102,  138,  141 
Rights  of  Colonists,  33,  37,  42,  57, 

71 
Rochambeau,  Comte  de,  102,  110, 

112 

Rockingham,  Marquis  of,  117,  119 
Rule  of  1756, 163,  166,  190,  192,  204 
Rutledge,  John,  67,  78,  83 

St.  Clair,  General  Arthur,  159 
St.  Leger,  Colonel  B.,  89,  90 
San  Domingo,  156,  185,  186 
Sandwich,  Earl  of,  53,  68,  75,  77,  98, 

114 
Saratoga,  Surrender  at,  91 


Savannah,  101,  110,  112 
Scott,  Sir  William,  192 
Sea-Power,    French,    98-101,    109- 

112,  114 

Secession,  187,  201,  234,  235 
Sedition  Act,  176-178,  180 
Seizures,  British,  162,  163,  166,  200, 

202,  243 
Seizures,  French,  173,  174,  202,  205, 

Senate,  United  States,  167, 179, 186, 

196,  242 

Shays'  Rebellion,  137 

Sheffield,  Lord,  150,  151,  154,  191, 

197,  245 

Shelburne,  Earl  of,   117-123,   152- 

154 

Sherman,  Roger,  78,  134 
Shipowners,  British,  191-193,  201, 

215 

Smuggling,  Colonial,  24,  25 
Spain,  in  Revolution,  98,  108,  117- 

122;  diplomatic    relations,     157- 

159,  168,  185,  186,  194,  215,  227 
Stamp  Act,  30-33,  200 
States,  American,  78,  80,  87,  104, 

106,  140 

States  Rignts,  146,  178,  234 
Stephen,  James,  191,  197,  207,  245 
Sugar  Act,  25,  29,  31 
Supreme  Court,  187 

Talleyrand,  174,  177 
Tarleton,  Colonel  B.,  103,  110 
Taxation,  Parliamentary,  33,  86-38 
Tea-Party,  Boston,  47-50 
Tecumseh,  210,  211,  220-225 
Tennessee,  158,  185,  211,  224 
Ticonderoga,  Fort,  62,  81,  89 
Tories,    American,    in    Revolution, 
59,   63-73,  89,   100-104,   110;  in 
treaty  of,  1783,  123-127,  147,  158 
Tories,  English,  12,  39,  43-48;  op 
ponents  of  colonies,  56,  72,  73,  96, 
97,  113-117;  in  control,  121,  151, 
152, 165, 170, 171, 176;  unfriendly 
to  United  States,   197-208,  212, 
215,  236,  238,  240,  247 
Townshend,  Charles,  40-43 
Townshend  Duties,  40-47,  200 
Treaties,  1763,  9,  28;  1778,  95,  98; 
1783,     117-126,     149-152,     158; 
1794,    164-172;  193,    196;    1795, 
168,  184;    1803,  186;    1814,  242; 
1818,  244 

Trenton,  Battle  of,  86,  112 
Triangular  Trade,  24,  25,  31,  132 

Union  of  Colonies,  63,  73,  79 
United   States,   in   diplomacy,   94, 


256 


INDEX 


117-120,  132;  under  Federalists, 
139-160,  165,  166,  170-180; 
under  Republicans,  182,  186, 190- 
200,  208,  209,  213-217,  227,  232, 
238,  242-248 

Valley  Forge,  92,  106 

Vergennes,  Cointe  de,  93-95,  118- 

125 

Vermont,  136,  214,  238 
Virginia,  in  Revolution,  46,  67,  100- 

105,   109,  110;    after    1783,  135- 

147,  177,  178 

Wars,  French  and  Indian,  9,  26,  27; 

of     Revolution,      75-113;     with 

France,  175, 177;  of  1812,215-235 
Washington  City,  229,  230,  238 
Washington,   George,   Commander, 

42,  57,  64,  66,  79-92,  99, 100,  107- 

112,  126;  in  retirement,  132,  134; 

President,  142-147,  159-164,  167, 

172,  173,  178 
Wayne,  General  Anthony,  79,  159, 

164 
Wellington,  Duke  of,  241,  243 


West,  Frontier  spirit  in,  209,  214, 
218 

West  India  Planters,  25,  150,  167, 
191  | 

West  Indies,  British,  before  1783, 
9,  21-27,  99-101,  108,  110,  112, 
125;  after  1783,  132,  149-155, 
166,  167,  245,  246 

West  Indies,  French,  trade  with, 
25,  27,  81,  156,  163,  167,  190- 
192,  196 

Whig  Party,  British,  in  control,  12, 
13,  35-40;  defenders  of  colonists, 
44-46,  51,  52,  60,  61,  68,  69,  73, 
96,  97,  113-117,  120,  121;  in  op 
position,  152,  165,  196,  198,  203, 
236,  247 

Whig  Party,  in  colonies,  56-63,  67, 
178 

Wilkes,  John,  44,  45 

Wilkinson,  General  James,  225,  228 

X.  Y.  Z.  affair,  174,  175 

Yorktown,  Surrender  at,  111,  113, 
116, 160 


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